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  4El Hassan bin Talal 
Preface 
The publication of the present volume is a welcome event, since discus-
sions of culture are all too often lacking from policymaking today. Eco-
nomic and political measures are necessary for human welfare and to build 
communities; but economic and political security alone do not add up to 
human security. The Barcelona Process has not, unfortunately, delivered in 
this respect. The third dimension, culture, must be included – the individ-
ual’s memory and expectations of his or her human dignity, group identity, 
aesthetic traditions and unique history. 
We are surrounded, at the beginning of a new millennium, by talk of a 
‘clash of civilisations’. It is easy to forget that global technology and com-
munications now link us together as a single world civilisation in which 
‘clashes of cultures’ can and should be avoided – by discovering and build-
ing upon common values. As the contributions below indicate, the role of 
culture in political systems around the ‘Greater Mediterranean’ embraces 
more than administrative and legislative distinctions thought to result from 
cultural differences. We ought also to be prepared to see how different in-
stitutions and codes of conduct have arisen in different times and places to 
address the same perennial challenges: fair distribution of resources, family 
and social obligations, property ownership, help for the poor, availability of 
technology, protection of the weak, control of the strong, recording experi-
ence and tradition.  
Throughout history the Mediterranean basin has been the scene of territo-
rial, political and sectarian conflicts between rivals for control, whether 
empires, dynasties, regimes, theocracies; nevertheless the societies and 
populations that inhabited its shores and hinterlands, south and north, west 
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and east, have never ceased to share ways of cultivating the land and the 
sea, to develop common technologies, to exchange not only their products 
but also their ideas – in short to create a modus vivendi that can be called 
‘Mediterranean culture’ in its broadest sense.  They now share a long and 
well-documented history of exchange and coexistence that can serve as a 
useful model for approaching and understanding other terrae mediae. Our 
differences remind us that there may be more than one way to address simi-
lar problems that reflect common concerns. 
Today, unless we find more and better ways to exchange ideas, experiences 
and skills among cultures, we risk not just historical misunderstanding but 
disaster. I would like to see a ‘School of Mediterranean Humanities’ in 
which to broaden the horizons of Euro-Mediterranean thinking and begin to 
see our neighbours in terms of shared histories and the expression of iden-
tical values in diverse languages. Only in this way can we begin to move 
from a culture of mere coexistence and survival to a culture of cooperation 
and peacefulness, not only along the Mediterranean littoral but around the 
world. 
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Introduction 
Does culture matter? What a strange question to ask since it seems to be so 
obvious that it does, in everyday life as well as in politics and in the daily 
business of governing a country. The sultan of Oman rules over his country 
by traveling, with his huge tent, from one assembly of men to another, giv-
ing advice on local affairs and trying to resolve disputes that have arisen 
between different sections of the local community. Contrast this to how a 
German city such as Bonn, is ruled. We will certainly find some interesting 
parallels, especially when it comes to the role of dispute resolution, but we 
will also find striking differences that we can easily attribute to different 
political cultures; different ways to understand and define what a govern-
ment is supposed to do, different notions of the limits of its power, and 
completely different ideas when it comes to determining who is entitled to 
rule and who is not. 
As soon as we go beyond such contrasting images, however, and the 
stereotyping associated with them, the issue becomes much more compli-
cated. This is why we have put a question mark behind "culture matters". 
Just how much of the differences in politics can we attribute to cultural dif-
ferences and how deep these differences truly reach is a matter of debate. 
Can we go as far as to say that certain systems of values are not compatible 
with certain political institutions? These questions are not only of academic 
concern. They are politically burning, considering, for example, the debate 
on Asian values. Some authors and politicians maintained that Western 
style democracy is not able to flourish on the soil of a Confucian culture of 
authoritarianism. The recent transition to a democracy in Taiwan, however, 
has caught many adherents of the culture-matters-thesis by surprise. 
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The link between culture and governance too, needs a question mark. It is 
by no means sure that a transparent system of government, tightly follow-
ing the rules of law and avoiding favouritism and corruption, is only possi-
ble where Protestantism or some equivalent of it provides the norms for 
such behaviour. And we do not know enough on how stable and resistant to 
change everyday cultures of bureaucratic behaviour are. Consider a sheep 
herder in Eastern Anatolia. He usually does not come into touch with gov-
ernment officials, because he still manages to live the independent live of a 
villager. However, his son wants to study and to become a white collar 
worker. In order to get admitted, the father presents a sheep to the director 
of the high school who gladly accepts the present. Is this a traditional cul-
ture of reciprocity transferred into the modern school setting, where it re-
sists change? Or is handing over and accepting the sheep a rational transac-
tion, easy to abandon, as soon as the director of the school can choose 
pupils on a different basis then on the gifts received, for example on the 
basis of a nation-wide system of exams? 
The debate on Asian values and the example of the sheep growing man 
speak to the issue of culture in politics and in governance. They are not 
only important in development research, but also for development practice. 
If culture matters, then it should be taken into account by development 
agencies, which is not the case today. Donor countries should not insist on 
democratisation or on good governance in their co-operation programmes 
with developing nations. They should be much more culturally sensitive, 
respecting different, non-Western modes of running a government and or-
ganising politics. "We", mostly Western donors, should abstain from de-
manding from "other" peoples what "their cultures" inhibit them to do or 
we should help them change their cultures first, not their system of gov-
ernment.  
The questions not only touch central concerns of the Southern Hemisphere, 
but also of the North, and more specifically of Europe. They touch the heart 
of the European project. After the end of the Cold War, the definition of 
what holds the European Union together had to change. Expanding the Un-
ion eastwards very quickly raised the questions of the limits of this expan-
sionary movement and therefore also of what holds the different states on 
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this side of the line together. Will it be possible to include not only the ob-
vious Eastern European candidates, but countries with apparently different 
political cultures and styles of government? Will Turkey, to jump on the 
most hotly debated issue, one day be member of the European Union? Is 
the democratic instability and the poor human rights record of Turkey an 
expression of its political culture? Will this culture change with the pros-
pects of an integration into the European Union?  
Turkey is, obviously, not the only debate surrounding the enlargement is-
sue where the culture argument is common currency. The Southern borders 
of Europe have become a focus of this debate as well. Why exclude, some 
policy makers and academics have asked, the Southern rim of the Mediter-
ranean basin, from the European vision, when the oldest and perhaps most 
developed European civilisation, the Roman Empire, had integrated them? 
Are there fundamental cultural barriers between Spain, France, Italy, 
Greece on the one hand, and Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt 
and the Maghrebin countries on the other? Is Island closer to Spain in terms 
of political culture than Spain to Morocco? And if there are such funda-
mental differences at all, do they matter for politics and governance? 
Some of these questions and concerns are in the research focus of the Cen-
ter for European Integration Research (ZEI) and the Center for Develop-
ment Research (ZEF), both new research institutes of the University of 
Bonn. The Center for European Integration Research has initiated a re-
search and policy advice programme concerning the enlargement issue. 
Culture and identity are important aspects of this programme. The Center 
for Development Research is addressing the developmental aspects of the 
question of culture.  
The Mediterranean Basin is a region of common concern, the Center for 
Integration Research looking at it from the perspective of the North, the 
Center for Development Research from the South. Building on these over-
lapping research interests and regional foci, the two centers have organised, 
under the leadership of Dr. Zervakis and Dr. de Soysa, a conference which 
took place in June 2000. The following collections of essays is the fruit of 
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this common efforts and contains some of the main papers that were given 
at the conference.  
The events following September 11 2001 have given the questions ad-
dressed by this collection of essays a new dimension of actuality and ur-
gency. Exploring the commonalities and differences of the political cul-
tures North and South of the Mediterranean, largely corresponding to the 
Christian and the Muslim part of the old world, takes on a different mean-
ing now that some see a dividing line along these lines being reinforced 
through the attacks on the symbols of Western economic and political 
dominance. Given the politically burning nature of these questions, it is all 
the more important that research contributes with solid empirical arguments 
and careful analysis to the debate. This collection of articles is but a first 
and very modest step in this direction, mapping the territory of possible 
approaches and exploring some hypothesis on the relation between culture 
and politics in the Mediterranean. 
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Culture and Governance in the Mediter-
ranean: A Rationale and Overview 
In the past decade, there has been a ‘renaissance’ in the concept of culture 
as a crucial determining factor in political and economic life (Inglehart, 
1988). At the global level, the celebrated thesis of a ‘clash of civilizations’ 
propounded by Samuel P. Huntington has spurred much debate, a topic that 
has gained new life and urgency given the events of September 11
th, 2001.
1 
According to Huntington, the ideological schisms of the Cold War decades 
have given way to cultural schisms, particularly between the West and the 
‘rest.’ This thesis is not simply relevant to security, but it suggests that 
since the end of the Cold War, ‘the most important distinctions among peo-
ple is not ideological, political or economic … [but will be] cultural’ (Hunt-
ington, 1997, p.21). The renaissance of culture in political life has gained 
enormous popularity, partly as a result of Huntington’s bold thesis on cul-
tural incompatibilities as an aggravating force in social and political life. 
Cultural theories have not been accepted unequivocally, but in fact there 
has been a debate as old as the science of politics on the salience of cultural 
factors for understanding political life (Almond and Verba, 1963). Others 
have argued that culturalists have got it backwards, that institutions and 
performance themselves determine what some have come to define as ‘cul-
ture’ (Barry, 1970; Pateman, 1980).  
 
 
1   This conference took place three monts before the tragic events. The papers that follow uncannily 
address the current debates in many salient ways. 
 Indra de Soysa / Peter Zervakis 
 
There is continued debate in the social sciences as to the relative impor-
tance of culture as opposed to structure and the quality of formal institu-
tions, particularly state institutions, as the primary determinants of political 
outcomes (see Crothers and Lockhart, 2000). The World Bank (2000), as a 
leading agency of development is explicit, however. Regarding South-East 
Europe, it states that ‘good governance is more than luck and tradition.’ 
Given the ferment in the literature, ZEF’s interests in the developmental 
aspects of culture and ZEI’s interests in questions of European institution-
building, identity, enlargement, and the Mediterranean region presented a 
fortunate opportunity for jointly exploring the question of whether or not 
and to what degree culture (tradition) matters in politics and governance in 
the Mediterranean region, which encompasses Western and Southern 
Europe, North Africa, Near East and the western reaches of the Middle 
East.  
The Mediterranean region is geographically well placed for exploring the 
issue of culture and governance because of its importance and proximity to 
the European Union and because it contains a mixture of relevant distinct 
religious cultures such as Christianity (catholic, orthodox, protestant), Juda-
ism (liberal and orthodox), and Islam (orthodox and fundamentalist). More-
over, it contains distinct political systems such as liberal democracy of 
varying degrees, monarchies, and authoritarian regimes (civilian and mili-
tary). The Mediterranean region, perhaps more than any other, is the most 
proximate physical boundary demarcating the West and the Rest, or the so-
called faultline between the old Byzantine and Ottoman and Holy Roman 
empires. The issue of culture and governance becomes all the more salient 
given that the export of institutions from the EU and its successful adoption 
is a hallmark of the EU’s policy toward its neighbors, especially in the 
Mediterranean area, where countries of the region are participants in the 
Barcelona Process. This process after all is viewed as a preliminary step 
towards greater political integration of this region. Therefore, a major ob-
jective of the workshop was to examine, in light of the new debates on cul-
ture, whether or not and to what degree culture influences political life and 
thereby shapes patterns of governance in the Mediterranean region. The 
questions are not purely academic, but the answers to them hold important 
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policy lessons given the EU’s desire to see ‘European-style’ institutions 
and norms abroad for securing better governance. Moreover, if as some 
suggest, culture is the ‘software’ that drives society, what is really to be 
expected from exporting the ‘hardware’ of western-style, liberal democratic 
institutions? 
The opponents of the cultural position, mainly the rational choice perspec-
tive, argue that rational action is constant across cultures but is conditioned 
by the institutional (structural) constraints within which individuals make 
rational calculations. Such approaches are likelier to view institutions as 
being the defining factor of political life and of societal outcomes, whereas 
cultural factors may in fact be epiphenomena. As some institutional propo-
nents claim, however, culture determines the shape and form that institu-
tions assume, so that even institutions are to some extent culturally deter-
mined. On the other hand, institutions reflect the power interests of those 
making calculations that further self-interest, which is rationally deter-
mined. Moreover, institutions may create social conditions that change cul-
tural attitudes in turn. Others argue that social structures, such as the size of 
the middle class, structure of the economy, inherited colonial structures and 
social power configurations, not civilizational factors, determine cultural 
mores and norms, which change themselves with exogenously determined 
structural change. In an age of globalization, such change is bound to be 
rapid and affect other aspects of socio-political life. The rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism thus can be seen as a culture clash between those who feel 
threatened by those who seem to be rejecting the old ways, not between 
opposing civilizationally distinct peoples. The papers contained herein re-
flect some of the confusion surrounding these intertwined questions, par-
ticularly the stubborn problem of defining precisely what one means when 
one describes one or another facet of human action as ‘cultural.’ Debates 
on what exactly entails culture and tradition and who determines them are 
far from being resolved even today, despite many cautionary warnings 
about the pitfalls of relying on culture (see Elkins and Simeon, 1979). 
Some of the papers in this compilation pay close attention to specific coun-
tries and topics that highlight the importance or insignificance of cultural 
explanations in political outcomes. These papers examine the ways in 
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which culture manifests itself in political outcomes and in questions of 
governance. The authors explore issues they think highlight best the prob-
lems and prospects of cultural explanations over others, teasing out the 
theoretical implications of their particular cases. The concluding papers 
focus on drawing out the implications of cultural (mis)understanding for 
policy and the problems and prospects of improving crosscultural dialogue 
among the different cultural grouping in the region. 
This compilation of papers from the conference is designed broadly to 
achieve three objectives. First, a group of leading scholars try to conceptu-
alize the importance of culture in explaining political life. Secondly, some 
of the papers tackle concrete cases drawn from cases in the region. Thirdly, 
some scholars try to provide a regional view of the question of cultural 
communication and understanding across the divisions within the region. In 
the first section, Lawrence Harrison, a leading proponent of the importance 
of culture, suggests that much of what determines ‘successful democracy’ 
could be traced to cultural factors rather than others (institutions). How-
ever, it was pointed out that long-term structural change, such as that which 
took place in the Far East during the post-War years was conducive to 
bringing about democracy. Places such as the oil-wealthy Middle East, 
which has at least seen rising income, however, have been resilient to de-
mocratic change, a resilience attributed partly to culture. Mohammed Ark-
oun argues that Islam and Christianity had a common humanistic tradition 
in the Mediterranean region in the Middle Ages, and he shows that reli-
gious issues are instrumentalized by political motivations so as to create 
over time the current rift that exists in the popular mind about the antitheti-
cal aspects of Islam and Christianity. Contrary to cultural arguments, Klaus 
von Beyme is firm that culture matters less than formal political institutions, 
highlighting particularly lessons from German experience in Europe. 
Erich Weede traces the origins of the divergent paths followed by the West 
in contrast with the Islamic world. He argues that the schisms within Chris-
tianity allowed it to secularize and thereby solve the contradictions between 
religion and state, the individual and the state, which led to the prerequi-
sites that led to the rise of the West. Islam, on the other hand has held secu-
larization at bay, which is a reflection of the unity that exists between 
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church and state. He sees fragmentation within the Islamic world as inevi-
table and a force for breaking out of the stagnation. Ergun Özbudun looks 
at the concrete case of Turkey to demonstrate that Turkish political culture 
persists in shaping the Turkish political system, which has undergone sev-
eral efforts at reform. Despite political, institutional reforms aimed at mak-
ing Turkish politics more democratic and participatory, Turkish politics 
returns to similar patters of corruption and malgovernance, which he attrib-
utes to culture. Paul Salem points out that the Islamic world is less mono-
lithic in its political culture as commonly perceived. He points out that it is 
pluralistic but unable to accept the secularist, western democratic vision as 
has been the case elsewhere. As he points out, the political tensions and 
repression in the Arab world can be attributable to this internal schism in-
side the Arab world—in other words, a clash within the Arab civilization.  
Several of the papers bring an international relations perspective by exam-
ining the question salient to inter-regional interaction. Dimitris Xenakis and 
Dimitris Chryssochoou examine the evolving Euro-Mediterranean partner-
ship, pointing out the prospects and challenges of greater integration. They 
look closely at the differing understandings of the ‘Mediterranean space,’ 
between the growing Islamization in the East and the increasing phobia of 
Islam in the West. They conclude by noting that growing economic ties 
between states in the region could act as a moderating force on the cultur-
ally determined incompatibilities. Stephen Calleya examines the Barcelona 
Process, highlighting the success achieved thus far and suggesting the way 
forward in the future. He encourages more dialogue and the promotion of 
cultural, educational, and civil society contacts between the partners so as 
to overcome common misunderstandings between the peoples of the re-
gion. This theme is reinforced by Franck Biancheri, who looks at the ways 
in which the new technology of communication, particularly of the internet, 
can help in bringing together civil society for strengthening democracy and 
partnership in the region. Ludger Kühnhardt, finally, examines the fascinat-
ing historical development of the Mediterranean space and explores the is-
sue of whether or not and to what extent a common Mediterranean identity 
exists, suggesting that the Euro-Med dialogue serve as a springboard for 
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improving development cooperation and common-problem solving with 
important spillover effects into Northern Africa. 
As the papers demonstrate, the question of culture and political life is 
enormously messy. Yet culture is an important determinant of many socio-
political manifestations. The divisions in the debate as to the degree of im-
portance certainly will remain with us in so far as new insights and research 
findings are able to prove otherwise. In terms of the Mediterranean region, 
there is renewed urgency for cross-cultural understanding and cooperation 
to solve enduring problems in the social, economic, and political realms. It 
remains to be seen whether political forces can work towards undoing the 
damage that history has done in terms of destroying the common bonds that 
the Islamic Mediterranean world and the Christian one shared. We feel that 
these papers go some distance towards encouraging more understanding 
through scholarly reflection. 
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The Relevance of Culture in Democratic 
Governance – Lessons from the  
Western Hemisphere 
I am delighted to have the opportunity to discuss the role of culture in de-
mocratic governance, an issue that has occupied much of my thought dur-
ing the past 20 years. This conference holds particular interest for me be-
cause of its focus on the Mediterranean, an area with which I have had little 
direct contact but one where I have long thought that cultural differences 
must help explain the striking contrasts in political systems. Comparable 
contrasts exist in the Western Hemisphere where, I am convinced, culture 
matters a great deal in explaining the very different political trajectories of 
Canada and the United States on the one hand, and Latin America on the 
other. My hope is that a discussion of culture's role in the Western Hemi-
sphere will shed some light on its role in the Mediterranean. 
At the outset, I want to define what I mean by "culture," a word of vast 
scope and elasticity. My usage is relatively narrow: I will be referring to 
cultural values and attitudes that influence the behavior of individuals and 
societies.  The central issue for me today is the extent to which cultural 
values and attitudes influence the structure and performance of govern-
ment, mindful of the relevant clauses of the UN Declaration on Human 
Rights: 
Everyone has the right of life, liberty and the security of person...human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of belief and speech...All are equal before the 
law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection... Eve-
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ryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives...  
I trust that it is clear that cultural values and attitudes have nothing to do 
with genes. They are transmitted from generation to generation by many 
instruments of acculturation, child-rearing practices probably most influen-
tial among them, but also including churches, schools, the media, the inter-
net, expressions of "pop" culture, and so forth. And, of course, cultural val-
ues and attitudes change, albeit usually slowly. 
Culture is one of several factors that influence how societies evolve. 
Among others are geography, including climate and natural resource en-
dowment; international relationships and the vagaries of history; and lead-
ership. But until recent years, culture's influence has, with some exceptions, 
been ignored. 
I want to define at the outset the fundamental differences in governance 
one finds in the Western Hemisphere. Canada and the United States are 
stable, mature democracies. Their elections are held on schedule. The par-
ties out of power frequently replace those in power. One finds a significant 
degree of decentralization of power to provinces or states and beyond to 
cities and towns. Government is substantially responsive to the wishes and 
preferences of the people as expressed in elections and through communi-
cations between constituents and elected officials at various levels. Checks 
and balances exist among the branches of government. The armed forces 
are under civilian control. The judiciaries are substantially independent, 
and the level of corruption is low (Canada was the fifth least corrupt and 
the United States fourteenth on Transparency International's index last 
year.)  
I hasten to add, particularly for the benefit of any Canadians who may be 
present, that there are some important differences, too, not the least being 
the contrast between the Canadian parliamentary system and the American 
presidential system. But the sign at the border south of Vancouver is sub-
stantially true. It reads, "Children of a common mother. Brethren dwelling 
together in unity." 
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Those qualities of mature democracies are for the most part lacking in 
Latin America. Costa Rica comes the closest—it has experienced democ-
ratic continuity since a civil war in 1948. Chile's and Uruguay's democratic 
traditions were interrupted in the 1970s by military ousters of elected gov-
ernments. Sadly, what we see going on today in Colombia, Ecuador, Gua-
temala, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela—not to mention Cuba—is far more 
typical of Latin American governance during the past two centuries, a gov-
ernance characterized by frequent coups d'état and civil wars. Most gov-
ernments are highly centralized; most judiciaries are not independent; 
checks and balances are weak; and corruption is commonplace. The idea 
that the military are above the law is widespread, particularly among the 
military.  
In the wake of the demise of the military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, a substantial consensus has existed in Latin 
America that democracy is the best way to organize human societies. But 
Latin American democracy remains for the most part incipient and fragile. 
A rich literature going back through Montesquieu to Plato addresses the 
link between culture and governance. From that rich literature I am going 
to select for comment today a few books that are particularly relevant to my 
theme.  
Book 19 of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748, is entitled 
"On the laws in their relation with the principles—we might substitute the 
word "values"—forming the general spirit, the mores, and the manners of a 
nation." He goes on to elaborate on Plato's observation in The Republic that 
governments vary in accordance with the dispositions of their citizenry. 
Montesquieu says:  
Many things govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the gov-
ernment, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a general spirit is 
formed as a result...I do not say that the [geographic] climate has not in 
large part produced the laws, the mores, and the manners of [a] nation, but I 
say that the mores and the manners...should be closely related to its laws. 
Let me place these words in a more modern context. Latin American coun-
tries have produced constitutions, often modeled after the American consti-
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tution of 1787, since their early years of independence in the first decades 
of the nineteenth century. But few Latin American countries have abided 
by these constitutions because they were incompatible with the reality of 
Latin American cultural values and attitudes, thereby confirming Montes-
quieu's wisdom. 
Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America was published in 1835. It 
has since become a classic, notable not only for its insights about what 
makes democracy work—or not work—but also for its prescient predic-
tions, for example, of U.S. infringement on Mexican territory, racial con-
flict in the United States, and rivalry between the United States and Russia. 
Tocqueville was familiar with Montesquieu's writings and took the latter's 
views on culture several steps further. Anticipating Max Weber, Toc-
queville perceived an intimate link between Protestantism and democracy: 
Most of English America was peopled by men who, having shaken off the 
pope's authority...brought to the New World a Christianity that I can only 
describe as democratic and republican; this fact singularly favored the es-
tablishment of a temporal republic and democracy. From the start, politics 
and religion agreed. 
This was in striking contrast to Tocqueville's view of what was transpiring 
in Latin America: A great part of the success of democratic government 
must be attributed to...good American laws, but I do not think that they are 
the main cause...Mexico, as happily situated as the [the United States] has 
adopted these same laws but cannot get used to democratic govern-
ment...People are astonished to see the new nations of [Latin] America 
convulsed by one revolution after another...and daily expect them to return 
to their natural state. But...may not revolution be the natural state for the 
Spaniards of [Latin America]?  
The principal cause of the contrast between the north and the south in the 
Western Hemisphere is at the heart of Tocqueville's understanding of what 
most influences patterns of governance: I am convinced that the luckiest of 
geographic circumstances and the best of laws cannot maintain a constitu-
tion despite [a society's] mores, whereas the latter can turn even the most 
unfavorable [geographic] circumstances and the worst laws to advantage. 
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The importance of [habits, opinions, and, in a word] mores is a universal 
truth to which study and experience continually bring us back. I find it oc-
cupies the central position in my thoughts; all my ideas come back to it in 
the end. 
The emphasis on culture as an explanation for the evolution of societies 
shifted to economic development with the publication of Max Weber's 
classic The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in 1904. While 
there are a number of aspects of Weber's work that touch on governance, 
for example, the political relevance of Benjamin Franklin's dedication to 
honesty, which Weber highlights, I am going to jump ahead to 1958, the 
year in which Edward Banfield's study of a southern Italian village was 
published with the title The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. 
Banfield lived in the village (he gives it the fictitious name of "Monte-
grano"—its real name is Chiaromonte) for nine months in 1954-55. He had 
just done a study of St. George, Utah, a Mormon community that was a 
beehive of organized activity, and was struck at the outset of his visit to 
Montegrano at the almost total absence of associations—of what is called 
today "social capital" or "civic culture." As he says, "We are apt to take it 
for granted that economic and political associations will quickly arise 
wherever technical conditions and natural resources permit...The assump-
tion is wrong because it overlooks the critical importance of culture." Ban-
field goes on to label the culture of the Montegranesi "amoral familism," a 
zero-sum world view in which no one furthers the interest of the group ex-
cept as his own interest or the interest of his immediate family is furthered. 
It is a culture rife with mistrust. 
In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published The Civic Culture, 
which presented the results of interviews conducted in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, to determine variations 
in values and attitudes that might be correlated with the degree of political 
cohesiveness and progress toward democracy of each country. In a sequel, 
Political Culture and Political Development, Verba and Lucian Pye em-
phasize the importance of "the extent to which members of a political sys-
tem have trust and confidence in their fellow political actors...a particularly 
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crucial aspect of a democratic political culture." Evoking David 
McClelland's  The Achieving Society, published in 1961, and Banfield, 
Verba and Pye stress the importance of value inculcation in childhood: 
In early social situations, the child will learn certain basic lessons about the 
nature of authority [and] the trustworthiness and supportiveness of other 
people...In Italy, children learn to distrust others. 
One final jump, this time to 1993 and Robert Putnam's Making Democracy 
Work, also focused on Italy and a book that highlights the concept of social 
capital—"civicness," or what Francis Fukuyama calls "spontaneous asso-
ciation"—as a crucial factor in development. I want to stress that social 
capital is essentially a cultural phenomenon—some societies have more of 
it than others, and in a given society the degree of social capital can change 
with time, as Putnam's most recent book, Bowling Alone, makes clear in the 
case of the United States.  
Making Democracy Work contains two paragraphs that are directly relevant 
to our concerns today and to the contrasting political evolution of the north 
and the south in the Western Hemisphere. I conclude this brief review of 
relevant literature with these paragraphs: 
Some regions of Italy have many choral societies and soccer teams and 
bird-watching clubs and Rotary clubs. Most citizens in those regions read 
eagerly about community affairs...They are engaged by public issues, but 
not personal or patron-client politics. Inhabitants trust one another to act 
fairly and to obey the law. Leaders in these regions are relatively honest. 
They believe in popular government, and they are predisposed to compro-
mise with their political adversaries. Both citizens and leaders find equality 
congenial. Social and political networks are organized horizontally, not hi-
erarchically. The community values solidarity, civic engagement, coopera-
tion, and honesty...people in these regions are content. 
At the other pole are the "uncivic" regions...Public life...is organized hier-
archically, rather than horizontally. The very concept of "citizen"...is 
stunted...public affairs is the business of somebody else—...the bosses, the 
politicians...Few people aspire to partake in deliberations about the com-
monweal, and few such opportunities present themselves. Political partici-
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pation is triggered by personal dependency or private greed, not by collec-
tive purpose. Engagement in social and cultural associations is meager. 
Private piety stands in for public purpose. Corruption is widely regarded as 
the norm, even by politicians themselves, and they are cynical about de-
mocratic principles. "Compromise" has only negative overtones. Laws...are 
made to be broken, but fearing others' lawlessness, people demand sterner 
discipline. Trapped in these interlocking vicious circles, nearly everyone 
feels powerless, exploited, and unhappy. 
These generalizations by Robert Putnam about the sharp contrasts between 
the North and South of Italy are substantially applicable not only to the 
sharp contrasts one finds in the Americas but also to the sharp contrasts 
between the advanced democracies of the West and, increasingly, East 
Asia, on the one hand, and many of the former Communist countries and 
the Third World on the other. I believe that at the root of these contrasting 
paradigms are contrasting cultural values and attitudes. 
What are the values and attitudes that make democracy work or not work? 
We do not know with certainty the answer to that question. Several of us 
are just now working on the design of a research project a key part of 
which is the development of a detailed typology of values and attitudes that 
influence the political, economic, and social evolution of nations, for good 
or for bad. 
What follows, then, are the relevant values and attitudes that have evolved 
in my thinking during two decades as a development practitioner and an-
other two decades as a researcher and writer focused on the role of culture.  
One word appears repeatedly in the preceding literature review—"trust." 
The correlation between trust and democracy is powerfully confirmed by 
the World Values Survey, whose coordinator, Ronald Inglehart, is with us. 
In his chapter in Culture Matters, Prof. Inglehart presents a graph that 
demonstrates that: 
1. Trust tends to be higher in Protestant and Confucian societies, lower in 
Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic societies; 
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2. Of 21 higher trust societies, only one—China—is not a stable democ-
racy; 
3. There is also a close correlation between trust and affluence.    
In my first book, Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind, I emphasized the 
relevance of the radius of identification and trust to the viability of plural-
istic political systems. If one views those outside the family and one's circle 
of friends as inconsequential or possibly even hostile, as is often the case in 
Latin America, it is difficult to establish a basis for the kind of trust that 
lubricates democratic politics and association. A party in power will be 
more reluctant to transfer that power to an opposition party in a low-trust 
society than in a high trust society. Citizens in societies where the radius of 
identification and trust is narrow are more likely to engage in tax evasion 
and nepotism, and less likely to engage in philanthropy, than citizens in 
societies with a broader radius of identification and trust. Compromise is 
likely to be more difficult to achieve. I note in passing that as far as I know, 
there is no accurate synonym in Spanish for the English word "compro-
mise."  
But we have to ask, "Why are some societies more trusting than others?" 
Three factors come to mind. The first is the degree of homogeneity in a so-
ciety. Human nature is such that human beings are more likely to trust 
someone who looks like them, speaks the same language, wears the same 
clothes, eats the same food, and so forth. It is consequently more difficult 
to develop trust in multiracial and multicultural societies than in homoge-
neous ones. The problems that Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and 
Mexico have encountered in building durable democratic institutions are in 
part the consequence of the difficulty of building trust among indigenous 
peoples, whites, and people of mixed blood. I note in passing that Chile, 
Costa Rica, and Uruguay are all relatively homogeneous societies. 
There is a comparable, if smaller, problem in countries like the United 
States that are becoming increasingly multicultural. I suspect that one of 
the factors contributing to the decline in trust in the United States in recent 
decades is this increasingly apparent phenomenon of "differentness" in our 
society. The same thing may also be happening in Canada. 
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The second factor affecting the degree of trust in a society is the rigor of 
the ethical code. If the ethical code demands "not single good works but a 
life of good works built into a unified system," as Weber wrote of the Cal-
vinist Protestant sects, people within that group are likely to develop confi-
dence about the motives and actions of others in the group, and to identify 
with them. At the other extreme is Haiti, where Voodoo, the dominant re-
ligion, is without any ethical content. What happens to people is assumed 
to be the consequence of the actions of hundreds of spirits who behave in a 
very human, capricious way.  The only way that one can influence one's 
destiny is by gaining favor with the spirits through Voodoo rituals. While I 
have not seen statistics on the level of trust in Haiti, I have lived and 
worked there, and the degree of mistrust is dismaying. It surely has much to 
do with Haiti's dismal political history. 
The Argentine writer Mariano Grondona, author of The Cultural Condi-
tions of Economic Development and now working on The Cultural Condi-
tions of Political Development, argues that the ethical code must be based 
on what Raymond Aron calls "a reasonable egoism." Ethical codes based 
on the morality of saints and martyrs will not be realizable in human socie-
ties. Grondona cites as an example of such ethics Marx's slogan "From 
each according to his ability, to each according to his need." He goes on to 
say, with reference to the differences between North America and Latin 
America: In cultures that are favorable to development, there is widespread 
compliance with laws and norms that are not totally exigent and are there-
fore realizable. Moral law and social reality virtually coincide. In develop-
ment-resistant cultures, on the other hand, there are two worlds that are out 
of touch with each other. One is the exalted world of the highest standards 
and the other is the real world of furtive immorality and generalized hypoc-
risy. Grondona goes on to emphasize the importance of what he calls "the 
lesser virtues." 
Advanced societies esteem a series of lesser virtues that are often irrelevant 
in traditional cultures: a job well done, tidiness, courtesy, punctuality. 
These contribute both to efficiency and harmony in human relations [and, I 
might add, to trust]. 
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The third factor influencing the degree of trust in a society is the comport-
ment of leaders and institutions. The steady decline in trust in the United 
States in recent decades, particularly trust in government, is surely in im-
portant part the consequence of Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the war in 
Vietnam and Richard Nixon's conduct during the Watergate episode.  
But trust is not the only factor on which democracy depends, just as it is 
not the only factor on which economic development depends, although it is 
surely helpful to both. Effective democracy depends on citizen participa-
tion, and this in turn depends on citizens who believe both that democracy 
is the best way to organize human societies and that they can influence 
their destinies through participation. Democratic participation will be diffi-
cult to achieve in a culture that encourages a fatalistic world view in which 
the goal is resignation in the face of omnipotent forces. Democratic socie-
ties tend to focus on the future, authoritarian societies on the present or the 
past. 
The viability of democratic governance also depends on a culture that en-
courages heterodoxy and dissent. This has generally not been true of Latin 
America, where orthodoxy has been a dominant feature and where dissent 
may be viewed as heresy. A comment by Nobel laureate Octavio Paz about 
the contrast between the two Americas is relevant: "One, English speaking, 
is the daughter of the tradition that has founded the modern world: the Ref-
ormation, with its social and political consequences, democracy and capi-
talism. The other, Spanish and Portuguese speaking, is the daughter of the 
universal Catholic monarchy and the Counter-Reformation." 
Finally, some cultures nurture vertical, hierarchical human relationships 
that are obstacles to democracy, while others nurture horizontal, egalitarian 
relationships that facilitate democracy. The difficulty that Confucian socie-
ties have encountered in building democratic institutions in part reflects the 
hierarchical, authoritarian currents of Confucianism. 
To move beyond cultural factors that nurture democracy, I think it is clear 
that economic development enhances the probability of democracy taking 
root. For one thing, a rapidly growing economy conclusively demonstrates 
that life need not be a zero-sum game in which what I gain is at your ex-
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pense. The pie expands, making it easier to cushion political and social 
pressures. 
Economic development depends on a measure of economic pluralism, on 
the ability of individuals to enter the market substantially free of govern-
ment interference. Experience in the market, in turn, encourages the view 
that people can influence their destinies thought their own efforts, precisely 
the attitude that drives political participation and political pluralism. 
You may recognize in what I've just said one of the principal themes in 
Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. I share his belief 
that economic development nurtures political pluralism. The democratiza-
tion in recent years of Korea and Taiwan is a case in point. 
Lest we become too optimistic about economic development transforming 
societies, we must remember that economic development, like political de-
velopment, is powerfully influenced by culture. An example is the key role 
that entrepreneurship plays in economic success. Some cultures are more 
entrepreneurial that others. For almost two decades, Latin America has 
tried to reproduce the East Asian economic miracles. Only Chile has ap-
proximated the hoped-for results. I might add that Chile enjoys an atypical 
tradition of entrepreneurship and institutional strength that goes back at 
least to the nineteenth century. 
Cultural change is usually a slow process. But societies can be transformed 
in a generation or two from traditional authoritarian modes of governance 
to modern democracies. Spain—la madre patria for Latin America—is a 
particularly relevant case.  
In the 1950's, Spain was comparable in its governance and economic and 
social conditions to Argentina and Cuba. Politics were dominated by a 
military dictator, and poverty and social injustice were widespread. Toward 
the end of the 1950s, Francisco Franco was obliged by economic stagnation 
to end his policy of self-sufficiency and to open up the Spanish economy to 
imports, foreign investors, and tourists. Not long thereafter, Europe no 
longer ended at the Pyrenees. Not only was the economic sector interna-
tionalized, with highly favorable consequences for economic growth. Poli-
ticians, intellectuals, the church, the military, and other elite groups soon 
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developed links with their opposite numbers in western Europe and the 
United States. Newspapers and magazines sprouted and created an increas-
ingly pluralistic political and intellectual environment in which Spain's tra-
dition of self-criticism, typified by writers like Cervantes and Ortega-y-
Gasset , was revived.  
Franco's death in 1975 was followed by a rapid transition to democracy. 
The symbol of opposition to Franco, the Socialist Party, won the 1982 elec-
tions, and by 1986 Spain was a member both of NATO and the European 
Economic Community. Power was peacefully transferred to the conserva-
tive Popular Party, led by José María Aznar, in 1996. 
The World Values Survey confirms the transformation of Spanish values 
and attitudes. With respect to democratic governance, Spain's value profile 
is now essentially indistinguishable from other members of the European 
Union. Symptomatic of the transformation is a comment made in 1976 by 
General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defense in the transition government of Adolfo Suárez. Gutiérrez Mellado 
had been attacked as a "liberal" by Franco's old guard. He responded: 
“I don't mind being called a liberal if that means that I admit to not being 
utterly right all the time, that I am ready to discuss things with people with 
whom I disagree, that I prefer that there should be no more fratricidal wars, 
that I want Spain to belong to all Spaniards...” 
The conditions I noted earlier in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Venezuela—not to mention Cuba—suggest that Latin America 
has a long way to go in its quest for stable democratic governance. But 
there are some hopeful signs. The victory of Vicente Fox in last year's 
Mexican elections ended what amounted to a one-party dictatorship that 
had endured for almost three-quarters of a century.  Fox's vision of a truly 
pluralistic, transparent Mexico depends on a cultural transformation com-
parable to Spain's. And much as the Spanish transformation was facilitated 
by Spain's links with western Europe, the Mexican transformation may 
benefit from Mexico's NAFTA links with the United States and Canada. 
We are reminded of the crucial role that political leadership can play in 
progressive cultural change both by Fox and by his predecessor, Ernesto 
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Zedillo, who made the transition to democracy possible in ways that evoke 
Adolfo Suárez's role in Spain's transition.  
A growing number of influential Latin American intellectuals have turned 
away from blaming others, particularly the United States, for their prob-
lems, and have instead looked inward to explain why Latin America is the 
least democratic, least developed region of the West. Among them have 
been Octavio Paz; the Venezuelan Carlos Rangel; Argentina's Mariano 
Grondona; the co-authors of the best-seller, Guide to the Perfect Latin 
American Idiot, Cuban exile Carlos Alberto Montaner, Colombian Plinio 
Apuleyo Mendoza, and Peruvian Álvaro Vargas Llosa; and Álvaro's father 
Mario Vargas Llosa, who a few years called for: “a reform of our customs 
and ideas, of the whole complex system of habits, knowledge, images, and 
forms that we understand by the word ‘culture’. The culture within which 
we live and act today in Latin America is neither liberal nor is it altogether 
democratic. We have democratic governments, but our institutions, our re-
flexes, our attitudes are very far from being democratic.”   
The Guatemalan sociologist Bernardo Arévalo de León put it succinctly 
last year when he wrote, "We have the hardware of democracy, but our 
software is authoritarian." 
A substantial consensus exists in Latin America today in favor of democ-
ratic governance, a consensus shared not only by political leaders and intel-
lectuals but also by people at the grass roots. Civic organizations that pro-
mote political participation and transparency now exist in most countries. 
Corruption has become a major issue in several countries, Mexico foremost 
among them, and anti-corruption campaigns have been given impetus by 
the adoption of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 
1998.  
Civic education and character education are growing in Latin America, of-
ten as the result of initiatives by private organizations many of which are 
headed by women. A number of organizations are promoting philanthropy, 
whose neglect in Latin America reflects in part the very short radius of 
identification and trust found throughout the region. And some profession-
als are studying traditional child-rearing practices with a view to introduc-
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ing modifications that will promote greater trust, sense of civic and social 
responsibility, and creativity—and demote authoritarianism. 
Octavio Paz's observation about the influence of religion in the Western 
Hemisphere is relevant to another force that may contribute to cultural 
change that enhances democratic governance. I have in mind the rapid 
growth in recent decades of Protestantism, chiefly Evangelical and Pente-
costal, which account for as many as forty percent of all Guatemalans, as 
many as twenty percent of Brazilians and Chileans. Latin America is, for 
the first time in its history, a region of religious pluralism. 
I do not, however, want to paint an excessively optimistic picture of the 
prospects for stable democratic governance in Latin America. We are con-
tinually reminded of the magnitude of the problem by the threatened disin-
tegration of Colombia and by the persistence of the Cuban dictatorship for 
more than forty years; by frequent examples of electoral irregularities; by 
the violence and crime that are so widespread, particularly in Latin Ameri-
can cities; by the corruption commonly found in public institutions, includ-
ing the courts, the police, and the military; by the fact that the most inequi-
table income distribution patterns in the world are found in Latin America.  
At the root of these troubling problems are a set of democracy-resistant 
values and attitudes that have persisted since colonial times. We can take 
encouragement, at least viewing the long run, from the fact that these cul-
tural obstacles are increasingly being addressed by Latin Americans.  
I hope that you have found this discussion of culture's influence on govern-
ance in the Western Hemisphere helpful. I appreciate that there are many 
differences between the Western Hemisphere and the Mediterranean re-
gion. But if culture matters as much as it does in the Western Hemisphere, 
then it has to be a powerful force elsewhere, too. 
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Culture in Politics and Governance – 
European Experiences 
Culture has been defined as the “software” that drives society and deter-
mines the success of exporting the hard-ware of western-style, liberal de-
mocratic institutions. I think the Manichean division of culture on the one 
hand and institutions and styles of governance on the other hand tends to be 
less useful the more modernisation affects the various systems. I propose to 
answer the question “does culture matters?” by an analysis of three deter-
mining factors: 
There are overarching factors of “political cultures” in various regimes, 
common to most of the actors within the system. 
The modernisation process tends to divide concepts of the most accepted 
form of political culture along ideological lines. 
There is increasingly a uniform pattern of western-style, liberal democratic 
institutions developing in Europe – including the Mediterranean countries. 
1) The venerable truisms of Almond/Verba’s “Civic Culture” underwent a 
process of uniformisation in Europe. Parochialism may persist in the mar-
ginalised areas of the respective “Mezzogiorni”. New parochialism may 
even bud in the developed parts of such countries, as in the Bask area in 
Spain or with the Lega Lombarda in the Italian North. But the average po-
litical culture in most European countries is more streamlined than 40 years 
ago when Germany was found to stick to a rather apolitical semi-
authoritarian political culture, with legalism in the attitudes as the only vir-
tue of the citizens, or Italian political culture was said to suffer from paro-
chialism and uncivic attitudes. 
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This happened because the basic insight from Almond and Verba was true, 
e.g. that political cultures are learned. The process of European cooperation 
and communication has unified the patterns of political attitudes and be-
havior unthinkable 40 years ago. According to the Eurobarometer Italy had 
most of the identifiers with Europe (30%), which was above the level of a 
small country such as Luxemburg, benefiting most from the process of Eu-
ropeanisation. The strongest identification with the national state was found 
in marginal areas, such as Finland (78%) and Greece (74%). Both options 
were mainly strong because regional parochialism had little political outlet 
in the institutions of the countries. Predominant identification with regional 
subunits were strongest, where the institutions offered the deepest possibili-
ties for political participation and federalism: Spain (38%), Belgium (32%), 
and Germany (27%). These finding of the Eurobarometers did not exclude: 
that countries showing a rather traditional pattern of national pride in a high 
degree were ready to accept a European citizenship (Greece: 61%) 
,whereas federalist countries such as Belgium, Germany and Spain were 
below average in this respect, that countries with little acceptance of Euro-
pean citizenship were below average in xenophobic attitudes, expressed by 
the answer to the question: “Are there are too many foreigners living in the 
country?” (Germany: 40%, Spain: 27%). The intervening variable of the 
percentage of foreigners living in the respective countries does not explain 
the variance. In countries with so far comparatively few foreigners, Greece 
proved to be most reluctant to accept more migration (64%). Portugal 
(30%) and Ireland (8%), however, have expressed more tolerance in this 
respect than countries with bigger shares of foreigners (Belgium: 57%, 
France: 55%, UK: 42%, Germany 40%). On the whole concerning prob-
lems of national identity the differences among European nations are the 
biggest, by far more than concerning the acceptance of the democratic 
process and liberal institutions. 
2) The concepts of the desired political culture and patterns of participation 
the European nations were deeply divided since the French revolution. 
France and Spain have most frequently invoked the “two countries” and 
opposed the “pays réel” to the “pays légal”. Countries with older traditions 
of religious cleavages, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and 
  32 
Culture in Politics and Governance 
even Germany, preserved under conditions of democracy patters of conso-
ciationalism. The pillars of society do not agree on “one culture”, but they 
accept formal rules for mitigating conflicts, most frequently handled by el-
ites. Class cleavages have strengthened the corporatist way of compromise-
finding even in religiously homogeneous countries such as Sweden and 
Austria. Some of these systems - after the erosion of the “Social democratic 
consensus” of the 1970s and 1980s – developed new models for their 
neighbours in organizing step by step the withdrawal from a welfare state 
which became unpayable. They managed to do so by consensus of the ma-
jor political camps and interest groups organisations, such as Sweden and 
the Netherlands. This was possible only by a process of deideologisation. 
But this did not mean that the camps have withered away and that only 
Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee parties dominate the political arena. This 
process did, however, develop a kind of middle road between a “unified 
culture”, in clash with surrounding cultures, and the national traditions of 
liberal institutions. 
3) The third factor is characterized by a “rapprochement” of the institutions 
in Europe. In the 19
th century in most bigger countries ideas of a special 
road of development were showing their impact - from Spain to Germany 
and Russia. Only Italy – thanks to its privileged position – too much vener-
ated as the cradle of European culture and too small to create a threat to its 
neighbours – developed in a remarkably “normal” way according to French 
and British models. We know, however, that even this did not prevent that 
Italy went through the longest fascist period among all the European coun-
tries. But even about the “normal road” to democracy there was no consen-
sus. The British model was accepted by most of the liberal and conserva-
tive ideologies, though not by the Socialists and Communists, but it was 
hard to imitate. The French model of radical Republicanism seemed to be 
more acceptable to radicals and socialists. But in the ideological debates 
from Sweden to Spain there was a debate on what is a “liberal institution” 
and what is “authentic parliamentarianism” - the French or the British 
model?. Some of these debates have smoothed down to quarrels of ideo-
logues and constitution-makers about the French semi-presidential system 
– which had many followers in the Italian debates – and the “normal” par-
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liamentary system. The British model is, however, no longer unique. New 
un-British elements such as judicial review, ombudsmen, federalism and 
institutions of corporatism have upgraded other parliamentary models, such 
as the German example. Sometimes even achievements, with rather detri-
mental psychological results in the executive-legislative relations, such as 
the “constructive vote of non-confidence,” have been borrowed from Ger-
many, as in Belgium, Spain or Hungary.  
The debate on a European Constitution – which should not be promoted by 
Germans, because it will arouse suspicion – will carry on uniformisation. 
Countries such as Sweden or Britain even below the level of the Constitu-
tion have to ponder over the introduction of a Constitutional Court in order 
to meet the challenges of the uniformisation of law, emanating from the 
European Court. Even if no Constitution will be accepted in the foreseeable 
future the European bill of rights will further streamline political institu-
tions and political cultures. The institutions on the one hand are shaped by 
the underlying cultures, on the other hand they are no passive victims of 
clashes of civilization. The states influence their cultures by education, mi-
gration policies and cultural policies. In many respects the diversity of cul-
tures is diminishing by deliberate action of states. The European citizenship 
on the one hand has abolished remainders of the “jus sanguine”, on the 
other hand the European states had to agree on common criteria for 
“Schengen country”. The Republicanism of the French tradition is no 
longer sufficient to integrate the minorities as it was two generations ago, 
though the dominant immigrants – contrary to the Turks who dominate in 
Germany – have a fair command of the country’s language. New measures 
of intolerance began to spread. Oddly enough in the questions of the tradi-
tional Islamic symbols German schools and bureaucrats were more tolerant 
than there French neighbours. 
The legal system was the first equalizer in history, the national state was 
added and considered all the citizens equal in one cultural and national re-
spect. This led to the acceptance of political rights for all compatriots in a 
democratic state. But the underprivileged classes discovered that this did 
not change their social situation. The welfare state had to be added. The 
legal state equalizes even non-citizens, and the welfare state does the same 
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to the level of the subsistence minimum. Only in the national citizen rights 
and in the democratic rights exclusion of non-citizens prevails, but is pro-
gressively diminished by new European law. 
The cultural policies which shape the respective political cultures are so far 
the element which remains most diverse. There are centralized traditions 
such as France and Italy and federalized traditions such as in Germany. 
These organisational variances do not explain the performance in terms of 
expenses for cultural policy. France and the Netherlands are on top, but 
Germany is closely behind them. Only systems, such as Britain, which had 
more reluctance to accept cultural policy as an arena for state activities, lag 
behind. National cultural traditions still determine which country promotes 
what kind of culture. France and Italy emphasize film, Germany – in inter-
national comparison – is almost absent, but does more for literature, librar-
ies and theater. In spite of all these differences there is an increasing com-
mon emphasis on social grass roots culture and the promotion of tolerance 
in multicultural societies. Thus, in the long run, even diversity in the insti-
tutional background and predominant areas of cultural promotion, uniform-
ity will increase. Common social challenges provoke functional equivalents 
in the policy-answers – despite remaining diversity of cultural values and 
institutions of cultural and educational policies. 
 
Conclusion  
The clash of civilisation is no unchangeable fate. The interaction of institu-
tions, political cultures and the uniformisation of ideologies progresses 
even in the Northern tier of the Mediterranean. The southern tier is still dif-
ferent, but will certainly be affected by the developments – not only be-
cause so many non-European countries aim at the integration into the 
European Community. Culture matters, but Europe has shown that in the 
long run of political modernisation institutions are more than an “interven-
ing variable”. 
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“ Marx n’a cessé de se débattre avec un dispositif théorique dont il ne franchit les frontières que pour les 
reconduire plus loin, sans jamais les supprimer“ . (Henri Maler, L'utopie avec Marx). 
 
“My personal conviction is that shying away from engaging in intellectual battle about the paradigms of 
development results not in more "friendly acceptance" of applied anthropological or sociological work, but 
in less. By now, you have heard my answer about strategy in conceptual clashes on the battlefields of knowl-
edge. We must assert our conceptual differences, because they make a difference. We must take firm posi-
tions without posturing, must be earnest without an offensively earnest tone, and must be opinionated while 
being free of fixed opinions. For applied social scientists, quibbling only for improving practical fixes is 
never enough. Winning requires intellectual wrestling and theoretical engagement“. (Michael M. Cernea, 
Social organisation and Development Anthropology. 1995 Malinowski Award Lecture). 
 
“Avec l’islam, c’est un nouveau monde qui s’introduit sur les rivages méditerranéens. Une déchirure se 
fait qui durera jusqu’à nos jours“. (henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne, Paris 1970, p. 111) 
 
Argument 
Faut-il, au nom d'un réalisme historique impliquant une philosophie de 
l'histoire qui resterait à valider, considérer que tout essai d'exploration ou 
de réactivation de la question du sens si constamment présente dans l'es-
pace méditerranéen, est nécessairement voué à sombrer dans les rêveries 
spiritualistes, les spéculations idéalistes, les évocations nostalgiques; ou 
peut-on, malgré la marche triomphante d'une mondialisation sans projet 
humaniste, identifier dans l'histoire méditerranéenne de la pensée et des 
cultures, des postures de la raison, des visées de l'esprit, des œuvres de 
l'imagination créatrice, des témoignages de prophètes, de saints, de pen-
seurs, d'artistes, de héros civilisateurs qui pourraient féconder, éclairer, ins-
pirer, assurer un supplément d'âme aux nouvelles luttes d'émancipation de 
la condition humaine telles qu'elles se dessinent pour nous en cette veille 
du 21
e siècle? 
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GENESEE D’UNE PENSEE 
Il y a longtemps que je me pose cette question fondamentale et que j’essaye 
d’y répondre non pas tant à partir d’une littérature pléthorique au sujet des 
rapports, encore fragiles, entre l’Union européenne et les Etats (très peu ou 
pas du tout les peuples) de l’aire méditerranéenne, mais en me fondant sur 
mes liens personnels, mes solidarités historiques avec l’ensemble des cultu-
res méditerranéennes des deux rives. Car, comme Jacques Berque, je n’ai 
jamais opposé l’une de ces rives à l’autre au nom d’une appartenance reli-
gieuse ou nationale. J’ai toujours distingué la légitimité du combat contre 
les dérives colonialistes, racistes, fascistes d’une certaine Europe et ma so-
lidarité intellectuelle avec les avancées de la culture humaniste en contextes 
islamiques comme en contextes chrétiens et européens laïcs. Il est essentiel 
de marquer fortement l’existence d’acteurs historiques qui pensent et agis-
sent dans cette perspective de remembrement historique du destin des deux 
rives effectivement rivales, séparées, déchirées, travaillées par des conten-
tieux, des ressentiments depuis que le fait islamique et la civilisation 
d’expression arabe ont substitué pour un temps leur présence hégémonique 
à celles de la civilisation gréco-romaine et du christianisme.  
Le texte qu’on va lire est le résultat de révisions, de réécritures successives 
après chaque conférence donnée dans divers hauts lieux de culture et 
d’histoire en Europe et dans le monde arabo-turco-iranien. J’apporte la der-
nière retouche après le colloque organisé à Bonn en Juin 2001 par deux ins-
tituts de recherche nouvellement créés (le ZEI et le ZEF) sur le thème Does 
Culture matter? Politics and Governance in the Mediterranean Region. 
Que l’Allemagne s’inté -resse de la sorte au monde méditerranéen est un 
signe encourageant pour l’œuvre de remembrement historique d’un espace 
de culture et de pensée humanistes, de civilisation euro-méditerranéen. Les 
organisateurs du colloque de Bonn ont choisi d’orienter les contributions 
vers l’examen d’une question venue des Etats Unis : après son fameux arti-
cle reçu par beaucoup comme une annonce prophétique, S. Huntington a 
édité avec son collègue ??? un livre où divers spécialistes s’interrogent sur 
les rapports de cause à effet entre formes et niveaux de culture et dévelop-
pement civilisationnel. Nous sommes toujours dans la problématique du 
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clash des civilisations, mais avec une focalisation plus insistante sur les 
cultures comme facteur d’accélération, de ralentissement ou d’échec dans 
les processus de développement. La question ainsi posée est délicate ; un 
mot, une expression peuvent faire basculer le propos dans le culturalisme, 
le mentalisme, voire le racisme. Outre ce risque, je ferai deux remarques 
préliminaires au sujet de la question does culture matter ?  
Venant de chercheurs américains, on peut se réjouir à l’idée que la culture 
soit promue au premier rang des préoccupations intellectuelles et scientifi-
ques dans un pays où la pensée jetable, les objets culturels confondus avec 
les produits les plus ordinaires suscités et exploités par le marché connais-
sent une irrésistible expansion mondiale. La vieille Europe chargée 
d’expériences historiques irremplaçables n’a plus que des îlots de résis-
tance à la marchandisation de la pensée et de la culture. Quant aux cultures 
marginalisées du monde méditerranéen, elles se sont effondrées plus vite 
que les cultures paysannes, montagnardes, urbaines en Europe, parce 
qu’elles ont subit les effets dévastateurs conjugués de facteurs internes de 
régression et de stagnation, d’agressions externes d’une modernité médiati-
sée par l’idéologie colonialiste. 
La seconde remarque bien mise en évidence au colloque de Bonn est 
l’absence totale d’intérêt au cas des cultures non européennes (occidenta-
les) pour inaugurer une recherche vraiment neuve sur une typologie des 
formations culturelles où les cultures européennes ne seraient qu’un exem-
ple parmi d’autres. Or les cultures ainsi renvoyées à des examens ultérieurs 
séparés sont celles que les politologues présentent comme dangereuses 
pour les « valeurs » de l’Occident. Cette thèse sous-jacente à la question 
initiale does culture matter ? n’est guère prise en charge dans le livre cité 
malgré les interminables discussions alimentées par l’intervention fracas-
sante – parce que d’essence idéologique – de S. Huntington. Il y a démis-
sion intellectuelle très nette d’une pensée qui, géopolitiquement, exerce 
néanmoins une hégémonie sans partage et ouvertement affirmée. De quelle 
partie de la planète pourrait surgir une pensée gratuite et porteuse d’histoire 
– je veux dire libérée des solidarités évidentes soit avec les puissances hé-
gémoniques, soit avec les idéologies de combat contre cette hégémonie – 
capable de radicaliser la question de la culture comme un facteur détermi-
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nant ou comme simple produit pour le marché dans la phase actuelle de la 
mondialisation?  
Penser l’espace méditerranéen est une ambition qui prend en charge les 
démissions, les omissions, les faiblesses, les rejets conscients ou implicites 
aussi bien de la recherche scientifique que des systèmes de transmission 
des savoirs et des stratégies géopolitiques et économiques qui continuent de 
prévaloir dans les rencontres euro-médi-terranéennes depuis Barcelone en 
1995. Les ouvertures, les programmes, la vision d’ensemble et les ré-
flexions critiques que je vais proposer sont particulièrement destinés à 
l’attention des jeunes générations des deux rives. Ce n’est pas seulement la 
place de l’islam et de son histoire qui fait problème aujourd’hui, comme 
déjà lors de sa première émergence en 610-632/732; depuis l’expulsion des 
juifs et des musulmans d’Espagne en 1492, l’Europe, puis l’A -mérique 
après 1945, ne cessent de secondariser les peuples méditerranéens, 
d’enfermer les sociétés converties à l’islam dans un monde « oriental » dif-
fus, tandis que sont célébrées les valeurs intellectuelles, spirituelles, éthi-
ques, humanistes de l’Europe chrétienne et gréco-romaine. Le judaïsme lui-
même a été longtemps marginalisé et noirci jusqu’à la « solution finale » 
avec sa suite tragique en Proche-Orient! Curieusement, les civilisations 
plus anciennes de l’Egypte pharaonique, de la Mésopotamie, de l’antiquité 
tardive ont trouvé un meilleur accueil à partir du 18
e-19
e siècle, tandis que 
les langues et cultures berbères, coptes, kurdes, araméennes… ont connu le 
sort des résidus « populaires » ou populistes. Les jeunes générations des 
deux rives continuent de recevoir un enseignement de l’histoire qui perpé-
tue les stigmates, les définitions idéologiques, les ignorances fortement ins-
titutionnalisées et même sacralisées dans les trois traditions monothéistes 
relayées par les Etats-nations unificateurs en pleines « Lumières » moder-
nes! Il y a encore de l’hagiographie dans bien des manuels d’histoire en 
usage dans plusieurs pays du monde méditerranéen.  
Le contexte intellectuel et politique français est une autre raison importante 
qui m’a incité à repenser l’espace méditerranéen dans les perspectives que 
je vais ouvrir. On connaît la rigidité idéologique du débat en France sur laï-
cité et religion; les calculs électoralistes continuent à raviver le contentieux 
mal géré entre cléricaux et anticléricaux. L’implantation d’une forte mino-
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rité de musulmans en France depuis les années 1960, a introduit un nouvel 
acteur qui tend à renforcer la tendance clérical du fait des retards considé-
rables dans toutes les expressions contemporaines de la pensée islamique. 
Les républicains seraient mieux fondés à se méfier d’un renforcement poli-
tique des communautarismes confessionnels qui compromettraient deux 
siècles de combat pour la construction d’un espace républicain de la ci-
toyenneté, si en même temps, ils mettaient en place une politique éducative 
moderne de gestion scientifique du fait religieux. On peut mieux prévenir 
les dérives politiques des formes fondamentalistes des religions en favori-
sant la créativité intellectuelle et culturelle d’inspiration religieuse. J’ai 
montré qu’une culture humaniste très féconde a pu s’épanouir en Iran-Irak 
bûyide du 4
e/10
e siècle grâce à la conjonction d’une politique tolérante et 
d’une classe sociale favorable au pluralisme doctrinal; j’ai analysé aussi les 
raisons et les conséquences de la disparition progressive de cet humanisme 
dans les contextes islamiques depuis le 13
e siècle
1. Pour éviter de me répé-
ter, j’ai choisi d’approfondir ici un thème historique englobant à la fois 
l’histoire de la pensée, l’histoire générale des sociétés et les fonctions du 
religieux dans l’aire méditerranéenne. Malgré les orientations pluridiscipli-
naires de la nouvelle histoire, l’histoire de la pensée connaît partout plu-
sieurs fragmentations: il y a l’histoire de la philosophie, de la théologie, du 
droit, des religions, de la littérature, des arts; ces divisions se retrouvent 
dans le domaine arabo-turco-irano-islamique classé dans l’orientalisme. On 
force une vision générale de la connaissance et une pratique de l’activité 
cognitive propre à l’islam classique à entrer dans des divisions et une pé-
riodisation qui reflètent le parcours historique de l’Europe depuis le 16
e 
siècle. Dans son Penser au Moyen Age, Alain de Libéra a beaucoup aidé à 
dévoiler l’arbitraire de ce regard sur un espace continu de la pensée qui 
s’étend à celui que j’appelle l’espace méditerranéen. Ces rectifications de-
vraient avoir des conséquences non seulement sur les frontières tracées à 
l’intérieur de l’histoire européenne entre Haut et Bas Moyen Age, Réforme 
et Renaissance, Temps modernes et contemporains, mais également sur le 
rétablissement d’une pensée qui s’intéresse aux liens, aux interactions entre 
 
1     Voir bibliographie complète dans M. Arkoun, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, Lon-
don 2001.  
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philosophie, théologie, droit, lecture des textes fondateurs, connaissance 
mythique, connaissance historique, institution sociale de l’esprit, etc. En 
d’autres termes, le regard d’un Moyen Age remembré sur l’homme, 
l’esprit, la con -naissance, l’histoire, le monde… donne à penser à notre 
modernité. Il en découlerait un autre statut et d’autres fonctions de la 
culture, d’autres voies et horizons de créativité pour l’esprit.  
Ainsi, je ne connais pas d’études sur la sociologie de l’échec de la philoso-
phie du côté musulman après la mort d’Ibn Rushd et de son succès en Eu-
rope chrétienne dans la même période ; plus généralement, quelles corrél-
ations peut-on établir entre les devenirs des champs intellectuel, religieux et 
politique sur les deux rives durant le long affrontement entre l’Europe mon-
tante et l’Empire ottoman qui a tenté sans succès de contenir cette montée 
au moins dans l’aire méditerranéenne ? Cette approche permettrait de sortir 
des représentations qui structurent encore les imaginaires respectifs de ces 
puissantes entités mytho-idéologiques nommées couramment 
« l’Occident »  et  « l’Orient »  avec  la  variante  « l’Occident »  et 
« l’Islam » ou la métonymie politologique Jihâd versus McWorld
2. La dé-
construction de ces deux polarisations d’essence idéologique et de facture 
fantasmatique, est d’autant plus urgente qu’elles continuent d’inspirer la 
production politologique la plus influente, surtout lorsqu’elles s’abritent 
sous les thématiques du dialogue inter-religieux, des quêtes d’identités ou, 
comme à Bonn, d’une interrogation à visée réflexive sur le rôle de la cul-
ture dans la production de l’histoire des sociétés. Que la culture soit un 
facteur déterminant est une évidence pour tous ; mais les signes positifs ou 
négatifs qui affectent les valeurs et les effets concrets de chaque culture 
dépendent des liens tissés entre  les divers champs de l’activité cognitive 
pour appréhender la réalité dans sa complexité. L’exemple de la culture 
arabe montre les dangers qu’il y a à séparer la culture littéraire notamment 
poétique destinée à transmuer une rude existence en émois esthétiques, de 
la culture intellectuelle critique qui ouvre des horizons de sens et dévoile 
les travestissements de la réalité. La culture indépendante du marché ne 
peut contribuer pleinement et de façon continue à l’émancipation de la 
 
2     Titre d’un livre de Benjamin R. Barber, New York 1995, que j’ai analysé dans L’islam actuel devant sa 
Tradition et la mondialisation, in Islam et Changement social, edité par M. Kilani, Lausanne 1998. 
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condition humaine que si elle est accompagnée dans toutes ses créations 
par une relation critique que je définis par trois verbes à l’infinitif : Trans-
gresser, déplacer, dépasser
3. Ni la théorie du clash des civilisations, ni le 
livre sur la culture qui cherche à lui donner une assise épistémologique plus 
défendable, ni la problématique du colloque de Bonn et de bien d’autres 
n’intègrent les préoccupations radicalisantes de l’épistémologie program-
matique annoncée dans ces trois verbes. L’épistémologie programmatique 
articule ses interrogations critiques au fur et à mesure que se déploie un 
programme de recherche; elle oblige à surveiller l’usage de chaque concept 
non seulement au niveau de chaque unité textuelle au cours de l’écriture, 
mais au niveau plus décisif encore du système de postulats implicites qui 
commandent les effets de sens et l’interprétation finale de l’objet d’étude. 
J’ai montré à propos du discours historien de mon maître Claude Cahen, 
comment se construit à l’insu de l’auteur le plus vigilant, une représenta-
tion réductrice du passé quand l’interrogation épistémologique 
n’accompagne pas chaque moment de l’écriture, sachant que celle-ci 
comme tout discours oral, est un procès de programmation soit de vérités 
plausibles, soit d’une nouvelle mythologie surimposée aux mythologies 
héritées dans chaque tradition de pensée et de culture. Comme on le voit, 
l’épisté -mologie programmatique ne se contente pas de prendre en charge 
les usages du concept et les systèmes de pensée dans les textes déjà écrits 
ou les discours prononcés  ; elle s’applique au processus même 
d’articulation du sens pour y intégrer par anticipation les interrogations 
propres à la critique de la réception. L’acte de penser un domaine complexe 
de la réalité comme le fait religieux, ou l’espace méditerranéen, ou la cons-
truction de la norme juridique est nécessairement programmatique dans le 
sens régressif vers le passé et le sens progressif vers le futur. C’est pour-
quoi il illustre en se déployant les exigences de l’épistémologie program-
matique. Mais cet exercice auquel je me livre depuis la rédaction de ma 
thèse sur L’humanisme arabe au 4
e/10
e siècle dans les années 1960, est 
pour moi indissociable de l’écriture de tout chercheur en sciences de 
l’homme et de la société, ce que j’exprime en parlant de cher -cheur-
 
3     On trouvera le commentaire de ces trois verbes au chapitre 2.  
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penseur, non de penseur-chercheur qui concernerait plutôt le théologien ou 
le philosophe classique. 
La pratique d’une épistémologie programmatique ainsi définie ne s’est pas 
imposée à moi à partir de l’épistémo -logie spéculative de la philosophie 
classique, ou de cette relation critique spontanée que nous exerçons à 
l’égard de toute proposition de vérité. C’est l’analyse linguistique et sémio-
tique du discours qui m’a permis d’expliciter cette vérité psycho-socio-
linguistique que toute articulation du sens est un acte de solidarité histori-
que. Dans tout énoncé, j’exprime un implicite vécu à mon insu, c’est-à-dire 
hors de toute emprise critique de la raison, tant que j’ignore les techniques 
de déconstruction des mécanismes profonds et des procédés normatifs 
(grammaire, rhétorique, stylistique…) d’articulation de ce qu’on appelle 
improprement le sens, alors qu’après l’analyse on parlera plutôt d’effets de 
sens non seulement pour les destinataires multiples, mais pour moi-même 
non encore devenu l’objet de ma propre analyse. Je ne suis pas psychana-
lyste et je ne me suis jamais soumis à une analyse autre que celle que j’ai 
appris à pratiquer sur les textes et notamment ces textes majeurs que sont la 
Bible, les Evangiles et le Coran. J’ai publié un fragment d’autobiographie 
où j’explique la genèse d’un discours, d’une écriture à partir d’une situation 
vécue dans une hiérarchie sociale codée exprimée grossièrement en socio-
logie courante par la relation dominants/ dominés. Pour simplifier à l'ex-
trême, je dirai que mon regard sur l’espace méditerranéen et l’écriture qui 
le traduit sont ceux d’un kabyle né à Taourirt-Mimoun socialisé dans 
l’Algérie coloniale, puis dans la société française, soumis aux tensions édu-
catives qu’impose la pratique constante de trois cultures dans leurs langues 
respectives : la culture orale kabyle (on dit de plus en plus amazigh), les 
deux cultures savantes arabe et française auxquelles est venue s’ajouter 
plus tardivement la culture anglo-américaine. L’idée d’une épistémologie 
programmatique grandit dans le passage obligé du registre oral prémoderne 
de la pensée au registre moderne et même métamoderne de la connaissance 
critique qui refuse d’abandonner aux usages résiduels deux langues histori-
quement décalées, mais toujours vivantes de l’espace méditerranéen. 
Cette digression théorique permet de déplacer la question does culture mat-
ter ? de ses préoccupations politologiques et de sa visée fonctionnaliste à 
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partir du haut magistère de l’Université de Harvard, vers l’anthropologie 
comme critique des cultures, toutes les cultures et en premier lieu, celle qui 
s’autorise à s’interroger sur le statut cognitif et les fonctions nécessaires ou 
seulement instrumentales et utilitaires de la culture. Je ne puis pousser plus 
loin ici ces mises au point méthodologiques et épistémologiques. Je signa-
lerai, cependant, à titre d’exemple éclairant, que l’anthropologie comme 
critique des cultures s’oblige à rompre avec tous les discours de victimisa-
tion des dominés face aux dominants pour ne pas idéologiser l’analyse cri-
tique ; elle conquiert ainsi l’autorité nécessaire pour soumettre la culture 
dominante aux questions de l’épistémologie programmatique rejetées le 
plus souvent avec dédain par l’establishment académique qui distribue les 
homologations intellectuelles, scientifiques et culturelles de toute produc-
tion de l’esprit. Ainsi, il serait facile de montrer comment une certaine pro-
duction historiographique et politologique de l’après-guerre froide large-
ment médiatisée en « Occident » , construit des Figures de l’ennemi, de 
l’actant dévoyé et menaçant de l’histoire pour combler le vide laissé par la 
menace communiste dans le fonctionnement mythologique nécessaire à 
tout imaginaire collectif. Le succès mondial d’un simple article de S. Hun-
tington en 1993 atteste la portée anthropologique d’une pratique des cultu-
res même en situation d’hégémonie pour créer des faire-valoir apologéti-
ques ou des héros négatifs servant de cibles à toutes les formes de la 
« guerre juste ». Cette expression qui remonte à Saint Augustin, travaillée 
par le Coran sous le nom de jihâd, a été utilisée spontanément, sans concer-
tation préalable, par G. Bush et F. Mitterrand pour légitimer la guerre du 
Golfe. Saddam Hussein de son côté, avait mobilisé l’imaginaire de ses 
troupes en parlant de la « mère des batailles » au nom d’une cause juste, 
autre façon de parler du jihâd dans la culture musulmane. Nous saisissons 
là le socle sémantique et sémiotique profond de l’imaginaire commun à 
toutes les cultures méditerranéennes enracinées par les trois théologies mo-
nothéistes médiévales dans un grand récit de fondation commun. Loin 
d’avoir aboli ce récit par une pratique sémiotique radicalement différente, 
le nouveau récit de fondation institué par la raison moderne n’a en fait 
changé que l’outillage technologique de l’investigation scientifique. La 
confiance eschatologique dans le Salut éternel a été remplacée par 
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l’espérance fragile, mais technologiquement fondée de l’allongement de 
l’espérance de vie.  
Revenons à l’espace méditerranéen. On commencera par identifier les mul-
tiples obstacles qu’il importe de lever pour assigner à la recherche de nou-
velles contributions à l’épistémologie programmatique, offrir aux systèmes 
éducatifs des questionnements critiques plus exigeants et des introductions 
plus ouvertes à la pratique de interculturalité et de l’intercréativité, créer les 
conditions irréversibles d’un renversement des rapports entre la priorité de 
fait donnée à la culture technologique indissociable des volontés de puis-
sance et la primauté de droit d’une culture humaniste vouée à la construc-
tion d’un sujet humain capable d’exercer toutes les responsabilités – qui 
restent à définir par cette culture – d’une gouvernance à l’échelle mondiale. 
IDENTIFIER LES OBSTACLES  
Nostalgies poético-culturelles, thématiques politico-religieuses, rêveries 
romantiques d'Andalousies perdues (la pax romana, le miracle grec, l'An-
dalousie musulmane), joie de vivre de touristes nantis, avides de mer, de 
soleil et de senteurs introuvables dans les régions riches, mais brumeuses 
du Nord, stratégies politiques de domination contrastant avec les quêtes 
obstinées d'un sens et de valeurs toujours revisités : l'espace méditerranéen 
ne cesse de nourrir tout cela à la fois. Et pourtant, il est inexorablement mi-
norisé, marginalisé, satellisé en tant que référent historique obligé de tous 
les peuples, tous les états-nations qui constituent l’Europe et ses expansions 
dans les Amériques, en Australie, en Nouvelle Zélande, en Afrique du Sud 
blanche. Il est vrai que des mémoires collectives nombreuses se sont cons-
truites au sein de l’espace global nommé l’Europe ou l’Occident ; mais on 
s’autorise aujourd’hui à parler d’une « Communauté » occidentale fondée 
sur les valeurs partagées de démocratie et de droits de l’homme. Plusieurs 
peuples de l’espace méditerranéen sont restés en dehors de ce parcours his-
torique récent, vécu en Europe-Occident comme une rupture saine, irréver-
sible avec les sources et lieux de mémoires que le judéo-christianisme, lui-
même construit dans la foulée de la modernité, continue de situer dans cet 
Orient dit Proche bien que, dans les imaginaires politiques actuels, il soit 
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aussi extrême que la Chine ou l’Indonésie. Même le miracle grec et le droit 
romain si longtemps et fièrement invoqués pour construire l’identité euro-
péenne subissent une éclipse dans la nouvelle culture où l’identité euro-
péenne se dilue dans un Occident de plus en plus façonné par la culture de 
McWorld.  Des siècles d’histoire intellectuelle et spirituelle du monde mé-
diterranéen sont rendus obsolètes non seulement par la puissance civilisa-
tion technologique, mais par la crise du statut même de la personne hu-
maine et de sa dignité. Les spéculations de la philosophie libérale 
américaine sur l’idée de justice, ou la culture des sociétés dites pluralistes, 
les appels de Jean-Paul II à la rechristianisation du monde, les efforts de 
médiation intellectuelle pour une pratique interactive de la recherche philo-
sophique et de la recherche théologique divorcées dans les conditions 
d’exclusion réciproques générées par les guerres de religion en Europe, ap-
paraissent dérisoires au regard de la dynamique historique que l’alliance 
Europe-Occident prétend gérer avec responsabilité. Je laisse aux grands 
gestionnaires intellectuels, religieux, politiques de cette dynamique le soin 
d’évaluer les types et la portée des responsabilité qu’ils assument pour la 
condition humaine, au-delà des nations, des communautés dont ils sont les 
serviteurs attitrés. On ne discerne ni programme mobilisateur, ni volonté 
politique efficace pour prendre en charge cette évidence historique : aux 
finalités religieuses et/ou philosophiques assignées jusqu’ici au dévelop-
pement historique de l'homme et des sociétés en contexte historique médi-
terranéen, s'oppose désormais une mondialisation vécue comme un destin 
sans finalité clairement définie et dûment intériorisée. L’évidence ainsi 
énoncée demande des éclaircissements.  
Le contexte historique méditerranéen n’a aucun monopole ni dans 
l’invention, ni dans la gestion des finalités assignées à la destinée de 
l’homme ; ces finalités sont soumises à la même contingence historique qui 
condamne toutes les productions culturelles des hommes en société à des 
évolutions ou à des disparitions. Cependant, cette con -tingence radicale est 
travestie, en tout cas domestiquée précisément par les religions monothéis-
tes et la métaphysique classique instaurée par les puissantes traditions pla-
tonicienne et aristotélicienne. Les idées de création divine et d’éternité du 
monde, de Parole de Dieu révélée et d’Intellect agent illuminant la raison 
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dans ses activités discursives ont dominé pendant des siècles ce que les phi-
losophes et les sociologues appellent aujourd’hui l’institution sociale-
historique de l’esprit humain lui-même. Nous savons que cette lecture 
« matérialiste » - pas du tout au sens marxiste – de l’esprit est loin d’être 
partagée dans ce que j’appellerai la logosphère occidentale contemporaine. 
Voyez les usages politico-religieux que les croyants de toutes appartenan-
ces font du retour de la religion ou même du Livre, la prolifération des sec-
tes dans les sociétés les plus «  rationalisées  », la réactivation par des 
« Eglises » concurrentes comme au Moyen Age, des problématiques de la 
foi et de la raison, des valeurs spirituelles et du matérialisme athée, etc. La 
pointe moderne et la culture médiatrice qui permettent de gonfler toutes 
sortes de discours interprétatifs dans l’Occident privé de finalités spirituel-
les et éthiques, demeurent celles fournies par Max Weber abondamment 
cité par tous les chercheurs et penseurs en quête de scientificité sur des 
problèmes plus embrouillés que jamais. 
Quel rôle jouent l’islam et le judaïsme dans cette gestion du destin de la 
condition humaine monopolisée par la logosphère occidentale ? En tant que 
forces de soulèvement historique dans l’espace méditerranéen, l’islam et le 
judaïsme ont une prééminence que je n’ai pas besoin d’expliciter ici. Je 
m’en tiendrai aux précisions suivantes. 
Malgré son antériorité chronologique dans la conceptualisation de la thé-
matique fondatrice, commune aux trois religions monothéistes (Dieu uni-
que, vivant, acteur de l’histoire du Salut des hommes créatures, fonction 
médiatrice des prophètes et du discours prophétique qui articule la Parole 
révélée de Dieu ; Loi divine fixant les normes et les voies éthiques, spiri-
tuelles, juridiques qui orientent le parcours terrestre vers la Vie éternelle) ; 
malgré tout cela qui demeure incontestable, le judaïsme est resté sous le 
régime de la « protection » (ahl al-dhimma) en contextes islamiques jus-
qu’à la création de l’Etat d’Israël ; il n’a été émancipé du contrôle politique 
et théologique du christianisme qu’après les révolutions modernes. Il n’a 
connu ni les expansions conquérantes à travers le monde, ni les tensions 
entre les formations étatiques et l’instance de l’autorité religieuse qui ont 
conditionné le devenir de l’islam et du christianisme. La singularité histori-
que et sociologique du judaïsme en tant que religion –je veux dire une voie 
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parmi d’autres de l’expérience humaine divin à travers toutes les contrain-
tes du déploiement social-historique de l’existence humaine – a pris fin 
avec la création de l’Etat d’Israël. Des penseurs juifs ont ressenti cette rup-
ture et tenté de penser ses conséquences : à savoir l’indépendance trop cher 
payée de l’instance religieuse par rapport à l’instance politique, ou la né-
cessité d’instrumentaliser la religion pour conquérir une souveraineté poli-
tique sur un territoire porteur de tous les récits fondateurs, de toutes les 
symboliques religieuses de ce socle commun de la conscience monothéiste 
évoquée ci-dessus.  
Je dois évoquer un autre exemple riche d’enseignements pour l’analyse de 
la singularité reconnue au judaïsme dans l’espace géohistorique méditerra-
néen : il s’agit de la communauté ismaélienne réactivée au 19
e siècle sous 
le protectorat britannique en Inde avec un Imamat, c’est-à-dire une gui-
dance spirituelle. Il y a aujourd’hui une diaspora ismaélienne aussi étendue 
que la diaspora juive ; son credo et ses pratiques rituelles ne comportent 
aucune référence à une terre promise susceptible d’être revendiquée comme 
la base territoriale d’un Etat indépendant. La communauté fortement sou-
dée autour d’une instance vivante de l’autorité spirituelle (l’Imam Karim 
Aga Khan) est en train de dépasser ses particularismes sectaires pour 
s’insérer avec son identité historique non seulement dans  l’islam comme 
religion, mais dans le monde moderne avec ses défis, ses tâtonnements et 
ses avancées dans l’émancipation de la condition humaine. On peut dire 
que la communauté ismaélienne assure à une échelle plus modeste la relève 
historique de cette singularité perdue par le judaïsme. 
Cela n’est évidemment pas le cas de l’islam majoritaire dans ses deux 
grandes versions sunnite et shî‘ite. J’ai souvent utilisé une définition heu-
ristique de cet islam pour le situer dans la problématique centrale et récur-
rente de toute l’histoire de la théologie et de la philosophie politiques dans 
l’espace méditerranéen : l’islam est théologiquement protestant et politi-
quement catholique. J’ai lancé cette définition, je le répète heuristique et 
non fermée, pour atteindre deux objectifs :  
montrer l’indigence intellectuelle de toute l’islamologie classique relayée 
par la politologie « moderne » qui enseignent que « l’Islam » - avec un I 
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majuscule renvoyant à l’Islam orthodoxe construit par la tradition islami-
que et transcrit avec « objectivité » par l’islamologie classique – a, dès ses 
origines, confondu les sphères du religieux et du politique ;  
mettre fin à cette fausse singularité en déplaçant toute la question de son 
cadre théologique orthodoxe transformé en clôture dogmatique encore plus 
rigide par le fondamentalisme actuel, vers une histoire comparée des sys-
tèmes théologico-juridiques monothéistes, utilisée elle-même comme une 
introduction nécessaire à une anthropologie des rapports dans toutes les 
cultures – y compris la moderne – entre plusieurs triangles anthropologi-
ques comme religion, société, politique; violence, sacré, vérité  ; langue, 
histoire, pensée, etc.   
Je ne reprendrai pas ici un parcours théorique et pluridisciplinaire com-
plexe qu’on trouvera plus détaillé dans mes divers écrits déjà publiés. Pour 
les différences doctrinales entre islam sunnite et islam shî ‘ite, je renvoie 
provisoirement à une étude ancienne que je suis en train d’approfondir sur 
« Le remembrement de la conscience islamique » in Critique de la Raison 
Islamique. Mon propos est de montrer comment la recherche scientifique 
elle-même sur les traditions de pensée et de culture dans l’espace méditer-
ranéen, consolide et même ajoute des obstacles épistémologiques à la 
communication entre les cultures au lieu de créer les conditions d’un dé-
passement des fausses con -naissances que chaque tradition a accumulées 
sur elle-même. C’est tout le sens de ma Critique de la Raison islamique. 
Car le travail de libération doit commencer à l’intérieur de chaque tradition 
qui doit apprendre à intégrer le regard critique de ceux-là mêmes présentés 
comme des opposants, des ennemis, des hérétiques, des infidèles selon les 
critères de l’hérésiographie médiévale et de nos idéologies modernes 
d’autoproclamation et d’autopromotion de soi. Dans les conditions géopoli-
tiques qui s’imposent aujourd’hui dans tout l’espace méditerranéen, on peut 
seulement tenter de nourrir, comme je le fais dans cet essai, une vision 
neuve et programmatique de ce que seraient la posture cognitive de l’esprit, 
l’environnement culturel qui rendraient possible et médiatiseraient 
l’accomplissement de tant de tâches libératrices. Rêver d’une pensée et 
d’une culture qui permettraient de dénouer tous les nœuds d’ignorances, de 
fausses légitimités légués par les passés érigés en consciences croyantes, en 
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mémoires identitaires qui servent encore de refuges ou de tremplins pour 
mener des actions terroristes et des guerres d’un autre âge. Si un tel travail 
d’archéologie des consciences croyantes confrontées depuis le 19
e siècle 
aux consciences laïques anticléricales et, pire encore, à la culture de la mort 
de Dieu pendant le long intermède du communisme athée, nous dispose-
rions de plus de références culturelles et doctrinales pour relier les deux 
noms Israël-Palestine avec un trait d’union qui restituerait la richesse révé-
latoire et non plus révélée, de l’épopée spirituelle vécue sur cette terre sous 
la conduite de grandes voix prophétiques. Ce n’est point là un rêve 
d’idéalistes attardés et de croyants nostalgiques : le travail que j’évoque est 
commencé et se poursuit avec des chercheurs, des responsables religieux, 
des intellectuels, des hommes et des femmes de culture qui se rencontrent 
dans les séminaires d’études inter-religieuses, dans le cadre des chaires de 
théologie récemment créées par l’UNESCO, dans quelques institutions 
d’enseignement.  
Je suis depuis longtemps les travaux qui ouvrent les voies de l’enquête ar-
chéologique sur les consciences croyantes islamiques; les plus significatifs 
par leur richesse d’information, la rigueur de leurs méthodes sont signés 
par des islamologues comme J. Wansbrough, J. van Ess, M. Cook, Devin J. 
Stewart, G. Makdisi, U. Rubin… De jeunes chercheurs «  musulmans  » 
commencent à penser des problèmes que l’orthodoxie fixée depuis le 11
e 
siècle a maintenus dans l’impensable ; cependant, les nœuds de la croyance 
dogmatique comme le statut cognitif et l’historicité de la Révélation cora-
nique, la déconstruction du Mushaf, l’histoire des Corpus Officiel Clos (le 
Mushaf et les recueils de hadîth dans les lignes sunnite, shï‘ite, khârijite, la 
biographie critique de Muhammad, la question des fondements de la Loi 
religieuse…continuent d’être soit contournés, soit réaffirmés avec cette 
chaleur de foi qui met fin à toute forme de questionnement. Dans cette 
même perspective, la production catholique et protestante est évidemment 
plus abondante, plus variée, plus innovante. Quant aux contributions de la 
pensée juive, elles restent, à mon avis, trop marquées non pas tant par la 
timidité intellectuelle devant les impératifs de l’orthodoxie – au sens où je 
l’utilise – que par le poids constant, en arrière-fond de l’écriture, des condi-
tions historiques, religieuses et philosophiques du passage du judaïsme de 
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la diaspora au judaïsme de l’Etat d’Israël. Comme pour la pensée islamique 
telle que je la problématise dans mon Unthought in Contemporary Islamic 
Thought, je tiens l’enquête archéologique sur les conditions de ce passage 
pour l’impensé majeur de la pensée juive contemporaine. Les chemins à 
parcourir pour les trois religions monothéistes sont, on le voit, plus ou 
moins entamés selon les obstacles différents légués par le passé; il reste que 
l’accomplissement adéquat ou l’escamotage des tâches si longtemps diffé-
rées conditionneront la construction d’une culture de paix ou la récurrence 
des imaginaires d’exclusion réciproque dans l’espace méditerranéen, donc 
dans le reste du monde.  
POLITIQUE, CULTURES ET GOUVERNANCE DANS 
L’ESPACE MEDITERRANEEN A L’HORIZON 2010 
Revenons à l’histoire en cours. L’espace méditerranéen reste conditionné 
pour son avenir par 4 grandes forces: l’Europe-Occident incarné par les 
puissances du G7 étendu depuis peu à 8; l’Union européenne qui peut soit 
renforcer un eurocentrisme hégémonique par l’addition ou la juxtaposition 
des stratégies géopolitiques propres aux Etats-Nations qui la composent, 
soit affirmer une vocation humaniste transnationale qui lui permettrait 
d’orienter la mondialisation dans le sens de solidarités nouvelles entre les 
peuples réconciliés partout avec leurs Etats; le national-totalitarisme récur-
rent dans le style de l’ex Yougoslavie, et enfin la prétendue alternative is-
lamique nommée islamisme politique ou fondamentalisme islamique par 
les deux premiers protagonistes. Examinons brièvement la portée et quel-
ques significations de ces forces. 
L’instance du G7 pouvait aider à harmoniser les politiques des pays riches 
vis-à-vis des pays pauvres non pas tant en effaçant périodiquement des det-
tes ou en lançant des actions humanitaires pour soulager des malheurs liés à 
des tragédies programmées, mais en redessinant une nouvelle carte des 
sphères géopolitiques régionales qui auraient vocation à conduire des expé-
riences de démocratisation et de développement économique en harmonie 
avec les données historiques et culturelles dans chaque sphère. Le G 7 
contribuerait ainsi à l’effacement progressif des frontières nationales lé-
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guées par les systèmes coloniaux, aiderait à l’émergence d’identités larges, 
mieux ancrées dans des parcours historiques communs et des impératifs 
géographiques et écologiques favorables à des développements durables, 
mieux intégrés dans les courants de mondialisation. De telles visions au-
raient aussi donné aux Etats-Unis et à l’Union européenne une occasion de 
dépasser leurs rivalités qui rappellent celles qui ont longtemps opposé les 
États-nations européens. Mais l’intervention très discutée de l’OTAN au 
Kosovo et surtout l’échec de la réunion de Gênes ont bien montré les limi-
tes de la « gouvernance » des pays riches violemment contestés par des ré-
sistances dont il reste à vérifier si elles sont elles-mêmes porteuses d’une 
philosophie politique plus fiable pour l’instauration d’une instance mon-
diale de l’autorité politique. S’il se vérifie que l’engagement au Kosovo n’a 
été rendu possible que par la nécessité de défendre les valeurs de 
l’Euroland contre l’extension d’un néofascisme à partir des Balkans, il fau-
dra renoncer à l’utopie d’une intégration à terme de la Méditerranée 
« musulmane » dans la sphère géopolitique et géohistorique de l’Union eu-
ropéenne. Celle-ci a accueilli sans atermoiements la Grèce de culture et de 
confession chrétiennes orthodoxes, tandis que la Turquie et le Maroc qui 
frappent avec insistance à la même porte, demeurent en observation. Assu-
rément, la culture importe (Culture does matter) dans la construction de 
tout sujet humain; le problème qui se pose dans toutes les sociétés à 
l’horizon 2020 est d’inaugurer une politique de la culture de transition ca-
pable d’assurer le passage des identités culturelles fermées promues par les 
idéologies nationalistes de combat aux pratiques métamodernes de 
l’interculturalité déjà présentes dans les «  maisons des cultu -res du 
monde » à Paris et à Berlin par exemple. C’est l’intercréativité dynamisée 
par la multiplication des festivals internationaux de la jeunesse qui rendra 
possible l’émergence d’instances de la gouvernance dans le monde et 
d’abord dans le cadre très prometteur de la sphère géohistorique euro-
méditerranéenne. Je tempère cette vision optimiste pourtant à notre portée, 
par un constat pessimisme: les inspirateurs des rencontres euro-
méditerranéennes depuis Barcelonne, sont davantage préoccupés par 
l’urgence des problèmes posés par l’immigration et l’idéologie islamiste 
véhiculée par des militants à l’échelle mondiale, que par les perspectives 
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d’une politique audacieuse de l’interculturalité qui a, de surcroît, l’avantage 
d’apporter une réponse de fond à la crise généralisée de la culture civique 
dans toutes les sociétés contemporaines. J’observe dans tous les pays mem-
bres de l’Union européenne que les gouvernements se contentent d’apaiser 
les revendications des immigrés musulmans en leur offrant des mosquées et 
la possibilité de se procurer de la viande licite. On respecte ainsi la liberté 
des cultes garantie par les constitutions ; mais on ne s’interroge pas sur les 
contenus des sermons et plus généralement le discours social qui circule 
dans l’espace sacré des mosquées. Les fidèles qui fréquentent les mosquées 
en Europe comme dans tout le monde musulman ont un besoin vital d’une 
information moderne non seulement sur leur religions, mais sur les reli-
gions présentes dans les sociétés pluralistes européennes. Je crie partout 
depuis des années que cette information de portée civique et strictement 
scientifique n’est pas disponible dans des formes et des espaces de commu-
nication accessible aux catégories socio-culturelles que constituent les im-
migrés. Je peux témoigner à partir de mes contacts continus dans toute 
l’Europe que la question cruciale de l’expression intellectuelle et scientifi-
que de la pensée islamique contemporaine n’est perçue ni comme une ré-
ponse politique urgente, ni encore moins comme l’un des fondements les 
plus solides d’une culture civique à l’échelle mondiale (voir mon The Un-
thought déjà cité).   
Gilles Kepel a montré dans son dernier livre
4 que les « menaces » de la pré-
tendue alternative islamique ne correspondent à aucune réalité doctrinale, 
encore moins militaire ou économique, ni dans la sphère méditerranéenne, 
ni ailleurs dans le monde. L’épouvantail islamiste a cependant servi à voi-
ler les difficultés que les rencontres euro-arabes n’ont pas reconnues les 
interventions prioritaires qu’on vient d’évoquer. Les irrédentismes confes-
sionnels, nationalistes, identitaristes se sont multipliés et amplifiés dans 
l’aire méditerranéennes à la mesure des mémoires collectives à la fois très 
anciennes et toujours vivaces au sein des millet, ces organisations confes-
sionnelles communautaristes léguées par l’Empire ottoman, ou ces groupes 
mafieux de l’Italie et de la France du sud. On a en Syrie une butte-témoin 
de cette donnée historique et sociologique majeure : le village de Ma‘lûla 
 
4    Jihad. Expansion et Déclin de l’islamisme, Paris 2000. 
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parle encore l’araméen déjà délaissé par les Evangélistes qui ont préféré le 
grec pour transcrire le message de Jésus de Nazareth, consacrant ainsi la 
première rupture sémantique et culturelle entre une tradition culturelle 
« sémitique » avec l’hébreu, l’araméen, le syriaque, l’arabe et une tradition 
« occidentale » avec le grec et le latin. La deuxième guerre mondiale a 
considérablement aggravé la dialectique sociale et politique des puissances 
et des résidus à travers le monde, mais plus dramatiquement encore dans 
l’aire méditerranéenne. Les puissances, ce sont les majorités religieuses, 
ethnolinguistiques et culturelles dont on peut suivre la montée dans 
l’histoire depuis le Moyen Age : les Empires, le califat, les monarchies, les 
états-nations. A partir du 19
e siècle, il y a eu le panislamisme, le panara-
bisme, le Pan-turquisme, le Pan-iranisme diversement utilisés par les mou-
vements nationalistes  ; du côté européen, la victoire des alliés a libéré 
l’Europe occidentale de la tentation fasciste totalitaire, mais renforcé la 
puissance idéologique du communisme soviétique qui, avec la politique des 
nationalités semblable à celle des millet, a figé l’évolution interne de plu-
sieurs groupes ethnolinguistiques et religieux constitués en résidus d’une 
histoire universelle et révolutionnaire dirigée par les grands timoniers ri-
vaux. Ainsi, se sont exacerbées des frustrations et des humiliations séculai-
res: langues et cultures écrasées, persécutions pour des croyances et coutu-
mes non conformes aux orthodoxies  religieuses et/ou idéologiques 
officielles, tensions réprimées entre  « élites »  dominantes,  riches  et 
« cultivées » des villes et masses paysannes, montagnardes ou pastorales 
« incultes » des périphéries et des provinces éloignées des centres. Les op-
positions nord/sud avec leurs polarisations idéologiques se retrouvent dans 
tout le pourtour de la Méditerranée.  
Comment sont gérés les irrédentismes légués par le passé et ceux que génè-
rent encore les états-partis post-coloniaux ? Enumérons les irrédentismes 
juif/musulman/chrétien ; juifs/arabes ; berbère/arabe ; kurde/turc/arabe/ ira-
nien; serbe orthodoxe/bosnien et albanais musulman  ; armé-
nien/russe/arabe/turc; grec orthodoxe/turc musulman  ; coptes/musulmans; 
basques, corses, îles italiennes/métropoles. On peut ajouter les oppositions 
d’essence idéologique, non moins virulentes et difficiles à dépasser entre 
les états-nations arabes eux-mêmes après les grands élans romantiques vers 
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la Nation Arabe Unie du Ba‘th et de Nasser jusqu’à la grande désillusion de 
1967, suivie par celle de la guerre du Golfe; entre la Grèce et la Turquie et 
Chypre toujours divisée; la Syrie et l’Irak ; la Syrie et le Liban ; l’Irak et 
l’Iran ; l’Egypte et le Soudan ; la Libye contre tous ; l’Algérie contre le 
Maroc…La longévité politique des chefs historiques ou dynastiques dans 
les payas arabes a favorisé la formation de groupes de pressions, de mafias 
politico-financières, d’enclaves socio-économiques dans des sociétés où le 
chômage, la marginalisation, les idéologies populistes constituent autant 
d’obstacles à des politiques d’émancipation et surtout d’intégration dans 
des ensembles euro-méditerranéens plus libérateurs. Je rappelle les dates 
suivantes : Hussein de Jordanie :1954-1999 ; Hassan II : 1961-1999 ; Kad-
hafi 1969— ; Arafat 1967— ; Asad 1979-2000 ; Saddam Hussein 1978 — ; 
Tunisie : deux présidents depuis 1956; Egypte trois depuis 1951. Il faut no-
tamment poser la question du poids politique d’une démocratie arithméti-
que manipulée par des alliances fondées sur des solidarités néopatriarcales.  
Devant ces faits massifs qui relèvent de l’anthropologie culturelle, sociale 
et politique, de l’histoire générale, de l’économie et de la géopolitique, que 
disent, que font les chercheurs, les penseurs, les intellectuels, les responsa-
bles politiques, les grands acteurs économiques, les hautes instances reli-
gieuses de chaque société civile là où elle peut s’organiser et s’exprimer 
pleinement? Quels leaders ont pesé le plus lourdement sur la manipulation 
des mémoires collectives, l’orientation du destin historique de chaque peu-
ple en intégrant ou rejetant les dimensions d’une civilisation méditerra-
néenne? Et comment faire aujourd’hui, devant les obstacles anciens et nou-
veaux qu’on vient d’évoquer, pour que la personne humaine ne soit plus un 
concept spéculatif utilisé pour travestir, sacraliser, moraliser des conduites 
radicalement anti-humanistes? Je pense aux mises en scène de pratiques 
démocratiques formelles par des régimes totalitaires ou conservateurs; aux 
discours moralisateurs, non moins formels des défenseurs occidentaux des 
droits de l’homme alors que le contrôle géopolitique de la carte du monde 
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et spécialement celle du Middle East au sens américain
5, reste ce qu’elle est 
depuis le 19
e siècle.  
Dans toutes les traditions méditerranéennes, on enseigne depuis le temps 
lointain des Miroirs de princes
6 que la responsabilité intellectuelle dans la 
tradition philosophique, la responsabilité spirituelle dans les traditions reli-
gieuses sont en amont de la responsabilité morale qui fonde elle-même la 
construction des légitimités juridiques et politiques.. Dans ses exposés sa-
vants et didactiques, la pensée moderne continue de discuter les conditions 
de légitimité de tout pouvoir selon la philosophie morale et politique; le 
sujet transcendantal kantien, la Cité de Dieu selon Saint Augustin, la Cité 
vertueuse selon Fârâbî, la gouvernance du Juste (wilâyat al-faqîh) dans la 
Tradition shî‘ite banalisée par Khomeini, la gouvernance selon la Loi di-
vine (al-siyâsa-lshar‘iyya) selon les Sunnites (Ibn Taymiyya banalisé dans 
le régime saoudien), demeurent, avec les corrections réalistes de Machiavel 
et d’Ibn Khaldoun, des références familières dans l’imaginaire éthico-
politique méditerranéen. C’est pourquoi on entend même des personnalités 
politiques faire appel à des interventions plus fréquentes d’« intellectuels » 
capables d’enrichir des débats sur les nouvelles articulations de l’autorité et 
du pouvoir. Les cultures populaires méditerranéennes savent en même 
temps que dans l’histoire concrète, le calcul politique manipule toutes les 
formes de la responsabilité pour faire prévaloir les impératifs immédiats de 
la Realpolitik. L’arme de la dérision est partout maniée avec une cruelle 
justesse dans les bons mots, les anecdotes piquantes qui rempliraient des 
volumes pour chaque pays où sévissent depuis des décennies des Etats 
contre les peuples. Le regretté Sayyid ‘Uways, un sociologue égyptien, a eu 
l’heureuse idée sous le règne du Za‘îm Abd al-Nasser, de publier les lettres 
adressées au tombeau de Shâfi‘î (m. 820) par des paysans lésés pendant la 
révolution collectiviste; il a donné la parole aussi à une autre catégorie du 
peuple égyptien réduite au silence en publiant les inscriptions relevées à 
l’intérieur des taxis du Caire.  
 
5    Voir le livre alerte, incisif et très nuancé de R. Stephen Humphreys : Between Memory and Desire. 
The Middle East in a Trouble Age, University of California Press 1999. On notera la charge poétique 
et la pertinence psycho-historique du titre. 
6    Voir Jocelyne Dakhliya, Le divan des Princes, Le politique et le religieux dans l’islam, Aubier, Paris 
1998. 
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Ces deux versants savant et populaire de l’imaginaire éthico-politique des 
peuples méditerranéens traduisent la permanence de structures sociales pa-
triarcales et d’institutions politiques patrimoniales depuis l’antiquité jus-
qu’à nos jours. L’attente messianique d’une gouvernance juste a accompa-
gné pendant des siècles un système d’organisation sociale et politique que 
les religions autant que la philosophie politique ont transfiguré en Repré-
sentations symboliques idéales qui nourrissent l’attente eschatologique spi-
ritualisée et intellectualisée chez les élites savantes, ritualisée et stigmatisée 
à la fois par l’arme de la dérision dans les cultures orales populaires. Deux 
facteurs historiques décisifs ont toujours et partout manqué dans les contex-
tes méditerranéens ainsi délimités anthropologiquement:  
La montée irrésistible et continue d’une classe sociale qui brise de façon 
irréversible les fondements patriarcaux et patrimoniaux de l’ordre écono-
mique, social et politique en imposant par la subversion simultanée des 
champs intellectuel, religieux, politique et économique hérités – comme l’a 
fait la bourgeoisie conquérante en Europe – une culture de développement 
du capital social et de l’investissement économique, un système de produc-
tion et d’échange à vocation mondiale, un droit moderne fondé sur la né-
cessité pour l’homme de repenser sans cesse l’historicité de sa condition. A 
cet égard, l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) pourrait jouer un 
rôle éducatif décisif en contraignant les divers décideurs des pays en quête 
de modernité à initier des politiques de développement durables et intégra-
teur dans les circuits mondiaux.    
Un processus historique également continu de mise en place simultanée 
d’un Etat de droit et d’une société civile comme agents interactifs liés par 
un contrat constitutionnel où sont définis les droits et les obligations de 
chaque agent pour garantir à tous les citoyens les protections, les ressour-
ces, les droits nécessaires au déploiement optimal de leur vocation de sujets 
humains collectivement responsables de l’émancipation de la condition 
humaine.  
La formulation et la portée historique déterminante de ces deux facteurs 
demeurent ouvertes à toutes les discussions, à toutes les corrections, à tous 
les compléments. J’ai essayé d’y inclure tout ce que je sais de l’histoire gé-
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nérale de la pensée dans l’aire méditerranéenne, des développements de 
cette pensée sur les deux rives « islamique-orientale » et « chrétienne-euro-
occidentale  » (terminologie impropre  : tout l’effort de repenser tant 
d’héritages et de problèmes vise précisément à faire déboucher sur une 
conceptualisation plus englobante et en même temps plus adéquate). Les 
objections sur les dérives colonialistes, impérialistes, racistes de la bour-
geoisie conquérante ne sont pas pertinentes dans le cadre théorique 
d’analyse que je cherche à définir pour un ensemble géohistorique dont il 
importe d’abord d’identifier les données anthropologiques communes et les 
forces historiques interactives qui ont pesé de façon déterminante sur le 
partage géopolitique, géoculturel, géoéconomique d’aujourd’hui entre une 
Méditerranée archaïque, engluée dans des héritages très mal gérés et une 
Méditerranée tardivement intégrée dans la dynamique historique de 
l’Union européenne. En outre, la perspective de mes analyses est prospec-
tive ; elles ne reprennent les connaissances sur le passé que pour souligner 
qu’elles sont inadéquates, aliénantes, imaginaires, voire fausses, donc dan-
gereuses pour une pensée qui veut intégrer les chocs du futur sur le présent 
douloureux, tragique, ingérable de la Méditerranée soumise à des processus 
régressifs.  
Dès le 10
e siècle, l’historien Miskawayh(m. 1029) a écrit des pages moder-
nes pour dénoncer les méfaits économiques et sociaux du système de 
l’iqtâ‘, concessions faites aux militaires pour l’exploitation de terres riches 
dans le bas Irak. Ce système a affaibli les pouvoirs politiques, asservi les 
paysans aux féodaux parasites et prédateurs, appauvri la production, gêné 
les progrès de l’agriculture jusqu’à la fin de l’Empire ottoman ! On sait que 
les révolutions socialistes post-coloniales ont achevé la désintégration, à la 
manière de Staline, des mécanismes de solidarité naturelle et des codes 
culturels indissociables de la civilisation paysanne méditerranéenne. Cer-
tains pays, comme la Tunisie et le Maroc, ont été sauvés de justesse de la 
collectivisation socialiste ; mais la bureaucratie des États-Partis centralisa-
teurs et les pressions de la démographie ont partout généré des stratifica-
tions sociales perverses : une classe riche parasitaire, solidaire de l’État pa-
trimonial, incapable d’animer une culture de développement intégré 
entraînant tous les secteurs de la société globale ; de larges couches vouées, 
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selon plusieurs variables, au travail précaire, aux pratiques d’une économie 
souterraine, au chômage, aux formes populistes de l’expression religieuse 
et politique, aux conduites de violence ou à l’émigration clandestine; entre 
ces deux formations, on discerne aussi une classe intermédiaire tiraillée en-
tre le désir d’accéder aux privilèges d’en haut, et les menaces de dégrada-
tion vers le bas. A tous les niveaux de l’existence sociale, la publicité mar-
chande véhiculée par les médias suscite l’engouement des riches pour 
toutes les formes, tous les styles, tous les gadgets de modernisation maté-
rielle, exacerbe les frustrations des exclus aussi bien des protections de la 
famille traditionnelle que des droits conférés par toute citoyenneté mo-
derne. Dans ces conditions sociologiques, politiques et culturelles, l’accès à 
la modernité intellectuelle devient aléatoire, fragmentaire, voire impossible 
pour certaines catégories sociales. Je pense notamment à la condition fémi-
nine dans tous les contextes méditerranéens. Même les femmes les plus en-
gagées dans les luttes de libération n’intègrent pas toujours dans leurs pra-
tiques éducatives avec les enfants et leurs programmes d’action, les 
conditions socioculturelles globales pour les filles et les garçons, d’un égal 
accès à la modernité intellectuelle sans laquelle la construction d’un espace 
ouvert de la citoyenneté demeure fragile et illusoire
7. Il faut souligner 
qu’une enquête sociologique sur les degrés de pénétration et les modes de 
présence de ce que j’appelle la modernité intellectuelle dans toutes sociétés 
« occidentales » contemporaines, révéleraient des négligences, des indiffé-
rences, des confusions, des absences, des ignorances, des inconsciences, 
voire des rejets qui expliquent les larges possibilités laissées aux directeurs 
de campagnes électorales et aux politiciens en général pour manipuler les 
imaginaires sociaux. 
APPROFONDISSEMENTS : DROITS DE L’HOMME, 
IDENTITES CULTURELLES ET COHESION SOCIALE 
DANS L’ESPACE MEDITERRANEEN 
On pourrait objecter que tout ce qui précède incite à la réflexion, mais reste 
trop général. Il est vrai qu’il est nécessaire d’entrer dans des situations 
 
7   Voir Camille Lacoste, La mère contre les filles,  
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concrètes, des problèmes précis vécus dans les différents contextes propres 
à chaque société. Les références bibliographiques abondent pour ceux qui 
voudraient élargir leur information. Pour approfondir l’analyse des conten-
tieux au sein de chaque société, entre les parcours historiques intra-
européens et, davantage encore, entre les pays de l’Euroland et ceux de la 
Méditerranée arabo-turco-irano-islamique, je retiendrai un fait récent qui 
permettra de mesurer le décalage historique qui sépare aujourd’hui les so-
ciétés des deux rives que les Romains pouvaient appeler Mare nostrum. On 
comparera la charte européenne des droits fondamentaux et les préambules 
des constitutions des pays arabo-turco-iraniens qui ont été les protagonistes 
de l’histoire générale de l’espace méditerranéen. La comparaison compren-
dra un moment historico-anthropologique et un moment philosophique ; sur 
la base des éclairages et des données indiscutables fournis par cette appro-
che comparée, on se de-mandera comment l’espace méditerranéen peut dé-
passer les clivages idéologiques qui continuent de nourrir des guerres civi-
les à l’intérieur de plusieurs sociétés et surtout de bloquer une politique de 
remembrement culturel et d’intégration économique de la sphère géohisto-
rique euro-méditerranéenne.  
Entre 1543 et 1687, de la révolution copernicienne aux Philosophiae natu-
ralis principia mathematica de Newton, l’Europe a eu le privilège de vivre 
des révolutions scientifiques successives qui ont fait de cette partie du 
monde un pôle incontournable de la production de l’histoire, un moment 
décisif de l’aventure moderne de l’homme
8. Tous les savoirs, toutes les 
croyances et de larges pans des théologies et des philosophies légués par 
l’Antiquité et le Moyen Age dans l’espace méditerranéen, ont été subvertis 
à des degrés divers par la nouvelle manière de penser le monde et la condi-
tion humaine. Cela explique les tensions avec le magistère catholique, le 
succès du protestantisme en phase avec la modernité, les résistances ou la 
mise à l’écart du judaïsme et de l’islam. Pour celui-ci, la nécessité histori-
que des luttes anticoloniales et anti-impérialistes continue de servir d’alibi 
mobilisateur pour voiler les processus de régression et de sous-
développement à l’œuvre à l’intérieur des régimes politiques, des sociétés, 
des systèmes culturels de représentation de soi qui ont prévalu depuis les 
 
8   Voir Paolo Rossi : La naissance de la science moderne en Europe, Seuil 1999. 
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13
e-14
e siècles. On peut parler historiquement de processus de régression et 
de sous-développement dans les contextes islamiques pour deux raisons: il 
y a régression par rapport au dynamisme créateur de l’islam classique, 
sous-développement par rapport aux forces de développement qui soule-
vaient dans la même période, les sociétés de la rive chrétienne et euro-
péenne de la Méditerranée.  
La Charte des droits fondamentaux dans l’U.E. stipule en préambule de la 
Convention 47 du 14/9/2000:  
« S’inspirant de son héritage culturel, humaniste et religieux, l’Union se 
fonde sur les principes indivisibles et universels de la dignité de la per-
sonne, de la liberté, de l’égalité et de la solidarité ; elle repose sur les 
principes de démocratie et de l’Etat de droit ».  
Le 22/9/2000, L. Jospin téléphone à Roman Herzog pour « rappeler que la 
France est une République laïque et que la référence à l’héritage religieux 
de l’Union est inacceptable pour elle ». Pour justifier cette intervention, M. 
Moscovici, chargé des affaires européennes, invoque la Constitution: « Il 
n’y a dans notre constitution aucune référence d’aucune sorte à un héri-
tage religieux. Nous considérons donc que cette mention est contraire à 
l’esprit laïc de nos institutions et va bien au-delà de nos traditions constitu-
tionnelles qu’elle obligerait à modifier ». On lit dans le préambule de la 
Constitution de 1958 : « La France est une République indivisible, laïque, 
démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité devant la loi de tous les ci-
toyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte tou-
tes les croyances ». Cela se traduit dans la pratique institutionnelle par la 
gestion des « cultes » par le ministre de l’intérieur. La République « une et 
indivisible » - comme Allah dans le Coran – fait l’objet de débats passion-
nés qui prennent des allures de credo et peuvent conduire à la démission 
d’un ministre. Cela fait partie de qu’on appelle « l’exception française ».  
On peut mesurer dans l’argumentaire juridique du ministre français à pro-
pos de la laïcité à quel point le raisonnement historien est totalement ab-
sent. Chaque préambule de toute constitution se présente comme un Mo-
ment inaugurateur fixant un encodage juridique explicite de toutes les 
activités des citoyens à l’intérieur d’un espace politique territorialement 
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délimité par des frontières reconnues dans des traités internationaux. Les 
défenseurs de la République indivisible refusent de s’interroger sur les 
conditions historiques (incluant l’idéologie et les postulats philosophiques 
des rédacteurs de la constitution) qui ont commandé les options politiques 
inscrites dans la constitution. Il faut des crises sociales et politiques excep-
tionnelles pour qu’une constitution change les options de portée religieuse 
ou philosophique. D’une constitution à l’autre, cependant, on relève une 
continuité des principes sacrés qui fondent l’être « historique » de la Na-
tion-Communauté. Du point de vue de la critique historique des systèmes 
de pensée en compétition lors de la rédaction de toute Loi fondamentale, 
les corpus religieux fondateurs et les corpus « laïcs » des constitutions mo-
dernes présentent plusieurs traits communs dans les processus de concep-
tualisation, puis de promotion aux fonctions d’instance suprême de 
l’autorité. Une fois votée, une constitution est l’objet de discussions exégé-
tiques par un corps d’experts exactement comme les textes religieux fonda-
teurs le sont pour les théologiens-juristes. La critique moderne de la raison 
juridique s’abstient de franchir les limites qui protègent la constitution en 
vigueur, tout comme les corpus religieux sont ouverts aux exégèses, mais 
non à la subversion de leur statut de Source fondatrice et légimante des lois 
de la cité. La pensée laïque encourage la subversion des corpus religieux, 
mais prescrit des limites quand il s’agit de corpus élaborés selon ses axio-
mes, ses principes, ses postulats philosophiques et juridiques. On sait que la 
philosophie du droit est une préoccupation secondaire, voire inutile pour les 
juristes; il en est de même bien sûr pour la Loi religieuse. Pourtant, 
l’exigence d’une critique de la raison juridique ne pas conduit pas à 
l’anarchie ou à un refus constant d’une Loi commune; elle permet seule-
ment d’accroître le rôle d’une société civile changeante dans le déclenche-
ment des procédures de révision et de discussion de tous les types de cons-
titution et de construction juridique. La démocratie parlementaire 
représentative est en train de montrer ses limites non pas dans les régimes 
autoritaires qui la pervertissent ouvertement, mais dans les pays d’Europe 
et d’Amérique où les procédures formelles sont respectées. 
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Qu’en est-il du côté des pays qui se réclament du modèle islamique. On 
partira de l’exemple égyptien qui a une portée paradigmatique pour les au-
tres.  
L’État, la société civile, l’individu, le droit positif, la séparation des pou-
voirs, le statut de la personne humaine, les libertés fondamentales de la per-
sonne et du citoyen, tout ce qui relève du travail de la modernité sur 
l’homme, la société, l’histoire, l’économie, la connaissance, la communica-
tion, la maîtrise de la nature, sont à l’ordre du jour des discussions couran-
tes en contextes islamiques. Selon les groupes sociaux et leurs références 
culturelles, ces discussions portent l’accent soit sur les conditions d’accès à 
un cadre laïc de pensée et de législation, soit sur l’application stricte de la 
Loi religieuse telle que l’ont articulée les docteurs fondateurs d’écoles, ce 
qui revient à maintenir la clôture théologique dogmatique également léguée 
par les docteurs médiévaux. Ceux-ci sont cités par les ulémas contempo-
rains comme l’instance de l’autorité dont il importe de maintenir la fiction. 
En fait, le clivage entre les deux positions n’est pas absolument étanche : il 
y a des partisans de la laïcité qui refusent la clôture religieuse, mais accep-
tent de fonctionner dans la clôture nationaliste laïcisante où le religieux fait 
son retour comme constituant de l’identité culturelle de la nation. La sortie 
de l’une et de l’autre clôture n’est guère constituée explicitement comme 
objet de recherche et de débat pour approfondir l’analyse critique des en-
jeux d’une troisième voie moins conflictuelle, plus programmatique visant 
à redéfinir laïcité et religion dans la perspective de dépassement proposée 
ci-dessus. On verra que cette troisième voie est en train de s’ouvrir en Eu-
rope grâce aux interactions entre les débats nationaux et les négociations au 
niveau de la Commission et du Parlement européens.  
En contextes islamiques, les Etats postcoloniaux ont rendu ces distinctions 
plus inaccessibles que jamais parce qu’ils ont étatisé l’islam de façon sys-
tématique. Ils ont ainsi dévoyé les expressions savantes de l’islam, combat-
tu ses expressions dites populaires et superstitieuses, sous prétexte de 
«  modernisation  » des croyances, favorisé l’émergence d’une religion et 
d’une « culture » politique populistes. L’analyse historique, sociologique, 
culturelle de ces transformations entre 1950-2001 reste disparate, fragmen-
taire et surtout coupée des données de la longue durée en ce qui concerne la 
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pensée islamique. Une question par exemple n’a jamais été retenue comme 
objet d’étude, à ma connaissance, par les chercheurs : parmi tous les minis-
tres de l’enseignement, de la culture, des affaires religieuses, de 
« l’orientation nationale » qui se sont succédés depuis les indépendances 
des différents pays musulmans, combien possédaient la culture historique 
moderne et l’autorité politique nécessaire pour infléchir le système éducatif 
et l’étatisation de la religion vers une vision moderne de la transformation 
nécessaire des rapports entre religion, politique et culture (Dîn, Dawla, Du-
nyâ), des conceptions léguées par l’islam classique aux acquits émancipa-
teurs indiscutables de la philosophie politique et juridique moderne ? La 
même enquête doit être étendue aux cadres sociaux de la connaissance in-
cluant les « intellectuels » pour monter que la posture intellectuelle requise 
pour penser et appliquer les transformations rendues plus urgentes encore 
par la propagation de la violence militante. Ce sont ces manques, ces vides, 
ces renoncements, les discours officiels régressifs comme en Algérie que je 
rassemble dans les concepts d’impensable et d’impensé dans la pensée is-
lamique contemporaine. 
« Au nom de quel droit » ? Cette question de grande actualité partout est le 
titre d’un livre que vient de publier Baudouin Dupret, un spécialiste de 
l’évolution du droit en Egypte notamment. C’est peut-être en Egypte, en 
effet, que la construction d’un droit positif moderne a connu des avancées 
significatives depuis les années 1930 grâce à de grands juristes comme 
Sanhouri et son disciple Chafik Chéhata. Pourtant, on lit dans le préambule 
de la constitution de 1980 les énoncés suivants : « L’islam est la religion de 
l’Etat, l’arabe sa langue officielle, et les principes de la sharî‘a la source 
principale de la législation ( mabâdi’ al-sharî‘a al-masdar al-ra’îsî li-
tashrî‘) ». Cet énoncé a suscité deux stratégies interprétatives : pour les uns 
« il n’y a pas de place en Egypte pour autre chose que la sharî‘a » ; pour 
d’autres, « l’article 2 ne peut être sanctionné que politiquement… ; la cons-
titution ne contient aucune norme objective sur laquelle une action en 
nullité pour inconstitutionnalité pourrait se baser ». (B. Dupret, Le prince 
et son juge, p. 107) 
Il y a des efforts certains des juristes en contextes islamiques pour libérer la 
sphère juridique de l’emprise dogmatique d’un droit religieux qui, au sur-
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plus, est resté à l’abri de toute critique portant sur ce que la pensée islami-
que a pratiqué sous le nom de sources-fondements du droit (Usûl al-dîn et 
Usûl al-fiqh). Mais l’étatisation totalitaire de la religion a atteint un tel ni-
veau de conditionnement des esprits et de fonctionnarisation des gestion-
naires du sacré et d’un nombre important « d’intellectuels », continue de 
maintenir le tabou sur tout projet de sortie de la clôture dogmatique perpé-
tuée depuis le 11
e-12
e siècle par ce que j’appelle les Corpus Officiels Clos 
de la croyance. Conscients de l’impossibilité politique, psycho-socio-
culturelle et juridique d’ouvrir directement ce chantier épineux, les juristes 
les plus éclairés mènent des combats périphériques et purement procédu-
riers et interprétatifs. On ne met jamais en question l’autorité divine des 
enseignements et des codes normatifs authentiquement transmis dans les 
Corpus déclaré orthodoxes ; on s’autorise seulement des audaces procédu-
rières pour faire prévaloir telle interprétation favorable à la philosophie des 
droits de l’homme partagée par les signataires de la Déclaration Universelle 
de l’ONU en 1948. Dans le Recueil des arrêts de la Haute Cour Constitu-
tionnelle égyptienne, on relève un exemple éclairant de cette position ré-
formiste (islâh) très ancienne dans la pensée islamique aussi bien que dans 
les autres traditions monothéistes. On opère un partage net entre les règles 
dont l’origine et la signification sont absolues, dirimantes (al-ahkâm al-
shar‘iyya al-qat’iyya fî thubûtihâ wa dalâlutuhâ) et les règles relatives re-
posant sur l’opinion (Al-ahkâm al-zanniyya). L’effort d’interprétation du 
juriste (ijtihâd) n’est possible que pour les secondes. Selon la hiérarchie de 
l’autorité des lois fixée par ce partage, l’application du droit moderne cons-
truit par les législateurs humains élus au suffrage universel, ne peut jamais 
prévaloir sur les principes définis par la Loi religieuse divine (sharî‘a). Au-
trement dit, celle-ci demeure à l’abri de toutes les formes de subversion 
imposée au droit canonique catholique en Europe à la fois par la montée 
d’une classe bourgeoise capitaliste et le travail de subversion intellectuelle 
des philosophes, des écrivains, des historiens, des artistes, etc. On sait que 
la critique philologique et historiciste a commencé, dès le 16
e siècle, à sub-
vertir l’héritage religieux du Moyen Age en s’appuyant sur les outillages 
mentaux de la raison classique, puis surtout la raison des Lumières, deve-
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nue le guide des constructions républicaines et démocratiques dans le 
champ historique commun dont on connaît l’expansion dans le monde.  
Avec la colonisation au 19
e siècle, les traditions religieuses et les cultures 
restées à l’écart de ce qu’il faut bien appeler la subversion intellectuelle et 
pas seulement politique, ont été exclues de l’imaginaire du progrès scienti-
fique par le regard ethnographique qui contribuait à la légitimation de la 
mission civilisatrice de la colonisation. Il est vrai qu’en Europe aussi les 
cultures dites « populaires », paysannes ont connu la même disqualifica-
tion, le même processus de réduction à l’état de résidus. Ainsi, la même 
critique historique qui a produit des effets libérateurs en Europe, a généré  
des champs de ruines dans les sociétés colonisées où la tradition est deve-
nue un refuge, un point d’appui pour résister à la domination étrangère. 
Lorsque, dans les années 1960, le discours de la décolonisation a proclamé 
« le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes », les contradictions entre 
l’aspiration aux libertés modernes et les politiques de traditionalisation et 
de reconstruction identitaire ont été exacerbées, rendant difficile, voire im-
possible la critique des fondements de la Loi et de la pensée religieuses 
dans tous les contextes islamiques. On peut faire aujourd’hui les bilans cri-
tiques de 40 à 50 ans de souveraineté politique nationale exercée par les 
« élites » censées éclairer la marche historique des peuples enfin libres de 
disposer d’eux-mêmes. Malheureusement, même cette tâche vitale est en-
core retardée ou faussée par le contrôle idéologique de tous les champs de 
la production historique des sociétés. Ces bilans doivent retenir en priorité 
les questions de l’Etat de droit et de son vis-à-vis dialectique la société ci-
vile, des instances de l’autorité légitimante, de l’autonomie dûment articu-
lée plutôt qu’une illusoire séparation des pouvoirs législatif, exécutif, judi-
ciaire, éducatif, spirituel  ; de la critique continue de la raison politique, 
juridique, économique visant à refonder sans cesse les légitimités.  
Il n’est pas possible de conclure cet essai qui propose des horizons de sens 
et d’espérance, ouvre des chantiers de réflexion et d’action pour une sphère 
géohistorique qui n’a pas eu depuis l’irruption des subversions modernes, 
les héros libérateurs, les chefs charismatiques, les créateurs de richesses 
intellectuelles et symboliques capables de réactiver et de prolonger les vi-
sions et les réalisations de la fonction prophétique. Celle-ci est à la fois in-
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voquée comme une instance vivante par les fidèles des trois religions 
« révélées », mais réduite à une survivance obstructive par la culture triom-
phante de l’incroyance. On ne perçoit pas clairement les suites historiques 
qu’aura la persistance de cette vieille polarisation de deux imaginaires du 
Salut: soit par la quête d’une Cité de Dieu sur terre, soit par la maîtrise 
technologique, mathématique, pragmatique du destin de l’homme grâce à la 
seule créativité de l’esprit autonome et responsable. Il faut en tout cas sortir 
de la pensée dualiste, dichotomique, manichéenne, essentialiste, substantia-
liste, fondamentaliste, qui perdure avec la polarisation idéologique des 
deux imaginaires. On aura compris que la troisième voie proposée dans cet 
essai n’utilise l’espace méditerranéen que comme un tremplin historique 
pour accompagner les combats engagés autour d’une mondialisation plus 
bénéfique pour tous les peuples que les grandes promesses mal tenues de la 
modernité des Lumières classiques. 
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Muslim and Western Civilization –          
Is Co-Prosperity and Peace Possible? 
Some Politically Important Differences  
In analyzing past, current, or future relations between Islam and the West, 
the political characteristics of these civilizations constitute a convenient 
starting point. To Muslims the West looks incurably secularist - not only 
because it tolerates atheism or agnosticism among its elites or even in much 
of the population in Europe (Berger 1996-97), but because it admits the le-
gitimacy of separating politics and religion. A Muslim political scientist 
teaching at an Islamic University (Moten 1996, p. 8) complains about this 
Christian peculiarity in the following terms: “The seeds of secularism are 
found in the doctrine of ‘dual swords’ which urges ‘rendering unto Caesar 
the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s’. This is 
interpreted to mean that human society is divinely ordained to be governed 
by two authorities, the spiritual and the temporal, and that none under 
Christian dispensation can possess both sacerdotium and imperium.“ In my 
view (Weede 1996, 2000; also Berman 1983; Bernholz 1995), the Christian 
separation between spiritual and temporal rule is one of the root causes of 
Western legal, political, social and economic development. It is not the 
only one, because the political fragmentation of the West has been at least 
as important, but rule divided between a temporal and a spiritual sphere is 
somewhat limited rule which is a prerequisite of individual liberty. 
From a Muslim perspective, however, admission of an autonomous tempo-
ral sphere of rule is an invitation to apostasy. The core meaning of Islam is 
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submission of the faithful to the revealed will of God, to the sacred law of 
the Shari’ah. Faithful Muslims - who are likely to be charged with funda-
mentalism by their internal and external critics alike - observe the Western 
way of life with horror and disgust. According to Moten (1996, S. 106), 
“the laws of the West lay much emphasis on the individual’s right that al-
lows him to do anything he pleases. The separation of politics from religion 
makes morality a matter of personal discretion ... Democracy is, as such, 
antithetical to the Islamic way of life.“ 
From this perspective, the trouble with Western democracy is not that 
egalitarianism is merely professed, but oligarchy is actually practiced - as 
Western critics since Michels (1910) argue. The defects of democracy go 
deeper: At best, democracy expresses the interests of human beings instead 
of the will of God. A final quote from Moten (1996, p. 85) elaborates on 
the contrast: “Unlike the West, the Islamic perspective assumes a single 
interest, i.e., promoting the cause of Islam, and does not allow groups and 
individuals to promote their own autonomously defined self-interests. The 
preferences of the rulers and the ruled alike are constrained by the 
Shari’ah.“ 
While this view is not the only one you find among Muslims, it seems to be 
on the ascendancy, as even those who bemoan fundamentalism have to 
admit (Tibi 1996). Western scholars, such as Gellner (1981, p. 1), agree 
and insist on the following point: “Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It 
holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent 
of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society.“ At least 
in principle, divinely ordained rules constrain rulers and ruled alike. By as-
signing legislation ultimately to God, Islam provides a route to limited 
government of its own. The Muslim route is similar to the Western notion 
of ‘natural law’. Although ‘divinely ordained’ and ‘natural’ laws are vul-
nerable to human interpretation and distortion, although such doctrinal ob-
stacles to arbitrary rule have frequently been overcome in human history, 
less than fail-safe obstacles are certainly preferable to no obstacles at all.  
For long Muslims have perceived the world in a clash of civilizations per-
spective (Huntington 1996b; Wang 1996-97, p. 72). They distinguish be-
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tween the realm of Islam and peace on the one hand, and the realm of igno-
rance (of the Islamic revelation) and war on the other hand. The ideal Mus-
lim polity is a single Muslim society and state, as realized in early Islam 
under the rule of the Prophet himself and his four rightly guided successors. 
Tribe and nation should not matter, but submission to the will of God or 
becoming a Muslim does. Since the tenth century when independent rulers 
in Baghdad, Cairo and Cordoba claimed to be caliphs, the Muslim aspi-
ration for unity has not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, Muslims reject not 
only Western secularism, liberty or democracy unconstrained by the 
Shari’ah, but also nationalism as alien and dangerous ideas coming out of 
the West. 
In principle, Muslims should expand the realm of Islam and peace. There is 
some disagreement about the role of the sword in propagating the faith. 
Certainly, however, war against infidels is preferable to war among Mus-
lims. Moreover, Muslims have to fight at least defensive wars to protect the 
realm of Islam. In principle, their opponents may always get peace under 
the single condition of submitting to the will of God, i.e., by becoming 
Muslims. Religious freedom in Islam, however, is a one-way street. Con-
version to Islam, i.e., submission to the will of God, is always legitimate. 
Rejection of the faith after conversion, i.e., rebellion against the will of 
God, can never be legitimate and has to be fought (see Tibi 1996, p. 68). 
Already the rightly guided caliphs had to wage war against Arab tribes who 
rejected the faith after the Prophet’s death.
 
In Islam any title to rule is derived from one’s readiness to submit to the 
will of God. By implication, Muslim rule over non-believers is acceptable, 
the reverse may be suffered, but it never can be legitimate. So Western 
power contributes to delegitimizing the West in Muslim eyes. The other 
reason why Islam and the West find it so difficult to get along is Western 
secularism. The more secular the West is or becomes, the less it deserves 
Muslim toleration. Faithful Moslems do not want toleration of their faith at 
the price of relegating it to the private sphere. Both Islam and the West 
provide blueprints for toleration. But their blueprints are incompatible. 
Contemporary Western tolerance largely rests on secularization and a loss 
of faith. For Muslims, a loss of faith deserves less toleration than failure to 
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adopt the faith in the first place. In principle, Muslim toleration has been 
focused on related monotheistic religions (El Hassan bin Talal 1998, p.57). 
In the past, a special tax on infidels provided a fiscal incentive for rulers to 
protect religious minorities.  
Is There a Risk of a Clash of Civilizations ? 
According to Huntington (1993, 1996a, 1996b), the risk of war is higher 
between nations belonging to different civilizations than elsewhere. More-
over, he specifically points to the bloody borders of Islam - thereby at least 
implicitly attributing a special war-proneness to Islam. In my view, both 
claims should be viewed with considerable skepticism. Recent quantitative 
research (Henderson 1997, 1998; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Russett, 
Oneal and Cox 2000; and Russett and Oneal 2001) demonstrates that be-
longing to different civilizations has little effect on the likelihood of war or 
militarized disputes, once other determinants of war are controlled in large-
scale logistic regressions using thousands of dyad-years as units of 
observation. Moreover, Huntington’s view of cultural differences as ever 
more important determinants of military conflicts is at odds with the fact 
that the number of interstate wars tends to decline, whereas the number of 
civil wars tends to go up (Carnegie Commission 1997, pp. 12, 25). Proba-
bly, there are more cultural differences between nations than within most 
nations. According to Huntington, most - though not all - nations belong to 
one and only one civilization. Finally, mass murder of subjects by govern-
ments is usually an intra-civilization affair. In the 20th century, the number 
of victims is in the order of magnitude of 150 million people (Rummel 
1994). 
This criticism of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” should not be mis-
read as a denial of the importance of cultural - for example, religious, lin-
guistic, ethnic or tribal - differences or loyalties as a cause of violence and 
war. In my view, however, most human beings most of the time are far too 
parochial to fight and to die for their civilizations which are defined by 
Huntington (1996b, p. 43) as “the broadest cultural entity”. 
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Huntington’s reference to the bloody borders of Islam can easily be ex-
plained by factors other than assuming a special Muslim war-proneness. If 
all civilizations were equally war-prone, then one should expect the most 
centrally located civilization sharing borders with most other civilizations 
to be the most frequently involved one in inter-civilization conflicts. Islam 
is the most centrally located civilization, because it is bordering every other 
one except for Latin America and Japan. For this reason alone, we should 
expect Islam to suffer from more bloody borders than other civilizations. 
Huntington himself points out that by contrast to many other civilizations 
Islam lacks a core state leading the lesser members of the civilization, as 
the US leads the West. Therefore, there can be nothing like imperial peace 
in the realm of Islam. Because of Islam’s democratic deficit
1, there can be 
no democratic peace either. Nor could there be peace through fear of nu-
clear war, at least not before Pakistan became the first nuclear power in 
Muslim civilization. Because of its central geopolitical location and be-
cause of the absence of pacifying conditions
2 more war involvement by 
Muslim states can easily be explained without assuming a specifically 
Muslim proneness to involvement in militarized disputes and wars.  
Although cultural differences need not lead to a clash between Muslim and 
Western civilization, contiguity itself and territorial conflicts itself provide 
some reasons for concern (Vasquez 1993; Weede 1975, 1996). Moreover, 
the close relationship between Israel and the American core of the West 
effectively makes Israel a part of the West. Therefore, the Arab-Israeli con-
flict might laterally escalate and entangle Western nations other than Israel. 
Beyond the Clash of Civilizations? 
Western political thinking and Western political practice provide essen-
tially two modes of handling conflicts of interest and power struggles, in-
cluding clashes of civilization. First, there is the Realist mode of ‘si vis pa-
cem, para bellum’, i.e., ‘if you desire peace, prepare for war’. In essence, 
this view underlines the anarchical character of the interstate system, the 
 
1   The prerequisites of democracy will be discussed later. 
2  See Weede ( 1996, chapter 7.2 ) for my views about the conditions of peace in the recent past.  
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absence of organizations and institutions capable of effectively constrain-
ing even the most powerful states, and the necessity for self-help, deter-
rence and war-fighting capabilities (e.g. Waltz 1979, Lieber 1995). Al-
though I believe this approach to be complementary rather than competitive 
with the next one, I shall not discuss it here.  
Although the second mode of handling conflicts of interests and power 
struggles dates back at least to Kant’s writings on perpetual peace in the 
late 18th century and to British 19th century liberalism, I will discuss it 
only in its modern guise. By now, there is overwhelming quantitative evi-
dence that democracies rarely fight each other (for example: Bremer 1992; 
Maoz and Russett 1993; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; 
Weede, 1996). Although there remain some critics of the democratic peace 
proposition at the dyadic level, the debate seems to shift. More recently, 
proponents of democracy begin to argue that democracies are indeed less 
warlike than autocracies (Benoit 1996; Ray 1995; Rummel 1995). Others 
(Bremer 1996, Oneal and Ray 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997) point out that 
the risk of war between democracies and autocracies is even higher than 
the risk of war between autocracies. By implication, a violent or bellicose 
clash of Western and Islamic civilizations is promoted by the contrast in 
political regimes between democracies and autocracies.
3 
Democratic constitutions alone cannot guarantee the viability of democra-
cies. Since Lipset’s (1959) path-breaking paper quantitative research has 
firmly established that prosperous nations are more likely to be governed 
democratically than poor ones (for example: Bollen and Jackman 1985; 
Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Lipset 
 
3   By now, Russett and Oneal (2001, p. 116) argue that their most recent research refutes this skepti-
cism about the limitations of the democratic peace. In their most recent view, democratization al-
ways promotes peace - even among nations surrounded by autocracies. To me, the earlier results of 
separate analyses of militarized disputes in the post-World War II period look more persuasive than 
the most recent analyses which begin in 1885 and collapse the multipolar era before 1945, the bipo-
lar era between 1945 and 1990, and even the beginning of a unipolar era thereafter. The qualitatively 
different alliance effects on militarized disputes found for the multipolar and bipolar periods of ob-
servation (Russett and Oneal 2001, p. 113) justify doubts about imposing the same causal structure 
on different periods of world politics. See also Gowa (1999). Although I agree with her on the need 
for separate analyses of different eras, I disagree with her pessimistic conclusions about the democ-
ratic peace.  
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1994).
4 If one wants to promote democracy, the most effective way is not 
to advertise or even to write democratic constitutions, as the British and the 
French did before they gave up their colonies, but the more demanding task 
of generating prosperity. 
Although the most important determinants of prosperity are domestic insti-
tutions and property rights which govern incentives to work and to save, 
opportunities to apply knowledge and to innovate as well as the efficiency 
of resource allocation (see Weede 1996, 2000 for my own views; or Hayek 
1960; Jones 1981; North 1990 and Pipes 1999 for related views), interna-
tional relations also affect growth. There are few propositions in economics 
which are as widely supported as the openness prosperity link: Free trade 
and foreign direct investment promote economic growth and prosperity (for 
example: Bhagwati 1991, p. 51; Dollar 1992; de Soysa and Oneal 1999; 
Edwards 1998; Friedman and Friedman 1981, pp. 31-46; World Bank 
1993). It is dubious whether Germany (and indeed, Western Europe) and 
Japan could have recovered as fast as they did after World War II without 
(comparatively) free trade. It is equally dubious whether the East Asian ti-
gers would have grown prosperous without market access in America and 
elsewhere in the West. Germany and Japan, South Korea and the Republic 
of China on Taiwan illustrate the causal chain running from free trade via 
prosperity to democracy and ultimately to the democratic peace.
5 
In addition to the causal chain running from free trade and prosperity to 
democracy and peace, there are other encouraging findings in recent quan-
titative research. Free trade and high growth rates directly reduce the risk of 
 
4   While there is as much agreement among sociologists and political scientists on the prosperity-
democracy link as one can find in these disciplines, I want to add another (more controversial) 
proposition: Democracy stands a chance only where a capitalist or market economy exists. The rela-
tionship between capitalism and democracy holds not only because of the prosperity effects of capi-
talism, but also because capitalism provides attractive opportunities for electorally defeated politi-
cians and office-holders. For a full account of my views on capitalism, democracy and peace, consult 
Weede (1996; 2000; 2002 ). For criticism of the prosperity-democracy link, see Friedman (1994, p. 
33) who nevertheless admits that economic growth eases coalition-building and democratization. 
While I disagree with Friedman on the strength of the impact of prosperity on democratization, I en-
dorse his criticism of 'occidentalism' or the claim that Western culture is a prerequisite of democracy. 
5   Prosperity and democracy made for reconciliation between Germany and Japan on the one hand and the 
US, Britain or France on the other hand. While democracy in South Korea and Taiwan has some positive 
impact on their relationships with Japan, democratic peace between both Chinese or Korean states will 
apply only after (or: if) the People’s Republic of China and North Korea become democracies. 
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militarized interstate disputes and war (Oneal et al. 1996; Oneal and Ray 
1996; Oneal and Russett 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001) in addition to the 
indirect effects via democracy. Elsewhere (Weede 2000, final chapter; 
2002), I called the entire package of pacifying conditions running from free 
trade, prosperity and democracy to the avoidance of war the “capitalist 
peace”. Russett and Oneal (2001) refer to the “Kantian peace” instead. 
Their “Kantian peace” also includes the pacifying impact of common 
memberships in intergovernmental organizations, but disregards the impact 
of free trade on prosperity and of prosperity on the viability of democracy. 
Free trade, prosperity and democracy are simultaneously desirable in them-
selves and means to pacifying the world. By contrast, big armies, high mili-
tary expenditures or a nuclear balance of terror are necessary evils at best.  
Is it conceivable that the free trade, prosperity and democracy route pre-
vents a potential clash of Islamic and Western civilizations? Since the 
causal relationship summarized above should be understood in probabilistic 
instead of deterministic terms, one should not expect that free trade or 
growth or prosperity or even democracy by itself suffices. Instead it is more 
reasonable to expect stable, peaceful and even amicable relations between 
Islam and the West only once the trade between Islamic countries and the 
West stands no longer by itself as a pacifying influence. In the long run, 
preventing the clash of Muslim and Western civilization requires prosper-
ous and democratic Islamic societies. 
Since Israel is part of the West, a secure peace between Islam and the West 
presupposes peace between Arabs and Israelis, too. Although this paper 
does not deal with the specific problems of Arab-Israeli peace-making, an 
analogy between Germans and the Arabs of Palestine points to an impor-
tant lesson. After a devastating defeat in World War II, Germany lost valu-
able territories in the east to Poland and to other nations. Two generations 
later, it seems safe to say that Germans have accepted the finality of these 
losses. In my view, this acceptance or reassignment depends on two previ-
ously established conditions : severe military defeat first and material pros-
perity for Germans, including refugees and their descendants, later. So far, 
Arabs from Palestine have experienced only the negative part of this treat-
ment. Without prosperity for Arab refugees from Israel, it is hard to see 
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how they can ever reconcile themselves to the status quo , i.e., to the final 
loss of their homes.  
Economic and Political Prospects of Muslim Societies 
Currently, the fiercest believers in Muslim values come close to regard de-
mocracy as an invitation to apostasy. Such an interpretation, however, does 
not prevail everywhere now, and even if it did, it would not necessarily re-
main a permanent feature of Muslim civilization. The Protestant Reforma-
tion of the 16th century certainly illustrates that religions, their interpreta-
tion and their social impact may change. Even after the Reformation we 
have witnessed radical and important changes in the Christian world. Once 
upon a time some Christian countries suffered from the inquisition and 
from witch-burning. It is hard to argue that Christian societies then were 
more enlightened or tolerant than the Mullah’s regime in contemporary 
Iran is today. If Christianity can and did change, so can Islam.
6 
Faithful Moslems cannot deny the potential for change and the history of 
change in Islam. In fact, almost all of them would agree that Muslim socie-
ties were ruled much more perfectly in the days of the Prophet than nowa-
days, and still better under the rightly-guided caliphs than under later ca-
liphs or sultans (Moten 1996, p. 59). While one cannot know how the 
Muslim interpretation of their faith and its commands will change, whether 
a single interpretation will prevail or whether multiple ones will compete 
and possibly establish different geographical strongholds, it is possible to 
point to some aspects of Islam which may affect the prospects of economic 
development and democratization. 
Concerning democratization the message of Islam looks ambivalent to me. 
The doctrine of the sovereignty of God may conceivably be understood as a 
prescription for limited government, as Gellner (1981) has pointed out. If 
God is the only legitimate sovereign, then even the ruler must submit to 
God and his laws. Although Islam does not constrain rulers by a duality of 
 
6   The claim that "all cultures are rich in conflicting political potentialities" has been elaborated for 
East Asia and the West by Friedman (1994, p. 27). For Islam, see Kuran (1997, p.67). 
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spiritual and temporal rule, the assignment of legislation to God does simi-
larly constrain worldly rulers.  
In practice, the limitation of government by divine law suffers from two 
shortcomings. Firstly, the clear and definite character of the law is neces-
sarily reduced by human interpretation, i.e., by differences of interpretation 
(Krämer 1997, p. 50; Schmidtke 1998, p.368 ff.)
7. Secondly, divine law - as 
established more than a millennium ago - does not necessarily meet all con-
temporary needs for legal regulation. The Shari’ah, for example, provides 
much more detail on family affairs than on commercial matters. The more a 
need for supplementary regulation is admitted, the less useful divine law is 
in limiting and constraining arbitrary government. In practice, Muslim rul-
ers have always supplemented the divine law by secular decrees (Arjomand 
1992; Hodgson 1974a, p. 347 ff.). Moreover, the gap between social re-
quirements for updated laws and divine law must get worse over time, i.e., 
the more socio-economic structures and economic activities deviate from 
seventh century practices.  
Since “the idea of limited government is inherent and essential in Islam” 
(Lewis 1997, p. 123 ), the main culprit responsible for autocracy and des-
potism in the Muslim past is not  religious doctrine, but what Weber ( 
1922/1964, p.191 ) had called ‘sultanism’. Under sultanism the ruler ap-
points foreigners or slaves as officials. Since foreigners or slaves com-
pletely depend on the ruler’s mercy, they are the most effective tools of ar-
bitrary government. Foreigners and slaves had a more important role in 
ruling Muslim societies during previous centuries than elsewhere ( Hodg-
son 1974 ). Since slavery and sultanism have been overcome in Muslim 
countries, the strongest political obstacles against a libertarian interpreta-
tion of Islam have been removed.  
 
7   How clear and definite the divine law, or one of its interpretations, can be is illustrated by the recent 
rulings of Saudi judges on progressive income taxation. According to the Economist ( 2001, p. 46 ), 
“they say Islam enshrines the payment of one-fortieth of personal income to charity, and that other 
taxes are illegal.” If the welfare state is inefficient and if it reduces growth rates, as I have argued 
elsewhere ( Weede 2000, chapter 7 ), then such constraints on taxation and redistribution could be 
quite beneficial.  
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As far as I see, influential Muslim theologians and jurists did never push a 
libertarian interpretation of Islam, but in principle they could.
8 Since many 
Muslims, including so-called fundamentalists, perceive a deterioration of 
Muslim governments from the Prophet via the rightly-guided caliphates to 
contemporary rulers, the idea that unlimited or arbitrary government has 
been bad for Islam and Muslim societies receives additional support. I do 
not want to predict that Muslim thinkers will arrive at a libertarian or ‘lim-
ited government is mandated by God’-interpretation of Islam, but I do think 
that this is one conceivable implication of the sovereignty of God - and the 
most likely one to promote both prosperity and democratization. 
The immediate concern for those who want to overcome or peacefully 
manage the clash between Islamic and Western civilization should not be 
democratization, but economic development. Whereas an agenda of de-
mocratization highlights different views in Islam and the West, an agenda 
of common prosperity is likely to be acceptable to everybody. Once Islam 
and the West are linked by trade and prosperity, an intellectual push in the 
Muslim world would still be required for democratization to occur, but it 
would no longer be as likely to abort as if occurring under current condi-
tions of widespread poverty (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). 
In my view (see Weede 1996, 2000), only the economic order of capitalism 
permits prosperity for those nations who (unlike some Arab oil producers) 
do not combine a sparse population and plentiful natural resources.
9 As al-
ready Adam Smith (1776/1976) recognized, the hope to attain private prop-
erty provides essential incentives for hard work. For private property to be 
safe, there must be limits to confiscation and taxation. As von Mises (1920) 
added early in the 20th century, private property in the means of production 
constitutes a prerequisite for scarcity prices in factor markets and a rational 
allocation of resources. As von Hayek (1945, 1960) added, decentralised 
 
8   Moten ( 1996, p. 120 ) comes close to it by writing: "The assumptions of the equality of all believers, 
brotherhood and collective responsibility of the Ummah to enjoin virtue... preclude the acceptance of 
an 'all-wise' absolute ruler, or the emergence of 'religious experts' who arrogate themselves all pow-
ers of decision making to the exclusion of the masses." But Moten does not arrive at the limited gov-
ernment or libertarian conclusions which Westerners like me or even Muslims living in the West 
(like Tibi 1996) might draw. 
9   Unfortunately, oil or mineral resources as such seem to permit distortions within economies and to 
retard democratic development (Ross 2001). 
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decision-making is essential, if knowledge scattered across millions of 
heads is to be mobilized and exploited. If one accepts these insights from 
classical and Austrian economics, then neither central planning nor some 
third way in between capitalism and socialism promises prosperity. Only 
capitalism and economic freedom do.  
Econometric studies (Beach and Davis 1999, p. 10; de Haan and Siermann 
1998; de Haan and Sturm 2000; Edwards 1998; Goldsmith 1997; Gwart-
ney, Lawson and Block 1996, p. 109; Knack 1996; Knack and Keefer 
1995; Tostensson 1994) also confirm the contribution of economic free-
dom, in particular of its improvement over time, to economic growth. 
Therefore, the question is whether Islam legitimizes or delegitimizes capi-
talism. Since Islam and the Shari’ah design a social order, Muslims cannot 
argue that their faith is transcendental and concerns other-worldly-matters 
only. Again, the faith is ambivalent in its implication for capitalist deve-
lopment. On the one hand one may point to the crucial role of merchants 
and traders in capitalist development. Neither Jesus, nor Buddha, nor Con-
fucius ever worked as traders, but Mohammed did. Moreover, Moham-
med’s life is understood as inspired by God himself and together with the 
Quran it is one of the sources of the Shari’ah. Conceivably, an Islamic le-
gitimization of capitalism might underline this fact and point to those 
verses of the Koran where economic activity and trade are praised (Rodin-
son 1986, p. 41).  
If a pro-capitalist interpretation of Islam were combined with a limited 
government interpretation of the sovereignty of God, then Islam could be-
come the most powerful religious guardian of private property rights. Since 
private property rights and the corresponding decentralized economic deci-
sion-making provide incentives to work and to save as well as room for 
innovation and scarcity prices, an interpretation of Islam seems possible 
which boosts economic growth instead of retarding it. 
On the other hand, Islam may be interpreted differently, too. An anti-
capitalist interpretation could again start with the Prophet himself. Since he 
alone among all Muslim rulers was inspired by God, his rule must have 
been the best government ever experienced by Muslims. If this is so, then it 
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makes sense to look for political guidance by analyzing the Prophet’s rule 
and, may be, the rule of his immediate successors, the four rightly-guided 
caliphs. If this aspect of the political implications of Islam is emphasized, 
then the faith becomes backward-looking, then the main message is a pre-
scription to apply seventh century law and customs - as a non-Muslim per-
ceives the Shari’ah - irrespective of changed economic structures. The 
backward-looking spirit of the faith would be worse than most of the de-
tailed regulations.
10 The economy can easily survive the proscription of liq-
uor and pork.  
At least concerning Muslim men, Islam has always been an egalitarian re-
ligion. In the past, this egalitarianism may have impeded the development 
of safe property rights. In the West, aristocracies and powerful estates first 
succeeded in forcing rulers to respect their property rights. Pipes (1999, p. 
195) has elaborated on this topic: “As Western history demonstrates, gen-
eral freedoms and rights usually originate in minority privileges. It has 
proved to be the most reliable way of implanting freedoms and rights, be-
cause it gives rise to social groups interested in protecting their advan-
tages.” Only later, rights and privileges were extended to the middle and 
lower classes in the West. The weakness of hereditary ruling classes in Is-
lam compared to the West is rooted in doctrinal egalitarianism, in the prac-
tice of Sultanism which was based on the institution of slavery, and in so-
cial instability arising out of polygamy. 
The relationship between polygamy and socio-political instability has first 
been recognized by Andreski (1968, p. 14). Under polygamy rich and pow-
erful men are likely to take many wives, whereas many poor and common 
men will not succeed in obtaining even a single wife. Therefore, upper 
class men will have too many sons aspiring to a position equivalent to their 
father’s position, whereas lower class men produce too few sons who are 
resigned to a common and poor existence.
11 The imbalance of reproduction 
rates at the top and at the bottom of the social pyramid generated down-
ward mobility pressure in Muslim societies, made half-brothers fight and 
 
10   Historically, the backward looking spirit seems to have prevailed because of a fear of public sanc-
tions (Koran 1997). See also Hodgson ( 1974 ) on “timid literalism” in Muslim civilization. 
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kill each other, and further reduced the already poor prospects of upward 
mobility for the masses. By contrast, medieval and Catholic Christianity 
benefited from celibacy which prevented one privileged estate, the priests, 
from legitimately reproducing themselves. Unintentionally, celibacy made 
some upward mobility possible and even inevitable. Since upward mobility 
is a substitute for rebellion, monogamy and celibacy in the West contrib-
uted to political stability by providing room for upward mobility.  
Socio-political stability is so important because it is a prerequisite for the 
establishment of secure property rights. The less stable a society and polity 
is, the poorer are the incentives for members of the ruling classes to desist 
from plundering their subjects. An autocrat with fairly safe tenure is inter-
ested in a healthy economy because it provides a profitable tax base. With-
out safe tenure a rational autocrat faces no incentives to worry about the 
long-term consequences of taxation or plundering. That is why subjects are 
better off under stable autocracy than under political instability (Olson 
2000). 
Two institutions which prevailed in the past in Muslim civilization - but 
which no longer exert significant effects - i.e., slavery and polygamy, con-
tributed to arbitrary rule and political instability. These conditions together 
with Muslim egalitarianism made the safeguarding of private property 
rights more difficult than it was in the West. Insecure property rights re-
duced incentives to work hard, to invest in long-term projects, and to inno-
vate. Therefore, Muslim civilization fell behind the West, as the Turks had 
to realize from the 18th century onward.  
Conclusions 
My views on the political and economic prospects of Muslim societies and 
the clash between Western and Muslim civilizations may be summarized in 
these terms : Cultures are malleable, even if one insists on a fairly literal 
reading of the Koran and the life of the Prophet. The effects of one’s inter-
pretation of Islam heavily depend on the non-Islamic type of knowledge 
 
11   The aspirations of wives and daughters are neglected here, because they lacked the power and influ-
ence to make their preferences policy relevant.  
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applied together with the Muslim revelation i.e., whether Western econom-
ics - and which part of it - is accepted. Currently a backwardly-oriented 
fundamentalism seems to be ascendant in most of the Muslim world. As 
long as this continues, Islamic civilization will remain weak. The challenge 
of Islam to the West will remain at the level of desperate acts of terrorism, 
not a serious bid for economic equality, much less for supremacy. But 
Muslim civilization is not alone in producing backwardly-oriented intellec-
tuals. The West and Islamic civilization together suffer from a division of 
labor where many of those who think about culture and the social order do 
not consider the double absence of business experience and rudimentary 
knowledge of economics to be a serious handicap. By contrast, the Prophet 
had business experience.  
The fact that Muslims live in a politically fragmented civilization provides 
reasons for hope rather than for despair. In my reading of Eurasian history 
and the rise of capitalism (Weede 1996, 2000; inspired by Jones 1981 and 
von Hayek 1960), no other condition was more important for the rise of the 
West than European disunity. This disunity forced rival European princes 
to respect the property rights of merchants and of producers and to grant 
liberties. Conceivably, Arab and Muslim disunity can provide a similar 
push for a future Muslim ‘race to the top’.  
As East Asia has demonstrated, Western-invented capitalism can be imi-
tated. Actually, latecomers to the game of capitalism may excel. The con-
temporary Japanese are richer than the citizens of the first industrial nation, 
Britain. Per capita incomes in Singapore exceed British, French, German 
and even Japanese incomes in purchase power parity terms (World Bank 
2000, p. 275). In a capitalist world nations become better off, if their 
neighbors and others are better off.
12 This possibility of co-prosperity pro-
vides the base for a capitalist peace. But nobody should expect the ‘free 
trade, prosperity, and democracy’-cure to work miracles in overcoming or 
mitigating the clash between a (compared to Islam) still confident West and 
an increasingly desperate Muslim civilization. In the long run, however, 
 
12   This does not imply that free trade or globalization are always helpful to all groups. Foreign compe-
tition, like domestic competition, may bankrupt some enterprises and make the workers loose their 
jobs (see Weede 2000, final chapter; 2002 for an analysis of these problems). 
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free trade and capitalism in the West may dangle enough carrots in front of 
Muslim faces to attract interest and imitation. 
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Political Culture and Democracy in    
Turkey 
In the words of Gabriel Almond, who has possibly made the greatest con-
tribution to political culture research in recent decades, “it is evident that 
political culture research and theorizing has had a ‘return’, or as Ronald 
Inglehart put it, a ‘renaissance’. And the movements that have most ac-
tively polemicized against political culture as an explanatory variable 
(Marxism of various kinds, and rational choice theory) now seem to have 
run out of steam, appear to be inclined to negotiate settlements, rather than 
requiring unconditional surrender.”
1  
One of the most often debated questions in political culture research is 
whether structures (socio-economic structures, constitutional design, stra-
tegic choices of leadership) influence political culture, or political culture 
influences political structures. Probably, the most reasonable answer to this 
question is that “causality worked both ways, that attitudes influenced 
structure and behavior, and that structure and performance in turn influ-
enced attitudes.”
2 Nevertheless, it is generally agreed upon that such under-
lying politico-cultural traits as tolerance, pragmatism, flexibility, modera-
tion, trust, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation play an important 
role in the consolidation and stabilization of democracy, if not so much in 
its initial installation.
3  
Another pertinent question is whether such democratic values and attitudes 
first develop at the elite level and then spread to the masses through a long 
process of practice and socialization, or whether they are widely shared in 
the society and therefore inevitably shape elite behavior. The weight of the 
historical evidence indicates that the former is a more likely course. There 
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are exceptional cases such as the United States, however where the princi-
pal stimulus for democratization came not from the political elites but soci-
ety itself. Guillermo O’Donnell, in a thoughtful reinterpretation of Toc-
queville, underlines the importance attached by Tocqueville to political 
culture as the most crucial support for democracy and the rule of law, and 
then asks the following question: 
“Tocqueville left us with another puzzle, no less difficult and relevant: Is it 
possible to reverse the sequence that he depicted? Instead of emerging from 
the interstices of a society that is already self-conscious of its rights and 
highly participatory, is it possible for a democratic rule of law to be im-
planted first in the sphere of politics and legislation and to spread from 
there into society and into the hearts of the citizens? Although he does not 
say so explicitly, it is clear that Tocqueville, thinking of France, believed 
that such an inversion would be very unlikely. We now know, however, 
that this did happen in France and in much of Europe. The roads to democ-
racy and the rule of law turned out to be more varied than Tocqueville sur-
mised.”
4  
Turkey clearly belongs to this second group of countries. The first steps 
toward the rule of law and constitutional government were taken in the 
nineteenth century by a small Westernizing bureaucratic elite. None of the 
three constitutions of the republican period (those of 1924, 1961, and 1982) 
was made by a broadly representative popular assembly through a genuine 
process of negotiation and bargaining. The 1924 Constitution was made by 
a Grand National Assembly completely dominated by Kemalists, even 
though a single-party system had not yet been consolidated at that time. 
The 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions were made by non-elected constituent 
assemblies in which the military and other state elites had great weight, and 
the constitutions finally adopted, although essentially conforming to de-
mocratic norms, reflected their basic values.
5  
In the first part of this paper Turkish mass political culture will be analyzed 
based on recent survey data. In the second part, some characteristics of the 
elite political culture will be discussed. 
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Mass Political Culture 
Certain values are commonly associated with a democratic regime. Among 
them one can cite a belief in democracy as the best form of government 
(democratic legitimacy), participatory values, tolerance, compromise, a re-
jection of political violence and extremism, a high level of interpersonal 
trust, and trust in public institutions. Turkish data on these elements of po-
litical culture have been collected through two surveys conducted in 1990 
and 1997 within the framework of World Values Survey. The cross-
national nature of this project gives us the opportunity to compare Turkey 
with a number of other countries.  
Democratic legitimacy : A very large majority (89 percent) of the Turkish 
respondents wishes to be governed by a democratic system. Similarly, 92 
percent of them agree with the statement that “democracy may have prob-
lems, but still it is better than any other form of government.” On the other 
hand, 24 percent thinks that economy works badly in a democracy, 30 per-
cent believes that law and order deteriorates, and 65 percent associates de-
mocracy with indecision and the slow functioning of decision-making 
mechanisms. As far as the last finding is concerned, Turkey is in the same 
category as Argentina, the Philippines, Sweden, Russia, and Taiwan. 
 
Similarly, 41 percent of the Turkish respondents prefers to have “a strong 
leader who does not have to worry about the parliament and elections.” 55 
percent believes that decisions should be made by experts in the way they 
believe it best for the country instead of by the government. Even more 
strikingly, 33 percent thinks positively about a military government. These 
findings seem contradictory with the strong preference expressed for a de-
mocratic form of government. On the other hand, it is interesting that pref-
erence for a strong leader and a technocratic government is also observed 
in important public opinion segments of more highly institutionalized de-
mocracies. Thus, the preference score for a technocratic government (gov-
ernment by experts) is higher in Japan and Spain, in addition to Russia, 
Taiwan, Argentina, and the Philippines, than in Turkey. What makes the 
Turkish case particularly interesting is that about one-third of the respon-
dents looked favorably upon a military government (only the Philippines 
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scores higher than Turkey on this point) even though some 90 percent be-
lieved that democracy was the best form of government. This paradox can 
be explained by the unusually high confidence score of the military as will 
be spelled out below.
6 
Interpersonal trust: Theoretical and empirical studies suggest a strong rela-
tionship between the level of interpersonal trust and stable democracy.
7 In 
the 1990 World Values Survey, only 10 percent of the Turkish respondents 
stated that they could trust a majority of others. This was the second lowest 
interpersonal trust score among the 43 countries included in the 1990 Sur-
vey. In the 1997 Survey, this score fell to 6.5 percent.
8 Such findings ex-
plain, among other things, the low level of associability in Turkish society. 
Confidence in public institutions: It is generally agreed that confidence in 
public institutions is one of the indicators of democratic legitimacy. One of 
the most interesting findings of the Turkish values survey is the extremely 
high confidence scores for the output institutions (particularly the military) 
and the extremely low scores for the input institutions (government, par-
liament, and political parties). Table 1 gives the confidence scores (com-
puted by subtracting the percentage of respondents who have no or little 
confidence in a given institution from the percentage of those who have 
much or some confidence) for various institutions. 
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Table 1 
Difference in 
Confidence Score Confidence  Score 
1990   1997    
Religious  institutions      34     40   6 
Military       82     88   6 
Judicial  system      27     43   16 
Press      -  15     -  1   14 
Trade unions        - 16       7    23 
Police        27       44   17 
Government             2 
Political  parties        -  40 
National Assembly       15       5       - 10 
Government officials       0      36    36 
Big companies      - 43      24    67 
Greens,  environmentalists         70 
Feminist  organizations       51 
European Union      - 28     - 1    27 
United  Nations       -  5 
Source : Esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko, 42. 
 
The unusually high confidence score for the military (much higher than the 
European average which is 50 in 1990) can be explained by the historically 
predominant role the military has played in Turkish modernization. For 
many Turks, the military is still seen as the ultimate guardian of a secular 
system of government and of a modern way of life. The special prestige of 
military in Turkey has also been confirmed by a number of other public 
opinion surveys. With regard to low confidence scores in political institu-
tions, Turkish findings are not appreciably different from European aver-
ages. Still, the (-40) confidence score for political parties is untypically 
low. All impressionistic evidence suggests that today political institutions 
(parties, government, and parliament) enjoy an even lower level of confi-
dence. Another interesting finding emerging out of a comparison of 1990 
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and 1997 Turkish data is the substantial increase in the confidence scores 
of large business companies and the European Union.
9  
Tolerance : One of the questions asked in the World Values Survey to 
measure tolerance was whether the respondents would be willing to accept 
certain categories of persons as their neighbors. Table 2 gives the findings 
obtained from the 1990 and 1997 Turkish surveys. 
 
Table 2 
Percentages of Non-Acceptance as Neighbors 
1990   1997 
Criminals    82   76 
People of different races  39    42 
People of extremist 
political  views      75 
Alcoholics    88   91 
People suffering from 
mental  illnesses   73   78 
Christians    59   61 
J e w s      6 5  
Immigrants,  
foreign  workers   32   46 
AIDS  victims    91   84 
Drug  addicts    93   94 
Homosexuals    93   92 
Source : Esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko, 86. 
 
Some of these findings can be understood in terms of the general conserva-
tism of Turkish society, such as the high non-acceptance rates for crimi-
nals, alcoholics, drug addicts, AIDS victims, and homosexuals. On the 
other hand, high non-acceptance rates for Christians, Jews, and people of 
different races are more difficult to explain, and are higher than in other 
democratic societies. Another question designed to measure tolerance was 
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about the values children should be taught at home. 59 percent of Turkish 
respondents in 1997 cited “tolerance and respect for others” among such 
values. However, this score is again somewhat lower than the average for 
World Values Survey countries (68 percent). A related question asked the 
respondents whether they preferred a party leader who would be willing to 
collaborate with other groups even if this means making important conces-
sions from his deeply held convictions, or a leader who would firmly stick 
to his convictions. 54 percent of the respondents chose the first option, 
while 46 percent the second option. Although such findings are comparable 
to those in the United States, the percentages of the proponents of compro-
mise are generally much higher in other democratic societies than in Tur-
key (Japan 66, Spain 85, Australia 72, Sweden 83, Finland 85). Finally, the 
Turkish respondents were asked whether, to maintain good interpersonal 
relations, it is more important to try to understand others’ preferences, or to 
state clearly one’s own personal preferences. Turkish respondents who 
chose the first option were 34 percent. This is much lower than in Nigeria 
(59 percent), USA (74 percent), Spain (71 percent), Japan (78 percent), and 
Australia (72 percent).
10  
The results of the two Turkish value surveys indicate that the characteris-
tics of Turkish mass democratic political culture are not, on the whole, in-
consistent with those of other democratic societies. Nevertheless, the low 
level of interpersonal trust, low level of tolerance for differences, relatively 
little value attributed to compromise, particularly high confidence in the 
military, and the extremely low level of confidence in political parties indi-
cate some problems in the way of further democratic consolidation. We 
will return to the implications of these traits for democratic  governance 
after we deal with the political cultural characteristics of the state elites. 
Political Culture of the State Elites 
The Ottoman-Turkish state has been characterized by a strong state tradi-
tion,
11 by which I mean a strong and centralized state, reasonably effective 
by the standards of its day, highly autonomous, and occupying a central 
and highly valued place in the political culture. Status-oriented rather than 
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market-oriented values were dominant. The relationship between economic 
and political power was the reverse of its equivalent in Western Europe. 
Instead of economic power (ownership of the means of production) leading 
to political power, political power (a high position in the state bureaucracy) 
provided access to material wealth. The wealth thus accumulated, however, 
could not be converted into more permanent economic assets because it 
was liable, in both theory and practice, to confiscation by the state. 
The Ottoman State, unlike its Western European counterparts, did not favor 
the emergence of a powerful merchant class. The much-referred-to “ethnic 
division of labor” meant that international trade was dominated by non-
Muslim minorities, but this economic power could not be converted into a 
significant political role because of the Islamic nature of the state. 
In short, the power of state elites in the Ottoman Empire was not seriously 
threatened. Neither the mercantile bourgeoisie nor the landowners devel-
oped into a class that could effectively control and limit, much less capture, 
the state. Thus, the fundamental social cleavage in the Ottoman Empire was 
based on a strictly political criterion. On the one side was the ruling askeri 
(military) class, which “included those to whom the Sultan delegated reli-
gious or executive power through an imperial diploma, namely, officers of 
the court and the army, civil servants, and ulema (Islamic scholars)”. On 
the other side were the reaya (ruled), who comprised “all Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government. It 
was a fundamental rule of the empire to exclude its subjects from the privi-
leges of the military.”
12 
Accompanying the excessive centralization of state authority and its con-
centration in the hands of state elites was civil society’s weakness, caused 
by the fragility or absence of corporate, autonomous, intermediary social 
structures that in the West operated independent of the government and 
played a cushioning role between the state and the individual. In Europe, 
the church was the foremost of these corporate structures, and it may have 
provided a model of organization for other corporate structures such as 
guilds, autonomous cities, and the like. These structures had no parallels in 
the Islamic Middle East. As a rule, Islamic law does not recognize corpo-
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rate identities. For all of the theoretical supremacy of the shari’a, the reli-
gious class has no corporate identity but depends on the state (i.e., secular 
authority) for its appointments, promotions, and salaries. 
Similarly, neither the cities nor the artisan guilds played an autonomous 
role comparable to that of their counterparts in Western Europe. The ahi 
guilds (artisan organizations with a strong religious coloring), which had 
played some role in the formative years of the empire, were later deprived 
of their corporate privileges and put under strict government control.
13 
In short, no autonomous structure stood between the political authority and 
the community of believers. This does not mean pre-modern Islamic Mid-
dle Eastern society was totally undifferentiated, atomized, or regimented. 
One can speak of a high degree of pluralism among craft guilds, the clergy, 
religious brotherhoods, endowments, mutual aid groups, non-Muslim reli-
gious organizations, nationalities, sects, tribes, clans, extended families, 
and the like. The penetrative capabilities of the Ottoman Empire, although 
fairly high by the standards of the day, were still too limited to allow it to 
regulate the entire range of social relationships. The strict separation be-
tween rulers and ruled and the absence of a representative system, however, 
did not permit this traditional pluralism to evolve into the pluralistic infra-
structure of a modern democratic state. Furthermore, the nineteenth-century 
drive by the centralized state to reaffirm corporate exclusivity in response 
to European challenges further weakened traditional pluralism. 
This absence of powerful classes that use the state to serve their own inter-
ests, combined with the absence or weakness of corporate intermediary 
bodies, produced a high degree of state autonomy. The state-which was not 
the captive of any particular social class- could make decisions that 
changed, eliminated, or created class relationships. 
Regarding the cultural dimension of state autonomy, it has often been ob-
served that the state has a salient role in both Ottoman-Turkish political 
thought and in the perceptions of the people. The state is valued in its own 
right, is relatively autonomous from society, and plays a tutelary and pater-
nalistic role. This paternalistic image is reflected in the popular expression 
devlet baba (father state). Another popular saying is Allah Devlete, Millete 
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zeval vermesin (may God preserve the State and the Nation). Ottoman writ-
ings on politics and government are replete with such terms as Devlet-i 
Aliye (sublime State), hikmet-i hükümet (raison d’état), and Devletin ali 
menfaatleri (sublime interests of the State). Such notions readily found 
their place in the political discourse of the Turkish republic. Indeed, the 
preamble of the 1982 Turkish constitution described the State (always with 
a capital S) as kutsal Türk Devleti (sacred), adding that no thoughts or opin-
ions could find protection against “Turkish national interests”-presumably 
meaning state interests as defined by the state apparatus. 
The exaltation of the state has been fostered consistently through the educa-
tional system and the military. Indeed, the military and (at least until re-
cently) the civilian bureaucracy have traditionally seen themselves as 
guardians of the state and protectors of public interest. Consequently, they 
have viewed with suspicion all particularistic interests and the political par-
ties that represent them. 
14 Negative attitudes also prevail with regard to 
most interest groups; in fact, the term interest group still has a somewhat 
pejorative meaning in Turkish. “Throughout the multiparty era,” Robert 
Bianchi argues, “much of the political elite has continued to share a linger-
ing fear that unless partitive interests are repressed, closely regulated, or 
prudently harmonized, divisions along such lines as class, religion, and re-
gion will threaten both the unity of the nation and the authority of the 
state.”
15 
Political Culture and Democratic Governance 
What distinguishes Turkish politics today from the turbulent years of 1970s 
is the stronger elite and mass commitment to democracy. However, al-
though democracy is seen, both at the elite and mass levels, as the most ap-
propriate form of government, the above analysis indicates some problem 
areas related to the realm of political culture. Turkish modernization in 
general and Turkish democratization in particular took place essentially 
through a process of reform from above. This historical fact has fostered 
among the state elites (particularly the military and to a lesser extent the 
civilian bureaucracy) markedly paternalistic and tutelary values that are not 
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consistent with a truly democratic political culture. At the mass level, the 
low levels of interpersonal trust and tolerance, together with a preference 
for strong political leadership are further obstacles in the way of the devel-
opment of a democratic political culture. These politico-cultural character-
istics go a long way in explaining the fact that, despite more than half a 
century of multi-party politics, Turkey lags behind not only new Southern 
European democracies (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) but also some of the 
Central and East European democracies in democratic consolidation. 
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The Crisis of Political Culture in the 
Arab World - A Conflict of Paradigms 
The interconnections between political culture, political institutions, and 
political outcomes are complex and multi-layered. Defining political cul-
ture itself is a complex challenge open to various interpretations. In this 
preliminary draft paper I will explore one aspect of this galaxy of questions 
relating to the competition among macro paradigms of political objectives, 
values, and behavior. In a sense, I will be examining the higher, more ab-
stracted or intellectualised aspects of political culture that are partly re-
flected in explicit ideologies or less explicitly expressed in political world-
views. I am not claiming that daily political behavior loyally follows these 
more intellectualised paradigms, but that they are a relevant part of the de-
bate relating to political culture in the Mediterranean region and its effect 
on politics. 
An important reflection to commence with is the fairly consensual para-
digmatic situation arrived at in the post-World War II West, especially after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Much already began to be written in the 
1950s about the end of ideology; by the 1990s Fukuyama was writing 
about the End of History and the development of a (albeit, perhaps flawed) 
consensus about the ‘best’ form of political, economic, and social organiza-
tion. This consensus was presumably about a liberal constitutional democ-
ratic government, a market economy, and a moderate set of social policies. 
In a subsequent book, entitled Trust, Fukuyama also presumed and argued 
that a certain type of political culture went along with this final paradigm – 
a political culture based on trust, cooperation, participation, respect for oth-
ers, etc. A similar tendency toward a unifying expectation about political 
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culture was expressed in the work of previous political scientists who ex-
amined the presumably, or hopefully, uniform attributes of Civic Culture. 
Whether we agree fully with the details of these views and researches or 
not, the main observation that concerns us here is that the West, has tended 
to increasingly accept one broadly-defined liberal-democratic-market-
economy-civic-culture paradigm as supreme. This has lent an important 
measure of coherence and cohesion to Western politics in recent years, 
very much in contrast to its turbulent past in which paradigmatic clashes 
between capitalism and communism, fascism and democracy, monarchism 
and republicanism, nationalism and regionalism, imperialism and inde-
pendentism, Protestantism and Catholicism, tore western societies apart 
over many centuries. Paradigmatic consensus is an important basis for 
growth of a common political culture that is internalised by populations and 
integrated into a set of political institutions for which they make sense and 
through which they can symbiotically produce a stable political process. 
The fact that there is an absence of consensus on political paradigms in the 
Arab world is a glaring, and politically very significant, reality. Among the 
reasons for the absence of such a consensus are a number of factors that I 
will examine, although not necessarily in order of priority or importance: 
First, the current increasingly global consensus has been produced and is 
projected by the West. And for that reason the Arab world has difficulty in 
accepting it as a consensus paradigm. Since the birth of Islam, the Arab 
world has been in dialogue but competition with the (Christian) West. As 
the crucible of a new and immensely successful religion and civilization at 
a time when the Christian West was somewhat marginal, the Arab world-
view is centered around a deep pride in its civilizational and cultural 
achievements, a conviction that the Jewish and Christian civilizations al-
though original and sacred are surpassed by the Islamic, and a sensitivity to 
giving up that pride of place in exchange for accepting the worldview or 
paradigm developed outside the Arab-Islamic center. The culturally com-
petitive worldview grew more embittered with the violent crusades of the 
Middle Ages and the Spanish conquest of Andalusia through which the op-
position of the Christian west was confirmed and the hostility of the two 
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civilizational blocs was hardened. The Arab-Western competition – par-
ticularly in the Arab East – was put on hold for a number of centuries as a 
result of the conquest of the Arab world from the East by the Mongols and 
the various Turkic tribes. This provided an insularity to the Arab world un-
til the west burst back onto the scene in the late 18
th century with the intel-
lectual impact of the French Revolution, the political impact of the Napole-
onic invasion of Egypt in 1799, and then in the 19
th and 20
th centuries, the 
direct and indirect conquest or control of Arab provinces and regions by the 
empires of the West. 
The brief rebellion against Turkish rule in World War I was quickly over 
and quickly replaced by anti-colonial movements of liberation against vari-
ous Western powers and against the Western division of Arab regions into 
separate states. The conclusion of national wars of liberation coincided 
with reverse phenomenon of the implantation of what was perceived as a 
colonial state on Arab land, i.e. the establishment of Israel in Palestine in 
1948. In the Arab perspective, this confirmed the nefarious intentions of the 
Balfourian West and ensured that the national anti-colonial struggles would 
continue through the struggle against Israel. Finally, the struggle for the 
Arab world’s largest resource, oil, which was symbolized for many by the 
direct intervention of US troops on the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait in 1991 to secure Western control of Arab oil, has ended in situation in 
which the West, and particularly the United States, essentially controls the 
production and price of Arab oil. The latest events of September 11 are a 
non-representative but still indicative symptom of the level of hostility to 
the West that still exist in some quarters of the Arab-Islamic world.  
Without going further into an analysis of the relationship, it is important to 
note the depth of competitiveness in the Arab perspective toward the rela-
tionship and the great difficulty of willingly and comfortably accepting the 
worldview of one’s civilizational competitor (no to use a stronger word) as 
one’s own. Ownership of the paradigm or worldview is essential to making 
it credible, and the fact that liberal democratic market economy paradigm 
that is now the only serious contender for a consensus paradigm on the 
world stage happens to be a Western-developed worldview, is a major 
handicap to its being adopted in the Arab world. And as it seems to be, in 
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many ways, perhaps the most practically applicable paradigm in this epoch, 
in rejecting it the Arab world is forced to fall back on other paradigms none 
of which have enough of the elements of practical success and durability. 
It is interesting to note that in the late 19
th and early 20
th century, there pre-
vailed, for a time, a much more positive attitude toward the West among 
Arab elites, in which they found it easy to adopt the general Western para-
digm of the time, and indeed introduce a whole set of concepts about na-
tionalism, secularism, civic culture, and democracy that were central to the 
political culture, political debates, and political movements of the first half 
of the 20
th century. However, this positive attitude was short-lived, and 
more combative attitudes introduced by communist thought, radical nation-
alism, and a reviving Islamism, as well as real conflicts with the west over 
their colonial rule, Israel, oil, and other issues, soon confirmed a more hos-
tile attitude. 
Second, the liberal democratic market paradigm has a number of inherent 
opponents and critics: 
a)  among the authoritarian state elites of the Arab world, as among the 
authoritarian states of the former Soviet bloc and other erstwhile dic-
tatorships, there is, of course, an opposition to most aspects of this 
paradigm. Constitutional liberties are downplayed in favor of na-
tional duties and sacrifices with the argument that liberties might be 
a dangerous breach in national security (viz. Saad Eddin Ibrahim in 
Egypt) or that liberty is akin to looseness and corruption, amoral pol-
lution from the West that has already taken its toll on the West 
(drugs, AIDS, divorce, social disintegration) and that a good consci-
entious state much protect their good societies against. Democracy is 
grudgingly paid lip service to, but it is painted as factionalism and 
petty politics that produces instability, fractiousness, and national 
weakness, while a strong leader is held up as the guarantor of stabil-
ity, national security, and steady progress. Market economies are 
also a part of the paradigm that many of the main Arab states have 
not come to accept as it would mean their ceding of their central role 
in the economy and society to powerful players in the domestic and 
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international private sector that are beyond their control and who 
would rob them of their patronage and socio-economic power. Re-
luctant states still propagandise about the rapaciousness of the pri-
vate sector, the dangers of globalization, and the necessity to main-
tain large public sectors. Certainly few of them have joined Clinton’s 
or Blair’s Third Way. 
b) Among the Westernized intellectual elites of the second half of the 
20
th century, their worldview was close to that of the Western radical 
left-wing which often derided liberalism and democracy as bour-
geois, favored more militant and communal moral attitudes, and 
railed against market economics as the source of all forms of domes-
tic and global inequality and oppression. In the Arab World this in-
tellectual attitude was reinforced by real struggles against the West. 
c)  Among the non-westernized non-elites of this same period, Islam be-
came an increasingly relevant paradigm. Chafing as they were from 
the West and from their own supposedly anti-Western Westernized 
elites, their attitudes toward the proposed paradigm were decidedly 
hostile. To begin with, they insisted that they were not at all in search 
of a paradigm, whether western or eastern as Islam, properly re-
centered, was the appropriate framework for political, social cultural, 
and even economic life. Liberalism was irrelevant as Islam made 
clear what was allowed and what wasn’t. Thoroughgoing democracy 
in which authority stemmed from the people was in principle unac-
ceptable, as authority was God’s alone, although Islam allowed an 
important role for consultation (shura) and collective decision mak-
ing (the prophet’s saying: my nation does not agree on error). 
Islamists take a more benign view of trade and markets, but they 
categorize it as subordinate to the overall interests of the Islamic 
community, bounded by the rejection of profit and regulated by the 
duties of zakat. There is certainly no conception of the supremacy or 
the hidden-hand goodness of the market, but rather that economic in-
teraction, like human interaction, is healthy and natural as long as it 
remains regulated by the greater good of the community which is 
guided by the precepts of religion. 
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The crisis through which the Arab world is passing can be partly attrib-
uted to this particular problem: that the liberal market democratic para-
digm for the Arab countries today – working toward building liberal 
constitutional democracies with healthy market economies and effective 
but moderate social programs – (a goal, incidentally, that many intellec-
tuals and researchers quietly endorse), has failed to be successfully 
floated as an enthusiastically embraced popular paradigm. While Chi-
nese students demonstrated for freedom – even carrying replicas of the 
Statue of Liberty – and while the youth of eastern and central Europe 
demonstrated for liberal market democracies, and while the middle 
classes of the Philippines and Chile raised this paradigm as a battle cry, 
no such politicisation of the dominant paradigm was successful in the 
Arab world. 
The largely failed story of Arab civil society, symbolized by the sad – 
almost horrific – imprisonment of one of its foremost proponents, Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim, is a primary symptom and indicator of the depth of the 
Arab predicament vis-à-vis moving ahead with an acceptable and rea-
sonable paradigm. 
Arab civil society was supposed to follow in the footsteps of Central 
and Eastern European civil society. The argument was that the Arab 
world, like Eastern and Central Europe, had gone through a time of 
revolutionary upheaval marked by radical socio-economic change, the 
rise of strong ideologies, and the dominance of powerful authoritarian 
socio-ideological states, and that this period, because of socio-economic 
and historical inevitabilities, was coming to an end. The assumption 
continued that an embattled civil society had emerged even within these 
difficult conditions and had identified the paradigm of the future and 
was bravely expressing it, and that civil society would lead the natural 
shaking off of the old socialist authoritarian husks and would lead the 
way in building the new political and socio-economic order. The Arab 
world would have its own Walesas and Havels and would unseat its 
own Ceaucescus. This was said to be accompanied by a general democ-
ratization trend expressed in more political liberalization and more fre-
quent and meaningful elections for parliaments and local administra-
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tions. Perhaps many governing elites themselves believed that such a 
democratising and civil society trend was sweeping the world and that 
they had to adapt to it, at least partially, or collapse like the once solid 
Soviet states. As it turned out, however, the Soviet collapse turned out 
to be a Soviet-centric event, and none of the Arab states suffered a simi-
lar fate nor even came close to facing serious internal political pressure 
for change. As the 1990s wore on and the Soviet cataclysm ebbed, Arab 
states regained confidence that their states were perhaps as solid as be-
fore and that, despite some necessary and wise absorption of democratic 
and participatory demands, they need not worry about a fundamental 
revolutionary trend that would inevitably sweep them away. At the be-
ginning of the 21
st century, the Arab dictatorships that had taken shape 
at the latest by the late 1960s were still going strong, indeed they were 
renewing their leases on life by dynastic transfers of power to their sons, 
as in Morocco, Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere. 
Civil society itself, as a galvanizing movement, failed to succeed as a 
revolutionary political force. There may be several reasons for this: 
a) Unlike in central and eastern Europe, where civil society leaders 
almost monopolized expressions of dissent and rebellion against 
the political status quo, in the Arab world, the Islamic movements 
had already staked out an oppositional position since the 1960s, 
and had grown immensely in power with the rise of oil wealth in 
the gulf, the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the de-
cline of Arab nationalist and socialist ideology in the 1970s. The 
lightning rods of discontent were the Islamic movements, and 
civil society organizations and leaders could garner the support of 
some members of the middle class and intelligentsia, but had lost 
the race in reaching out to the larger mass of the population and 
representing for them an expression of their discontent and a 
leadership for their resistance or rebellion against domestic op-
pression or injustice. 
b) The resort of many worried Arab states to local and national elec-
tions had the effect of strengthening a new class of electoral poli-
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ticians at the local and national level rather than strengthening 
civil society organizations and leaders, most of which found 
themselves unable to wage or win elections. This new political 
class, based largely on patron-client relations and other forms of 
traditional interaction, seized another significant portion of politi-
cal life, in addition to that already seized by the Islamists, and left 
civil society organizations and leaders even more marginalized. 
c)  Civil society itself in the Arab world was perhaps less robust than 
in central and eastern Europe partly because of the makeup of 
Arab society. As civil society in those countries failed to stand up 
to ethnic identities (e.g. the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Chechnya 
conflict, etc.), so civil society in the Arab world could not over-
come other ascriptive associational ties of religion, family, tribe 
region, or even race (Kurd-Arab in Iraq, Berber-Arab in Algeria, 
etc.). The Soviets had perhaps homogenized many of the eastern 
and central European societies more effectively than had hap-
pened in the Arab world, and hence a national civil society could 
more effectively represent the national social structure, whereas 
the more segmented nature of many Arab societies made a na-
tional civil society more marginal and less effective. 
d) Western support for these civil society organizations and the har-
mony of eastern Europe many of whose population was unabash-
edly saying that they were, after all, Europeans, and they wanted 
to be like western Europe, whereas in the Arab world, the prob-
lem of seeing the west as a hostile ‘other’ made civil society links 
with the west almost treasonous and made their rhetoric sound 
unacceptably like that emanating from western embassies in their 
capitals. 
For three reasons and more, the experience of democratisation through civil 
society in the Arab world is currently in serious decline. The arrest and sen-
tencing of its most prominent proponent in the largest and most central and 
most pro-American Arab state is an announcement to all other Arab states, 
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that they can return to business as usual and that there is no need to fear or 
to accommodate civil society. 
Much of what I have discussed above relates to the central proposition that 
whereas most regions of the world have moved under the general paradigm 
of liberal market-economy democracies (with the notable exception of 
China, and a much less significant handful of much smaller countries), and 
that most of the rest of the world is seeking to organize its political institu-
tions and political culture under that general paradigm, albeit with varying 
measures of success. The Arab world, for many reasons, has not been able 
to move under this overall global paradigm and is still being pulled to and 
fro among a number of paradigms. As a political result the amount of po-
litical cultural confusion and contradiction, at all levels, in the Arab world, 
is very high, with obvious results in the form of political tension, political 
repression, and the necessary continuation of authoritarian forms of gov-
ernment. 
Of equal importance is the problem that the other paradigms that segments 
of Arab society are attracted to have not been able to – and perhaps are ob-
jectively not able to – provide a basis of political stability and political de-
velopment. Among the main alternative paradigms are the following: 
1.  The Islamic paradigm is of course the most dramatically visible and 
is actually in various forms of implementation in a number of Arab 
and Islamic countries. The example of Iran – a righteous and victori-
ous revolution against obvious oppression, and an admittedly poor 
post-revolutionary performance partially saved in the past years by 
the popular reform movement of President Khatami – has been and 
remains a strong example for young and radical Islamists that radical 
Islamic ideals can be realized in practice with some measure of suc-
cess and durability. The example of Saudi Arabia and some of its 
more conservative neighbors gives another example to older and 
more conservative Muslims or Islamists, that Islamic states are vi-
able and durable and that they provide better alternatives, perhaps, 
than other models in the Arab world such as those in Iraq, Syria, or 
even Egypt. And certainly that they provide better alternatives than 
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those in post-Soviet Russia. The monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, 
claiming descendance from the Prophet, and maintaining strong Is-
lamic state identities, provide another less sever model of conserva-
tive politics with an Islamic identity; they offer a viable semi-Islamic 
model of government in contradistinction to the secular republican 
model of government. The wealth, power, and success of Saudi Ara-
bia and the Gulf states, as well as their strong communication influ-
ence in satellite television and the Arab press, has gone a long way in 
convincing many in the Arab world, both elites and no-elites, that a 
form of Islamic or Islamic-oriented government and social frame-
work is the most appropriate one for the Arab world. This conviction 
is based on a number of perceptions: (i) that the Arab-Islamic world 
is different than other societies and that its social, cultural, moral, 
and religious makeup make it such that an Islamic government is 
most suitable for it, even if other forms of more secular or republican 
government are more suitable for western Europe or North America. 
For others, the argument is that (ii) this form of government is actu-
ally better than other forms of government, and that the Arab-Islamic 
world adopts it because it is the best not because it is particular to the 
Arab world. The belief is partly religious, but also partly moral in 
that the West as well as the post-Soviet or Chinese East have failed 
to protect their populations against the social and moral ills of mod-
ernization, and that the Islamic alternative is indeed the paradigm for 
the future. The Islamic paradigm is, of course, a long and complex 
topic regarding which much has been written, but suffice it her to 
make this quick reference to it as a strong competing paradigm. 
2. the Arab socialist nationalist paradigm was indeed the dominant 
paradigm in the period between the 1950s and 1970s. It shaped the 
thinking of an entire generation and became the dominant paradigm 
in the cultural institutions of power in the central Arab countries of 
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. It was also the dominant paradigm of the in-
telligentsia (journalists, professors, poets, writers, musicians) that 
was responsible for most of the cultural production in the various 
media in that period. Represented by dominant figures such as Abdel 
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Nasser and hardened by repeated wars with Israel, this worldview, 
with its ample borrowing from Soviet and nationalist thought, re-
mained a strong paradigmatic presence even after the passing of its 
heyday a couple of decades ago. Although the states that created, and 
were created by, it are now cold repressive relics of their once char-
ismatic past, the paradigm remains a touchstone of legitimacy and 
loyalty to wide sectors of the intelligentsia and middle class. In its 
vision of a united Arab world – or at least a more unified one – and 
strong corporatist semi-socialist states that ‘represent’ all sectors of 
their society, dominate the developmental economy, and tend to the 
social and welfare needs of their populations, this Arab socialist na-
tionalist paradigm is still a powerful presence that runs in many 
senses in alternative directions to the global liberal market democ-
ratic paradigm.  
Conclusion 
In this preliminary exploration of the issue of paradigmatic competition in 
the contemporary Arab world, I have tried to shed some light on the extent 
to which the global liberal-market-democratic paradigm, although consid-
ered seriously by many influential Arabs individually, has failed to become 
a dominant paradigm in the Arab world, and how alternative paradigms, 
inherited or renewed, are competing for dominance in the political cultural 
arena. Much work still needs to be done to develop the theses presented in 
outline form above. Certainly, however, this paradigmatic dissonance cre-
ates waves of political cultural dissonance within various sectors of Arab 
societies themselves, and prevents the political systems from developing a 
coherent symbiosis between political institutions and political culture, and 
leads to the continuations of political tension and political repression. It is 
also the case that this paradigmatic tension finds its way into high levels of 
tension in the international relations of the region as well. International re-
lations themselves require a fit between institutions and paradigm, and the 
absence of acquiescence in the Arab world, at the level of populations and 
many elites, to the current global paradigm, translates into high levels of 
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conflict and tension at the international level. This is partly why more than 
half the countries with which the West, and the US in particular, is in direct 
or indirect conflict, are in the Arab world. It is the case that most of the task 
of working toward more paradigmatic consensus in the Arab world, 
whether it is on the current global paradigm, or one of the alternative Arab 
paradigms, or some new Third Way, falls on Arab writers, thinkers, lead-
ers, and activists; but it is also the case as well that the West, and Europe in 
particular, has an obligation and an interest in better understanding the de-
bates and contradictions raging in the Arab world in order to build better 
relations with the Arab world and in order to refine the global paradigm in 
ways that take into account the specific perspectives and sensitivities of 
others. 
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Euro-Mediterranean Formations – 
Socio-Cultural Imperatives of System 
Change 
Introduction 
Over the last decade, ‘good governance’ became a term in inflationary use 
both by comparativist and international relations scholarship. Although its 
longevity may be questioned by those adhering to the more conventional 
analytical  foci of economic liberalisation and democratisation, its perti-
nence has been consistently hailed by those subscribing to the promotion of 
flexible but value-driven patterns of (collective) rule-making. This paper 
aims at assessing the nature and aspirations of the European Union’s (EU) 
involvement with the promotion of political change in the Mediterranean 
region, through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), after the sign-
ing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995. Clarifying some con-
ceptual and definitional problems facing the ‘good governance’ approach to 
Euro-Mediterranean politics will be central to developing a more penetrat-
ing understanding of the emerging regional system. 
An important distinction related to the line pursued in this paper is between 
democratisation and good governance. The former refers to the process of 
attaining a democratic end-product with reference to the governance of a 
polity or, as the case of the EU qua ‘sympolity’ clearly illustrates, of a plu-
rality of polities. The democratisation philology emphasises the institu-
tional means by which democratic principles and processes are to become 
part of a polity’s modus operandi, with the view to establishing conditions 
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of public accountability, political legitimacy (both input- and output-
oriented) and citizen participation. Although no consensus definition of 
democratisation (either as a process or strategy) can be said to exist, central 
to its attainment are the institution of competitive periodic elections, indi-
vidual and collective executive accountability, meaningful legislative rep-
resentation of the demos, a participatory civil society, and the rule of law 
(with or without a formal constitutional expression). This list could well be 
extended to a variety of good democratic practices in the workings and 
composition of political institutions, principles referring to some form of 
separation of powers, civic rights and duties, respect for human and minor-
ity rights, promotion of associational-type organisations, etc. The problem 
associated with the ‘democratisation approach’ to the promotion of political 
change in a state or group of states is that its desired end-situation - democ-
racy - is linked with the Western liberal political tradition. Thus, employing 
the language (and assorted value spheres) of democratisation might not be 
entirely, partly or at all appropriate as a guide towards the promotion of 
political change in such areas as North Africa, the Middle East or South 
East Asia, whose polities are characterised by different belief-systems, cul-
tural traditions, political practices and social structures as compared to the 
average West European state. 
Good governance on the other hand, seen as a flexible policy framework, 
aims at distancing itself from absolute notions of democracy and democra-
tisation, focusing instead on a set of norms and rules that are associated 
with what can be described as a system of working relations based on the 
following constitutive elements: policy and decisional openness and trans-
parency, public accountability, lack of corruption, the institutionalisation of 
civil society, the socio-political dimensions of legitimacy, civic compe-
tence, individual and collective liberties, minority and human rights, effi-
cient public-sector management, equitable distribution of public resources, 
dialogical or deliberative political processes, the independence of the judi-
ciary, the conception and enactment of well-articulated laws, etc. What it 
lacks, therefore, as opposed to the democratisation strategy, is a clear focus 
on a final product of the process of change, be it transitory or tranforma-
tive, linear or erratic, domestically driven or externally controlled. Instead, 
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good governance may well focus on issues of political liberalisation, inter-
faith or inter-cultural dialogue, and socio-economic governance, without 
however democracy being logically or necessarily located at the end of a 
continuum, whose two extreme poles are represented by ‘non-democracy’ 
(encompassing a variety of autocratic, authoritarian, totalitarian and like-
minded political regimes) and full-blown democracy (or, as some realist 
democratic theorists would probably have it, polyarchy). 
In summary, the good governance approach forms the basis of a particular 
type of socio-political agenda informed by notions of mutualism and recip-
rocity, rather than by the universal applicability of liberal-democratic ideals 
in the sense of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisation’ thesis. Its is above all an 
instrument for capacity-building in furthering inter-systemic convergence, 
without subsuming the collectivities into an absolutist ideology of good 
democratic practice. Thus, central to the development of a better under-
standing of the emerging Euro-Mediterranean system is the need to ac-
knowledge the normative and procedural qualities of diversity and differen-
tiation, as opposed to systemic uniformity and principled universality. 
Good governance does not easily become, to borrow from Niblock, ‘sub-
ject to allegations of cultural bias’.
1 Finally, despite the fact that, much like 
democratisation, no general agreement exists in the acquis académique as 
to what good governance comprises, unlike democratisation, it ‘constitutes 
a more diffuse and less directly challenging manifesto … emphasise[s] val-
ues and practices which are not absolutes … [and] enables concern with 
democracy to find expression through less direct but nonetheless significant 
channels’.
2 
Definitional Accounts 
The Mediterranean constitutes an interactive system of states and societies, 
whose mapping remains nebulous. Although ‘different definitions and dif-
 
1   T. Niblock, ‘Good Governance: Towards a new Framework to Guide the European Union’s In-
volvement with Middle Eastern States’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Democratisation’, 
University of Reading, 15 January 2000, p. 3. 
2   Ibid, p. 4. 
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ferent criteria often produce different regions’,
3 the problem of defining 
this ‘unique body of water’ is that those who raise the same type of ques-
tions fail to agree on a geographically bounded unit of analysis. But defin-
ing the Mediterranean requires taking into account that ‘mental maps’ and 
‘imagined spaces’ are those that ultimately define communities and politi-
cal regions.
4 Pre-1945 maps of the region may look today archaic, yet the 
way in which such maps are drawn offer a powerful policy tool for control-
ling its component territories. But broad concepts such as the ‘West’ or the 
‘Orient’ that continue to divide the region cover no well-delineated territo-
ries. Their appeal is in the associations they conjure up, mixing geographi-
cal space with socio-economic interaction, as well as with political and cul-
tural identity to draw an imaginary but identifiable divide.
5 A more studied 
analysis reveals that the region offers an efficient line of contact. After all, 
in the disorderly universe of politics, perceptions generate reality. The abil-
ity to manage such perceptions is thus crucial, especially given that there is 
hardly another topic that have caused such a clear-cut split among its stu-
dents: Christian Europe and the Islamic world. 
Unlike most northern European countries that generally regard North Af-
rica as an incongruent and ‘backward region’ of no great strategic interest, 
countries like Italy, Spain, France and Greece hold a different view. Like-
wise, for many North Africans, the dividing line between Europe and Af-
rica lies in the Sahara and not the Mediterranean. Tempting as it may be to 
characterise the latter as ‘a kind of horizontal dividing line’ between the 
European North and ‘an arc of crisis’ located in the South, its division into 
Europe and ‘other’ fails to capture the dialectic between these distinct yet 
intertwined geographical spaces. A North-South conflict theoretical 
framework underestimates the realities of both North-North and South-
South frictions and the sympathies that not only prevent the outbreak of 
autochthonous conflicts but also underlie Western European efforts to de-
velop harmonious and balanced, albeit not symmetrical, relations across the 
 
3    B. Russet, ‘International Regions and the International System’, in R. A. Falk and S. H. Mendlovitz 
(eds.), Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1973), p. 83. 
4   See also P. Gould and R. White, Mental Maps (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974); and A. K. Henrik-
son, ‘The Geographical “Mental Maps” of American Policy-Makers’, International Political Science 
Review, 1:4 (1980) 495-530. 
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Mediterranean.
6 While Calleya argues that the Mediterranean encompasses 
at least two ‘international regions’ (the EU and the Middle East) and three 
sub-regional groupings (southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb),
7 
one could identify many variations in these divisions, presenting analysts 
with the problem of regional identity. From the perspective of international 
regionalism, although sub-regional constellations need a complex re-
conceptualisation of wider regional dynamics, it is still useful to think of 
the Mediterranean as a single system (totality). Some of the many security 
considerations around the basin derive from similar trends such as unre-
solved questions of political legitimacy, slow growth to resurgent national-
ism, religious radicalism, the search for regional dominance, arms supplies, 
strategic balances, etc. Another paradox arises when considering that it is 
security, rather than societal, economic or cultural considerations that le-
gitimise a holistic approach to the study of Euro-Mediterranean politics.
8 
True as it may be that security problems in the area can best be handled at 
the regional level, the question is how to achieve coherent patterns of inter-
action among Mediterranean states, as well as between them and the rest of 
the world so as to enhance regional stability.
9 
The Mediterranean has been described as a dense network of diversities 
and dividing lines between different political and socio-economic 
(sub)systems, cultures and regimes, languages, forms of expression, and 
religious denominations. For a penetrating understanding of the Mediterra-
nean to be reached, one has to recognise that the region has always been a 
crossing point for conflict and co-operation, unity and diversity. Current 
discourses assert that the Mediterranean exists as an ‘entity’ or ‘unity’; a 
view which chimes well with Braudel’s, in that the Mediterranean formed a 
 
5   W. Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, (London, Pinter, 1990), p.8. 
6   N. Waites and S. Stavridis, ‘The EU and Mediterranean Member States’, in Stavridis, et al. (eds.), 
The Foreign Policies, p. 29. 
7   See S. C. Calleya, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Rela-
tions in the Mediterranean Area (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997), especially pp. 89-140. 
8   D. Fenech, ‘Ways and Means of Security around the Mediterranean Sea: A Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership’, Fondation Mediterraneenne d’Etudes Strategiques, Seminar de la Tour Blanche, Tou-
lon, 21-24 June 1995. 
9   T. Niblock, ‘The Realms within which Integrated Communities Approach could be fostered’, in G. 
Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach (London, Fed-
eral Trust, 1992), p. 49. 
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large-scale unity, whose history could be understood only by looking at the 
factors that tied its coastal parts together.
10 But as Aliboni asserts, the spe-
cial bonds of Mediterranean solidarity will continue to form part of an 
open-ended debate.
11 In this context, Lister makes the point that the ques-
tion of a Mediterranean ‘ideal’ of unity is rarely explicitly spelled out; 
rather, ‘it is usually a vague expression of goodwill and shared history’.
12 
Being a heterogeneous synthesis of religious and ethnic groups along the 
lines of a ‘hierarchy’, and of unequal economic development, a plurality of 
regimes, divergent perceptions of security, and uneven demographic 
growth, Mediterranean complexity occupies a prominent position between 
order and disorder. For our purposes, the Mediterranean is defined as a het-
erarchical regional space, where geography, history and politics intermesh 
with culture and religion with enormous complexity, resulting in a compos-
ite system of partial regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and 
belonging.  
Threat Perceptions and Misperceptions 
From a macro-historical perspective, Mediterranean fragmentation consti-
tutes the major obstacle to substantive regional co-operation. Contemporary 
analysts point to both real and potential conflicts that originate in or impact 
upon the region. In revisiting their respective causes, Balta distinguishes 
between conflicts that originate in the distant past and conflicts that 
emerged in the second half of the twentieth century.
13 Potential conflicts 
are divided into three categories: those inherited from colonialism (mainly 
territorial), those stemming from deeply divided societies (e.g., Lebanon), 
and those originating in minority issues (e.g., Basques, Corsicans, Kurds, 
etc). Conflicts inherited from the past are closely associated with the three 
monotheistic denominations affecting Mediterranean societies. These in-
 
10   See F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vols. I-II, 
5th ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1987). 
11   See R. Aliboni, ‘The Mediterranean Dimension’, in W. Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European 
Integration (London, Pinter, 1990), pp. 155-67. 
12   M. Lister, The European Union and the South: Relations with Developing Countries (London, 
Routledge, 1997), p. 72. 
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heritances exemplify the denominational fractures among Christianity, Ju-
daism and Islam, as well as the schisms between the Catholic and Eastern 
Orthodox camps, and between the Sunnis and Shiites. Such conflicts are 
the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Greco-Turkish rivalry and the continuing divi-
sion of Cyprus. 
Following Spenser’s analysis, the prevailing view during the Cold War was 
that the Mediterranean represented ‘a region of importance because of its 
proximity, potential instability and hence exploitation by the erstwhile So-
viet Union, but of less importance as an “out of area” region in NATO 
terms’.
14 Post-1989, however, the emphasis shifted from global assess-
ments of security issues to regional ones. Lesser argues that in the new stra-
tegic environment, problems and interests have shifted towards the South.
15 
Although the aftermath of the Cold War gave the impression that certain 
protracted conflicts might be resolved, the easing of East-West tension was 
not followed by a similar trend in Mediterranean politics. Rather, the re-
moval of the bipolarity and with it the view that wanted the Mediterranean 
to serve as a sub-theatre of superpower antagonism introduced an idiosyn-
cratic fragility at both regional and sub-regional level.  
Important security issues appear to be products of the new world (dis)order. 
The Gulf crisis of 1990/91 was the first major international conflict to be 
recorded in the era of Pax Americana post-Cold War, questioning the ca-
pabilities of European institutions, the impact of independent national di-
plomacies and the future of multinational crisis management. The Gulf cri-
sis interrupted Europe’s newly-founded complacency about its own 
security, as it clearly showed that, without the US, Europe lacks the mili-
tary capability to confront or deter its enemies in its southern flank.
16 Iraq’s 
 
13   See P. Balta, ‘La Méditerranée en tant que zone de conflits’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 
37 (1997). 
14   C. Spencer, ‘Rethinking or reorienting Europe’s Mediterranean security focus’, in W. Park and G. 
Wyn Rees (eds.), Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe (London, Longman, 1998), p. 139. 
15   I. O. Lesser, ‘Growth and Change in Southern Europe’, in J. W. Holmes (ed.), Maelstrom: The 
United States Southern Europe and the Challenges in the Mediterranean (Cambridge, MA, World 
Peace Foundation, 1995), pp. 11-30. 
16   D. P. Calleo, ‘The United States and Security in the New Europe’, in W. Weidenfield and J. Janning 
(eds.), Global Responsibilities: Europe in Tomorrow’s World (Gutersloh, Bertelsmann, 1991), p. 
172. See also W. H Taft, ‘European Security: lessons learned from the Gulf war’, NATO Review, 
39:3 (1991) 7-11. 
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invasion of Kuwait also highlighted the fragility of Arab unity. Not only 
did it disprove the myth that Arabs do not attack their brethren, but also 
exposed the poorer countries’ resentment towards the opulent life-style of 
the oil-rich monarchies and the shallowness of security arrangements in the 
Arab world.
17 At the same time, the initial euphoria of a universal collec-
tive security system hardly outlived the aftermath of the Gulf War, as the 
Yugoslav crisis destroyed the illusion of what US President Bush called a 
‘new world order’. Although the aftermath of the Gulf War sparked an in-
terest in issues of conflict-resolution in the Mediterranean,
18 soon after the 
termination of the civil war in Lebanon, there was a return to traditional 
power-relations; the most striking examples being the stagnated Cyprus 
problem and the erratic Middle East Peace Process. 
As Jervis rightly points out, in international relations, it is the threat itself 
as much as the perceptions of threat that guide policy-makers.
19 Today, 
most analysts agree that the Mediterranean does not present Europe with a 
major military threat,
20 as the growing arms races in the region and its mili-
tarisation are mainly intended for use on a south-south scale. Not surpris-
ingly, then, EU states are more concerned about losing control over their 
energy supplies and growing illegal migration. Similarly, they are preoccu-
pied with increased instability in parts of North Africa and the weakness of 
democratic institutions. Although issue-specific disputes are not to be ruled 
out, the main security risk is linked to the new challenges posed by radical 
movements and the growing north-south economic asymmetries. Nor do 
southern Mediterranean countries perceive any direct military threat from 
Europe, for they tend to associate ‘security’ chiefly with domestic con-
cerns. Still though, the international management of domestic crises exac-
erbates anti-Western feelings: ‘Even talking about it may have a destabilis-
ing effect’.
21 This perception stems from a chain of events that have fuelled 
 
17   J. P. Zanders, ‘A New Security (Dis)Order for the Gulf’, POLE Papers, Centrum voor Polemologie, 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1, 1995. 
18    F. Halliday, ‘The Gulf War and its aftermath’, International Affairs, 67:2 (1991) 223-4. 
19    R.  Jervis,  Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1976). 
20   P. Moya, Frameworks for Cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic Assembly, Civilian 
Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, AM 259, 7 October 1995, p. 12. 
21   R. Aliboni, ‘Introduction’, in Aliboni, Joffé and Niblock, (eds.), Security Challenges, p. 10. 
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a deep sense of strategic insecurity in the Arab world. The Gulf War, the 
international isolation imposed on Iraq and Libya, and the overwhelming 
US preoccupation with Israeli security have convinced the Arabs that the 
West may not hesitate to strike out against them should its interests require 
so. Most North African regimes are skeptical of Europe’s willingness to 
play a decisive role in Mediterranean security,
22 while they are suspicious 
of NATO’s involvement in the region,
23 despite its initiative for a ‘Mediter-
ranean Dialogue’.
24 For their part, finally, EU states exhibit a relative diffi-
culty in dealing with Mediterranean security, in contrast to dealing with 
similar problems in other transformative regions. 
Islamophobia and Modernity  
Mediterranean security is full of misunderstandings about distorted percep-
tions and images of Islam, as well as about the threat of terrorism used by 
extremist nationalist movements. Other issues stem from the appropriation 
of Islam for political ends and the tensions arising from questions regarding 
universal values and norms of human rights. These misunderstandings 
emanate as much from mutual ignorance, as they do from intended confu-
sion. One should also guard against the simplification often suggested in 
the media that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is a violent and merciless force 
orchestrated by Iran with the help of other radical regimes.
25 As Essid 
points out, ‘there is still a need to define and redefine terms which reduce 
dialogue to a series of parallel monologues and, at several levels, reinforce 
misunderstandings’.
26 It is thus of great value that any meaningful debate 
about Islam should dispel the clouds of deliberate myth-making and re-
vengeful rhetoric that are particularly detrimental to a mutually rewarding 
dialogue. 
 
22   G. Joffé, ‘Southern Attitudes Towards an Integrated Mediterranean Region’, Mediterranean Politics, 
2:1 (1997) 18. 
23   See T. Greenwood, ‘US and NATO Force Structure and Military operations in the Mediterranean’, 
McNair Papers, 14, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 1993. 
24   N. de Santis, The future of NATO’s Mediterranean initiative’, NATO Review, 46:1 (1998) 32-35. 
25   P. Cuco, The Eastern Mediterranean, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee, As-
sembly of Western European Union, Document 1465, 24 May (1995). 
26   Quoted in Faria and Vasconcelos, ‘Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality’, Chaillot 
Papers, 25, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1996, p. 1. 
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During the Gulf War, the West was seriously concerned with the possibility 
of a militant Islamist backlash against intervention, unveiling several fault-
lines between and within Mediterranean polities and societies. This sig-
nalled the re-arrangement of world order, reducing East-West antagonism 
to a minimum, while re-emphasising the Orient-Occident and North-South 
divides, thus offering useful ammunition to those arguing that the dominant 
conflict post-1989 is between Occidental and Oriental values, or an Occi-
dental economic/technological ‘post-historical’ world and an Oriental ‘his-
torical’ world.
27 Rather effortlessly, Huntington depicted multiple 
(sub)regional ‘clashes’ as a result of the irrefutable existence of different 
cultures (civilisations), projecting a historical Mediterranean fragmentation, 
rather than unity.
28 His Clash of Civilisations raised the question of secu-
rity’s cultural dimension, in that the ‘clash’ occurs along the lines of relig-
iously inspired militancy against Western liberal values. But his analysis 
missed the underlying causes of Islamic resurgence, as it is obsessed with 
the cultural symbols or the retrieval of collective historical memories. A 
related criticism is that, by rewriting Muslim history, he failed to encourage 
intelligent dialogue between the two opposing cultures. As Sachedina as-
serts, such scholarship effectively corrupts the common moral and political 
language of the two cultures, fosters confrontation, and prolongs historical 
stereotypes.
29 Arguing that the notion of ‘Islam vs. the West’ will not rep-
resent the arena of the next ideological struggle, Fuller and Lesser suggest 
that a comprehensive reform to break away from authoritarianism is im-
perative, that political Islam threatens the established order in Muslim 
countries far more than the West, and that confrontation can best be pre-
vented by integrating Islam into the global process.
30 
Nevertheless, concern of an Islamic ‘threat’ to the West increased after the 
Gulf War, by creating a new enemy stereotype after the demise of commu-
 
27   F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, Free Press, 1992). 
28   S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London, Touch-
stone, 1996). 
29   A. Sachedina, ‘Religion and Global Affairs: Islamic Religion and Political Order’, SAIS Review, 
18:2 (1998) 59-64. 
30   See G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser, A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Boulder, 
CO, Westview Press, 1995). 
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nism, preparing a climate for a ‘new cultural war’.
31 Rising anxiety in in-
ternational relations is, according to Blunden, contagious.
32 All too often, 
Western foreign policy-makers have exploited a general public ignorance 
about ‘Orientalism’ to advance self-serving objectives. Since ‘Islam is both 
a religion and a polity’,
33 several extremist groups have used it for radical 
purposes. The traditional view of ‘Orientalists’ in the West is that the Ar-
abs/Muslims ‘show lack of coordination and harmony in organisation and 
function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective 
action for mutual benefit or common profit is alien to them’.
34 Crucial to 
the creation of such stereotypes has been the role played by the Western 
media in equating Islam with ‘fundamentalist Islam’ and, hence, with a di-
rect threat to the liberal-democratic West. In this context, Said notes, ‘there 
is a consensus on Islam as a kind of scapegoat for everything we do not 
happen to like about the world’s new political, social, and economic pat-
terns’.
35 Likewise, Esposito suggests that the selective presentation of facts 
and biased analysis have contributed to a negative perception of Islamic 
religion by mainstream Western society, reducing Islam and its revivalism 
to stereotypes of ‘Islam vs. the West’, ‘Islam vs. modernity’, ‘Muslim 
rage’, etc.
36 Similarly, Roberson argues that ‘the Islamic threat is essen-
tially a counterfeit issue imbued with stereotypical misperceptions and a 
casual commitment to analysis ... in some cases, a conscious exercise in 
image creation for tactical political purposes’.
37 
With the majority of pre-liberal images being influenced by the pre-
eminent role attached to a value-driven distinction between the individual 
and the collective, it was thanks to the legacy of the Enlightenment that 
certain notions of ‘civility’ were linked to a more normative political lan-
guage. Such a legacy has largely survived the present era, with the West 
attempting to monopolise global discourse on the democratic functions of 
 
31   M. J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis, University of Minne-
sota Press, 1997). 
32   M. Blunden, ‘Insecurity in Europe’s Southern Flank’, Survival, 36:2 (1994) 137. 
33   T. W. Lippman, Understanding Islam (New York, Penguin Group, 1990), p. 70. 
34   E. Said, Orientalism (New York, Vintage, 1979), p. 310. 
35   Ibid. 
36   J. L. Espozito, Islam and Politics, 4th ed. (Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1998). 
37   B. A. Roberson, ‘Islam and Europe: An enigma or a Myth?’, in B. A. Roberson (ed.), The Middle 
East and Europe: The Power Deficit (London, Routledge, 1998), p. 120. 
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government and human rights. But much like those in the West, Muslims 
believe that their faith has a divine purpose too, motivating them to set the 
world straight. They believe to be the chosen people following the right-
eous path to ‘judgement day’. More than religion and polity, Islam is also a 
culture with a different perception of the relationship between church and 
state. Although the roots of this discourse can be traced to the revival of 
classic Greek ideas and the Renaissance, the coming of modernity clearly 
exposed the differences between the two cultures.
38 Most Arab societies 
were introduced to the logic of modernisation under the heavy pressure of 
colonial Europe. Modernisation was more successful in dismantling the 
traditional structures than in setting up their modern replacements.
39 The 
process of adaptation to modernity is still going on for Islamic countries. 
Although Gellner has argued that Islamic culture is endowed with a number 
of features that are congruent with requirements of modernity or moderni-
sation,
40 many Muslim leaders still fight for a line ‘back to the roots’. Arab 
governing elites are particularly eclectic in picking out those ‘values of 
modernisation’ that best fit their aims for maintaining power and control 
like modern weapons, surveillance technology and consumer goods. Such 
processes of ‘selective sorting out’ and ‘selective adaptation’ do not allow 
the Western value system to be accepted by these societies. Instead, mod-
ernisation is often reduced to a symbol of moral decay, with Western influ-
ence having to be controlled, for it increases the technological, military, 
economic and scientific superiority and/or hegemony of the capitalist 
world.  
In Western polities, a separation of state and religion (secularism) was nec-
essary to safeguard the modernisation project - and its assorted properties 
of industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, technology, growth in 
communications, etc. - but Islam is still against any such separation.
41 
Huntington observes that fundamentalist Islam demands political rulers to 
 
38   See C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York, 
Harper and Row, 1966). 
39   See G. A. G. Soltan, ‘State Building, Modernization and Political Islam: The Search for Political 
Community(s) in the Middle East’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 37 (1997). 
40   See E. Gellner, ‘Up from Imperialism’, The New Republic, 22 May (1989) 35-36. 
41   P. G. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State (in Greek) (Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and For-
eign Policy, 1991). 
  122 
Euro-Mediterranean Formations 
be practicing Muslims: ‘shari’a [Islamic law] should be the basic law, and 
ulema [theologians and jurists] should have “a decisive vote in articulating, 
or at least reviewing and ratifying, all governmental policy”’.
42 According 
to Islamists, modernity may only be reached within the framework of in-
digenous values and not through their assimilation to Western culture. As 
Aliboni asserts, modernisation through imitation of the West is but a trap 
leading to subordination.
43 In this context, Huntington notes that, ‘to the 
extent that governmental legitimacy and policy flow from religious doc-
trines and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from and 
contradict the premises of democratic politics’.
44 This view accords with 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset’s earlier analysis that ‘the Islamic countries of 
the Middle East and Northern Africa ... appear to have little prospect of 
transition even to semi-democracy’.
45 But it comes in direct opposition to 
Pool’s claims that ‘the view that Islam is utterly incompatible with democ-
racy, whatever form the latter takes, is to view Islam from a limited and 
simplistic perspective. Contemporary Islam can be democratic, undemo-
cratic and anti-democratic and the political orientations of Muslim and Is-
lamic movements have exhibited similar variations’.
46 Although Curdy ar-
gues that democracy and Islam ‘are contradictory only if democracy is 
defined by certain Western standards’,
47 Pool is right to suggest that ‘presi-
dents and kings remain in charge of a state-controlled process of democra-
tisation as part of strategies of ... regime survival’.
48 
The revival of Islam per se, of political Islamism, and of Islamic radicalism 
are products of these antitheses. Fragmented and struggling with moder-
nity, Islam now faces a variety of challenges including potentially violent 
movements. The threat of radicalism currently manifested in the Southern 
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  123 
Dimitris K. Xenakis / Dimitris Chryssochoou 
Mediterranean rim lies in the fact that many of its essential aspects repre-
sent a reaction to years of intolerable political and socio-economic condi-
tions. In this sense, the fundamentalist threat is not merely a symptom of 
deeply rooted differences between the West and Islam, but also a means of 
responding to post-colonial pressures towards liberalisation, which is per-
ceived as threatening the ‘inner cohesion’ of the Islamic tradition. In this 
context, religion is used to cover other deficits like economic, social and 
political, pointing to an alleged inferiority in self-perception, dissatisfaction 
in terms of social development and the non-acceptance of an organisa-
tional/technocratic problem-solving capacity of ‘the other’. In brief, the 
creation of a climate of open dialogue in the Mediterranean is no easy task, 
given the tendency by both sides to fuel prejudices. But as long as misper-
ceptions persist and differences are not tolerated, then the relationship be-
tween Islam and Europe will remain tense, offering an apology for inaction. 
Therefore, a new ‘hermeneutics of civilisational dialogue’
49 emanates as a 
praesumptio juris et de jure: a dialectic of cultural self-realisation through a 
reciprocal exchange based on a philosophy of mutual understanding that 
does away with any subjectivist view that wants the ‘West’ to act as a uni-
versal civilising force based on an almost metaphysical obligation to hu-
manity. But let us now turn to the launching of the Barcelona Process and 
examine the extent to which the latter has marked a break with past Euro-
pean policies towards the region, by means of advancing the socio-cultural 
dimension of Euro-Mediterranean governance. 
A Socio-Cultural Partnership 
The political aims of the EMP were not extensively discussed in the Barce-
lona Conference of 28-29 November 1995 so as to avoid drawing attention 
to the democratic deficit in the Middle East.
50 Although US foreign policy-
makers saw the EU’s involvement in the region as a direct invasion of 
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European diplomacy to an area firmly located within their traditional 
sphere of influence, all partner states stressed that, while the EMP was not 
to replace other regional initiatives, it would contribute to their success. 
Yet, no operational role was foreseen for the EMP in the ongoing Middle 
East Peace Process, although it was hoped that it could mark a positive 
economic impact. The Barcelona Conference managed to bring Israeli and 
Syrian representatives at the same table, which was inconceivable for any 
previous initiative. The participation of these Arab countries bestowed a 
considerable degree of legitimacy to the meeting. A contributing factor was 
the euphoria that stemmed from the achievement of significant progress in 
the Oslo peace talks.
51 In an atmosphere of ‘high hopes and low motives’,
52 
the Conference became the ‘launching pad’
53 for a regional process aiming 
to preserve peace and stability, set up a shared prosperity zone through and 
promote a structured political dialogue among the partners. Although the 
Barcelona Declaration does not in itself represent a historical turning point, 
in so far as its main objective was not one of regional integration, it did in-
troduce a new co-operative spirit in three areas: political and security; eco-
nomic and financial; and socio-cultural. These fields were structured into 
three ‘baskets’ - resembling the 1975 Helsinki Final Act - whose continuity 
was to be aided by the setting up of a follow-up mechanism, to which we 
now turn. 
To start with, a Commission official described the inclusion of the Social, 
Cultural and Human basket as a mini-revolution in itself.
54 Its scope was 
wide-ranging and ambitious, granting NGOs and civil society representa-
tives a significant role in EMP affairs. As Colas put it: ‘The incorporation 
of civil society into the Barcelona process is a clear case of international 
regime formation, which seeks to respond to changes of intergovernmental 
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elitism’.
55 Linkages and networks between civil societies in both Mediter-
ranean shores may lay the foundation for knowledge, understanding and 
mutual confidence, which are vital components to the construction of a 
Euro-Mediterranean social space. Co-operation among civil societies 
should not take the form of assistance or the imposition of the Western lib-
eral-democratic model. Rather, it should incorporate the component civil 
societies in political decision-making and also take into account their re-
spective particularities. The Declaration underlined that ‘the reinforcement 
of democracy and respect for human rights’ are indeed the essential ele-
ments of the entire project. But co-operation in these areas is also the most 
sensitive dimension of the EMP, for the debate on democracy and human 
rights in the region is linked to issues of identity, rights and reciprocal civi-
lisational interaction. Certain sectors of North African and Middle Eastern 
public opinion suspect that the West wants to impose its civilisation and 
hegemony under the guise of universal democratic principles, whilst in the 
North, in parallel to the explosion of racism and xenophobia, the precon-
ceived idea that there is an intrinsic incompatibility between (political) Is-
lam and democracy has developed at both grassroots and elite level.
56 As 
Fahmy points out, potential differences may emerge in the various concep-
tions of democracy and human rights, and the only way for their resolution 
is through a cultural dialogue to reconcile the contending interpretations.
57  
The EMP aims at bringing the peoples of the envisaged Euro-
Mediterranean space closer together, to promote shared or at least mutually 
compatible understandings of governance and collective rule-making, to 
eliminate discomforting cultural stereotypes and, in general, to project posi-
tive images among the partner polities. Arguably, such a ‘pro-active’ ap-
proach to fostering a sense of Euro-Mediterranean (societal) security chal-
lenges the islamophobic ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis and its assorted 
conceptions of religious and cultural conflict. The means for bringing the 
component collectivities closer together with the view to setting the scene 
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for a ‘new cultural order’,
58 rest on an inter-cultural hermeneutic dialogue 
in a wide range of issue areas like cultural heritage, media, inter-faith 
communication, and so on. The third basket highlights common roots (as 
part of a common experience) and the richness of the region’s cultural di-
versity, in an attempt to do away with negative pre-conceptions. But build-
ing the socio-cultural Partnership is a delicate process, not least due to dif-
ficulties inherent in sustaining a constructive cultural dialogue among 
distinct units. All the more so, if such a dialogue aims at transcending im-
ages from the region’s colonial past, feelings of intolerance and xenopho-
bia, as well as a narrow view of national, and in some cases ethnic, identity.  
An additional obstacle may be that any inter-civilisational dialogue implies 
cultural exchanges and mobility that are not always easy to achieve in the 
southern rim. In light of the above, what is needed is a new hermeneutics of 
north-south perceptions, together with the inclusion of religious and socio-
cultural rights in the debate on democracy and modernity. Although the 
third basket is often projected as being only of secondary importance to the 
politico-economic dimensions of the EMP (focusing on security and free 
trade issues), the view taken here is that it is potentially the most revolu-
tionary outcome of the nascent regional process. It is a recognition that 
trade, investment and economic assistance are part of an evolutionary and 
purposeful process that incorporates a substantive human dimension. After 
making obligatory references to ‘dialogue and respect among cultures and 
religions’ as ‘a necessary precondition for bringing peoples closer’, the 
third basket identifies the need for a programme of human exchanges be-
tween the two coastal shores, whilst including the utilisation and further 
development of human resources in the region. In addition, it touches upon 
the sensitive issues of illegal immigration, organised crime and drugs traf-
ficking, as well as on co-operation between local authorities, trade unions, 
interest associations, and public and private companies. Finally, the Decla-
ration recognised the challenges posed by ever-alarming demographic 
trends in southern Mediterranean and declared that these should be coun-
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terbalanced by appropriate policy measures to advance socio-economic 
progress.  
Turning to the policy level, after the Barcelona Declaration, the whole 
process moved forward by a series of new Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements that both updated and enhanced pre-existing bilateral arrange-
ments. In addition to the Customs Union with Turkey, new Association 
Agreements were signed with Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia,
59 while close to completion were those with Egypt and 
Algeria. In its communication to the Council of Ministers and the EP, the 
Commission indicated the priorities of the Second Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference that was agreed to take place in 1997. After review-
ing the first 15 months of the EMP and the state of negotiations in the As-
sociation Agreements with the twelve Mediterranean partners, the Com-
mission suggested several objectives for future co-operation.
60 More 
specifically, it proposed a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Sta-
bility to endorse the achievements of the first pillar, while on the question 
of social, cultural and human affairs, it reported that efforts had already be-
gun in the spheres of cultural heritage, promotion of human rights, educa-
tion and dialogue among civil society representatives, and that these efforts 
should be further intensified along with the introduction of measures to 
combat drugs-traffic and organised crime.  
Still though, no substantive progress has been achieved in third pillar is-
sues. In particular, the 1997 Malta communiqué reported serious disagree-
ments over language referring to human rights and referred only in passu to 
‘the rule of law, democracy and human rights’ as commonly shared objec-
tives. During 1997, many EU governments took up ratification of the new 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that the EU had earlier initi-
ated with Tunisia, Israel and Morocco. During the ratification process, par-
liamentarians and others raised questions of human rights compliance, par-
ticularly with reference to Israel, as specified in Article 2 of the 
Agreements. Several EU states indicated that they would seek to have the 
 
59   See A. Jbili and K. Enders, ‘The Association Agreement Between Tunisia and the European Union’, 
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Commission set-up a human rights monitoring mechanism as part of the 
implementation process. But no EU member demanded human rights im-
provements from Israel, Tunisia or Morocco, as a condition for ratifying 
their respective Association Agreements. In 1997 the EU signed an interim 
Association Agreement with the Palestinian Authority and was scheduled 
to sign one with Jordan later in November, while negotiations continued 
with Egypt and Algeria. As EU and Syrian officials were about to open ne-
gotiations, the Council continued to suppress a November 1995 report on 
human rights in Syria that the EP had mandated as a pre-requite for eco-
nomic assistance (along the lines of the conditionality principle). 
Central to the process was the need for a renewed political commitment to 
ensure a close balance in all three baskets, although some partners felt that 
progress in the first basket was overtaking progress in the remaining two. 
The Malta Conclusions attempted to redress this imbalance, albeit partially, 
by indirectly slowing down progress in the first basket.
61 In general, the 
Malta Conference was unsuccessful in revitalising the Arab-Israeli peace 
talks and in reviewing progress in the implementation of the Barcelona 
provisions. But at the rhetoric level, the first Euro-Mediterranean Review 
Conference stressed that the Partnership is an ‘irreversible process’, albeit 
not too well equipped to confront the challenges of a turbulent region. In 
this context, it is fair to suggest that cultural relations have been subject to 
extensive scrutiny due to the absence of any visible progress post-1995, 
despite the appearance of a strongly stated political commitment to placing 
the socio-cultural dimension on an equal footing with the other two. The 
1998 Rhodes Ministerial Conference confirmed the priorities of the cultural 
Partnership. This strategy was outlined also in subsequent meetings in 
Stockholm and Palermo, and was based on the following objectives: focus-
sing activities on a small number of thematic framework programmes 
(Heritage, Audio-visual and Humanities); increasing public involvement 
(particularly by women and young people); and encouraging the establish-
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ment of regional networks of cultural operators so as to foster exchanges of 
experience and further develop joint endeavours among the partners. 
Towards a Common Strategy  
The EMP was not intended to impinge upon other peace processes in the 
Mediterranean region, but rather to contribute towards them. Today, how-
ever, we live in a very different political atmosphere in the Middle East, 
where confrontation is constant and the prospects for peace are rather 
bleak. Be that as it may, the third EMP meeting in Stuttgart was very im-
portant for it was held three weeks before the end of the five-year period of 
the Oslo Accords. At the Berlin European Council on 24-25 March 1999, 
EU leaders remained concerned at ‘the current deadlock in the Middle 
East’, and called for ‘an early resumption of negotiations on an accelerated 
basis’. Three weeks later, EMP partners reiterated in Stuttgart their firm 
commitment to a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the Middle East 
based on faithful implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338, together with the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Con-
ference, the Oslo Accords, and the Wye River Memorandum.
62  
The Third Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart demonstrated that, ‘three and 
half years after the inaugural conference in Barcelona, the EMP has devel-
oped considerably and has given clear proof of its viability in sometimes 
complex circumstances’.
63 The principal aim of the Conference was to pro-
vide additional impetus to the Partnership and to confirm more clearly the 
goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration. The participants recalled the 
priority accorded in the EMP for the protection and promotion of human 
rights and agreed to concentrate activities on priority areas, increase the 
involvement of actors outside central government level, and make the EMP 
more ‘action-oriented’ and ‘visible’. They also emphasised the importance 
of intra-regional and sub-regional co-operation in all three baskets, endors-
ing the guidelines set out at the 1999 Valencia Conference on the methods 
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of future co-operative arrangements, and calling for a ‘systematic evalua-
tion’ of the BP and for a ‘concrete follow-up’.
64 
At their meeting in Stuttgart in 1999, the EMP Foreign Ministers agreed the 
guidelines for a Charter for Peace and Stability. The text was to be agreed 
at the next ministerial meeting in November 2000 and the Charter would be 
applicable whenever sufficient progress has been made in the Middle East 
Peace Process. The Charter’s main purpose was to institutionalise the exist-
ing political dialogue and to set up concrete mechanisms to address re-
gional security and stability. The existing ad hoc Senior Officials meetings 
should be converted into an institutional forum for dialogue on political and 
security issues, and mechanisms should be established for operational joint 
action on terrorism, conflict prevention and crisis management Partnership-
building measures should be implemented in a flexible way for these issues 
to be addressed by a smaller number of partners wishing to advance more 
quickly, without prejudice to the principle that all Barcelona partners have 
the right to participate if they so wish.  
The EU produced in its ‘Common Strategy on the Mediterranean’ at the 
Feira European Council in June 2000. The relaunch of the process was 
formalised later in October 2000 with a new Commission report, prior to 
the Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles. The major objective of the Common 
Strategy was ‘to make significant and measurable progress towards achieving 
the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration and its subsequent acquis’. In 
dealing with political and security issues, the Common Strategy expressed the 
strategic importance of Mediterranean stability to the EU, and therefore re-
peated the objective of establishing ‘a common area of peace and stability’.
65 
To that end, the political and security-related dialogue is to be strengthened at 
all levels, bilateral as well as multilateral, including the Charter for Peace and 
Stability, and further confidence- and security-building measures are to be 
elaborated. The Common Strategy has the merit of clearly summing up the 
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actions through which the EU aims to achieve its broad objective of estab-
lishing an area of peace and stability and notably of including crisis manage-
ment and post-conflict peace-building. But being a unilateral document (EU 
only), in no way can it commit the south Mediterranean partners, whose con-
sent is still needed. Yet, the Common Strategy offered a new development: 
the EU has now become the main actor in the process and the importance 
of the Euro-Med Committee has been reduced to that of a coordinator of 
what is mainly agreed first by the Europeans. 
In seeking to improve the initial Barcelona objectives, the Commission 
worked on a Communication on ‘Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process’, 
which provided the main input for the EMP Foreign Ministers meeting in 
Marseilles.
66 This Communication reviewed the experience of the first five 
years of the process and made specific proposals for taking it forward in a 
number of areas where difficulties have been encountered. The overriding 
approach has been to see how to focus on a clear set of short and medium 
term goals - ambitious but achievable; and, also, how to increase the sense 
of ‘ownership’ of the Partnership. It also tried to find ways of speeding up 
progress by promoting cooperation, dialogue and south-south trade on a 
sub-regional basis (whether Maghreb, Mashrek or any other intra-regional 
configuration), thus enabling therefore those partners that wished to pro-
ceed at a faster pace to do so.  
The fourth Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers was held 
in Marseilles five years after the inaugural Barcelona meeting. It aimed at 
reinvigorating the whole process.
67 The Conference was preceded by the 
outbreak of rapidly escalating violence between Israelis and Palestinians, 
which caused a severe crisis in the Middle East Peace Process. As a result, 
Syria and Lebanon refused to take part in the Conference. Thus, at the Mar-
seilles meeting, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers decided not to seek 
agreement on the proposed Charter for Peace and Stability, as this was 
clearly not the right time. Nevertheless, a good deal of progress was made 
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towards agreement on this instrument which will promote respect for fun-
damental principles of human rights and democracy and facilitate conflict 
prevention and crisis management. It further called for a reinforcement of 
the political dialogue to clear up misunderstandings and thus mandated the 
Senior Officials to deepen the dialogue in a number of specified fields, and 
to broaden it so as to include issues such as disarmament and regional secu-
rity developments. As Chris Patten, the External Affairs Commissioner put 
it: ‘We should make sure that we can capitalise on that progress when the 
time is right so that it becomes a genuinely meaningful document reflecting 
the EU’s active commitment to maintaining regional peace and stability’.
68 
Once again, however, the crisis in the Middle East paralysed the EMP and 
prevented agreement on concrete security projects.  
The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Brussels 
on 5 and 6 November 2001 in the new international context in the after-
math of the terrorist attack that changed the outlook of international rela-
tions. The Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist at-
tacks committed on 11 September 2001. They regarded these acts as an 
attack against the entire international community, against all its members, 
all religions and all cultures. The Ministers formally rejected as both dan-
gerous and unfounded any equating of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim 
world. In this connection the importance of the EMP as a relevant and rec-
ognised instrument for promoting a dialogue between cultures and civilisa-
tions was emphasised by all. In attempting to go beyond declarations, the 
Ministers urged all the parties concerned to resume immediately negotia-
tions so as to apply the recommendations contained in the Mitchell Report 
and the Tenet Plan and to satisfying the legitimate rights and expectations 
of the peoples of the region for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East. That was to be achieved through adherence to UN Resolu-
tions 242 and 338, of the principles of the Madrid Conference, including 
the principle of the exchange of land for peace, and of the agreements con-
cluded in Oslo and those which had made it possible to register tangible 
results on the ground in earlier negotiations. 
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The Emerging Regional System 
Jünemann defines the EMP as ‘the climax of a political process that started 
shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but more than that it marks the 
starting point of a new era of interregional relations’.
69 Keeping in mind 
Edwards and Philippart’s view that the EMP has led to a process whose 
analysis and interpretation encompasses different theoretical possibilities,
70 
its philosophy has been summarised by Derisbourg as non-paternalistic, 
based on recognition of interdependencies, shared interests and the right to 
development and freedom, the need for decentralised co-operation, as well 
as the importance of the private sector and of a continuous dialogue at both 
intergovernmental and civil society levels.
71 A new phase in Euro-
Mediterranean relations has thus emerged, consisting of openness, prior 
dialogue and joint tasks from policy-design to implementation. As Jüne-
mann reiterates, however, ‘the Barcelona concept aims at a careful west-
ernisation of the Mediterranean, gradually converting it into an area of eco-
nomic and political influence’.
72 Regarding the commitment to democracy 
and human rights, it seems that some non-EU partners will at some stage 
face the reality that the other participants, European or not, might actually 
insist on the preservation of the principles and norms agreed in Barcelona. 
But although the political conditionality underlying the economic and fi-
nancial Partnership ‘allows the EU to suspend its commitments in cases of 
failure concerning democracy or respect of human rights, offering an ap-
parently effective instrument to influence the process of democratisation ... 
it exposes the MPCs to the good will of the Europeans, thus offending their 
demand for equal partnership’.
73  
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As Fahmi notes, the EMP resolved the major question of whether regional 
security would be addressed within a strictly Mediterranean context or 
within a wider framework encompassing European security concerns.
74 Al-
though the Declaration did not linger over the meaning of security and sta-
bility, it produced a clearly Eurocentric perspective of the ‘common 
threat’.
75 The EMP was a collective attempt to redefine European threat 
perceptions towards the region by addressing issues of social unrest and 
economic underdevelopment, rather than by detecting a direct Arab mili-
tary threat. Although the initial target date for the establishment of a free 
trade area in the region is the year 2010, EU states made no secret of the 
fact that the aid plan for the transition period intended to contribute to the 
slowing of migratory flows to their respective societies. The argument is 
that with trade growing, jobs will be created in Mediterranean countries 
and immigration will slow down. From this view, political change in the 
south is expected to result from large-scale economic liberalisation. In this 
context, Kienle notes that this approach is a retouched version of the theory 
of markets as a democratising force.
76 
This ‘automatic pilot’ theory of the market is among the basic tenets of lib-
eralism. For economists and political thinkers such as Adam Smith or Her-
bert Spencer social harmony is spontaneous. It does not require coercive 
force to be produced or for that matter maintained. Laissez-faire, the argu-
ment goes, defined in the context of pursuing individual interests, is capa-
ble of producing co-operation in other fields automatically. But the propo-
sition that this theory applies to international markets that consist only of 
independent agents trading for their own account and competing against 
each other is largely questionable. For it may well be that economic ration-
ality, along the lines of an ‘exchange Gesellschaft’, continues to play a cen-
tral role in the economic governance of an ever globalising, if not already 
globalised, market economy, but this is not the case in the Mediterranean, 
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where elements of economic rationality coexist with a struggle for power. 
It is, then, highly unrealistic to subscribe to the view that a kind of auto-
matic governance could spontaneously emerge from the approach adopted 
in Barcelona.  
From a purely economic perspective, the Barcelona document does not rep-
resent a radical break with past European policies towards the Mediterra-
nean, but rather it is ‘a deepening of past efforts’,
77 in that it incorporates in 
its economic agenda more clearly defined global objectives. In overall 
terms, the entire project was a sign of the EU’s willingness to play an in-
creasingly active economic role in bringing all partners closer together and 
in reducing political and social sources of conflict. But building the envis-
aged free trade area pre-supposes that partners will come to understand 
each other with the view to sharing, albeit gradually, the same practices. 
Since the Declaration, any rigid distinction along economic, political and 
socio-cultural lines can only be made at the cost of avoiding the complexity 
of Euro-Mediterranean social and political reality. Herein lies perhaps the 
most innovative aspect of the EU’s Mediterranean approach post-1995: that 
in addition to the traditional economic pattern of intra-regional relations, 
there now appears to be an intrinsic link between security and socio-
cultural arenas. 
According to Marquina, no existing notion of security gives backbone to 
the EMP and that the documents themselves contain incoherence and im-
precision regarding the concepts of co-operative security, preventative di-
plomacy and ‘good neighbourliness’.
78 He also claims that these principles 
remain under-explained in both conceptual and operative aspects. Despite 
such views, however, one could legitimately argue that there exists a de-
gree of coherence, albeit not organisational symmetry, let alone isomor-
phism, within the EU’s intention, in that economic problems can only be 
tackled once issues of political legitimacy are adequately addressed. Ulti-
mately, most Mediterranean players seem to agree that institutionalised re-
gional co-operation would have to involve, least of all in terms of imple-
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mentation, the private sector, business enterprises and individuals.
79 Ali-
boni argues that such an initiative is the result of a remarkable and success-
ful effort by the EU to innovate and reinforce its Mediterranean policy, in 
that its efforts towards a ‘structured strategy of regionalism’ are now 
clearly marked by elements of change predicated on the establishment of a 
free trade regime and the search for a common area of peace and stability 
to provide security and support economic development.
80 But the economic 
objectives, which are to be met through a series of institutional reforms, 
hide security risks since accelerated market liberalisation in the southern 
rim could produce greater waves of socio-political instability. Moreover, 
the EMP has not yet either operationalised or regularised political co-
operation, something that may prove vital in case of further economic re-
cession in the southern rim. These mechanisms are cited in the Barcelona 
document (encouraging information exchanges and establishing dialogue 
mechanisms) and in the Action Plan that was set out at the beginning of the 
process.  
Joffé makes the point that the EU, in seeking to employ a meaningful 
global and comprehensive approach, should provide the following set of 
mechanisms: support for responsive and participatory political processes 
sustained by the encouragement of economic transparency and accountabil-
ity within a codified and independent legal structure; collective co-
operative security alongside viable economic restructuring; and a financial 
commitment to the creation of a vital human and physical infrastructure 
that will make the economic refashioning of the region into a ‘win-win 
situation for all’.
81 In general, the EMP aims at correcting the structural 
deficits evident in past European policies and can be seen, in Gillespie’s 
words, as ‘emblematic of a process’ being constituted from a dynamic set 
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of international exchanges, but still falling short of a meaningful Partner-
ship.
82 At the same time, it is a vital step in the process of animating some 
confident expectations towards the emergence of a common ‘Euro-
Mediterranean consciousness’, laying the groundwork for the creation of an 
international regime.
83  
Indeed, the EMP can be seen as a nascent and multidimensional regime that 
aims at establishing links between political, economic and socio-cultural 
arenas. The core claim here is that states obey the rules embodied in inter-
national regimes due to the functional benefits the latter provide. For the 
moment, however, the regional Partnership represents a balance of separate 
national preferences, rather than a common Euro-Mediterranean interest 
per se. Although it sets up a system of flexible regional arrangements, the 
substantial differentiation of the ratio with the Community budget for the 
economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe has been the major 
reason for attracting the interest of southern Mediterranean countries.
84 In 
particular, the EMP is propelled by a certain ‘economism’ whose financial 
rather than trade implications are favourable to the non-EU partners. In re-
turn to the above, EU governments linked issues of economic liberalisation 
to a set of political principles and norms of good governance. 
Keohane, in an influential study that straddled the lines of realist and neo-
liberalist  thinking, suggested that international regimes are ‘institutions 
with explicit rules, agreed upon governments that pertain to particular sets 
of issues in international relations’.
85 This is of special importance consid-
ering that Euro-Mediterranean politics combine both power politics consid-
erations and questions of increased complex interdependence. Keohane’s 
‘lean’ definition of the term has the advantage of relieving scholars from 
the burden of justifying their decision to call a given injunction a ‘norm’ 
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rather than a ‘rule’.
86 The above definition is helpful since norms are not 
explicit in the complex framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations and 
since no substantive level of institutional autonomy characterise the opera-
tion of the newly formed mechanisms. Although the EMP offers some gen-
eral rules of conduct to govern the behaviour of the participants, it remains 
weak in relation to the development of an identifiable set of norms. Ceteris 
paribus, it can be seen as an international regime in statu nascendi, albeit 
one that accords with Keohane’s ‘lean’ definition of the term. Without a 
better or less nebulous definition offered by the acquis académique, such a 
claim remains valid.  
A distinctive feature of international relations today is that power is becom-
ing more widely dispersed and low politics acquire more salient for schol-
ars and policy-makers. Developments in Euro-Mediterranean politics and 
attempts at institutionalising the EMP are no exception. The latter, only a 
handful of years since its inception remains in limbo between a loose asso-
ciation of states and an internationalised regional regime. The question is 
whether the EMP can sustain itself for any length of time without becom-
ing first a system of patterned behaviour, generating a notion of rules of the 
game to guide and at a later stage structure international behaviour. From a 
linear projection of Euro-Mediterranean governance, the Partnership could 
evolve into a fully fledged regional regime with an institutional life of its 
own. At present, however, and given the rather discomforting empirical 
developments in the process, no such entity has fully come into being, in 
terms of complying with the basic analytic tenet of rule-governed behav-
iour.  
On the other hand, the fascinating element in the evolving Partnership is 
that, from a dynamic macro-political perspective, it may well prove capable 
of instrumentalising the principles and norms embedded in the Barcelona 
Declaration and transform them into concrete rules of the game based on 
shared beliefs, standards of behaviour and, crucially, decision-making pro-
cedures for implementing collective choice. Keeping in mind Olsen’s point 
that ‘[w]righting rules for a large number of heterogeneous countries is no 
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easy task],
87 especially with the view to making these rules fit the special 
conditions and particular situation of each country, implementation is cen-
tral to the viability of regional regime-formation, for the latter process em-
phasises the need for institutionalisation and the development of an interna-
tional co-operative culture among partner states and societies. For it is the 
combined effects of institutionalisation, in the sense of ‘learning one’s 
place in a larger order’,
88 and international culture, in terms of developing 
repertoires of shared understandings, that bring about a purposeful system 
of mutual governance. The idea here is to regularise a form of co-operation 
that, as Jervis notes, is more than the following of short-term self-interest 
(or power maximisation).
89 
But it would be wrong to equate in any deterministic fashion the end-result 
of the Barcelona Process with the formation of a regional regime per se. 
For these constructs are not regarded as ends themselves. Rather, as Kras-
ner states, ‘[o]nce in place they do affect related behaviour and outcomes. 
They are not merely epiphenomena’.
90 From this angle, regimes impact on 
policy outcomes and related behaviour, thus transcending ‘structural orien-
tations [that] conceptualise a world of rational self-seeking actors’.
91 In 
short, regimes make a difference, in that they often transcend a state-centric 
realist perspective that primarily reflects calculations of self-interest. The 
relationship between patterned behaviour and convergent expectations is a 
key to our understanding of international regimes: those two aspects create 
an environment of ‘conditionalised behaviour’ that in turn ‘generates rec-
ognised norms’ that transcend national boundaries and nurture a broader 
social space.
92 Contrary to structural arguments made by realists, interna-
tional regimes have an independent impact on behaviour and are a crucial 
part of patterned human interaction. The latter view is drawn from the 
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Grotian tradition, where ‘regimes are a pervasive and significant phenome-
non in the international system’.
93 
In the case of the EMP, it could be argued that regime-creation is directed 
at setting the limits of acceptable behaviour within a nascent and flexibly 
arranged structure of governance. Noteworthy in that respect is that the 
Partnership addressed the post-Cold War Mediterranean reality as an over-
lap of different regions bringing together different dimensions.
94 The flexi-
bility of the EMP sets the limits of ‘consciousness-raising’ in issues of 
Euro-Mediterranean governance and the possibility of the regional forma-
tion to acquire operational capabilities. Its weak institutional structure 
makes it difficult for individual actors to transcend the pursuit of short-term 
interests. But regimes also deploy a system of interconnectedness among 
different arenas of collective action that helps explain the nature and com-
plexity of interdependence among the actors involved who, in turn, are 
conscious of the need to achieve mutually rewarding outcomes. Yet, being 
a highly fragmented system of policy interactions, any future attempts to 
navigate the dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean governance need to be 
differentiated according to the specific conditions of co-operation embed-
ded within its structures. In particular, the EMP encompasses a multiplicity 
of norms of behaviour, which in the end determine the degree and intensity 
of actors’ involvement. Further, a partial conceptualisation of its compo-
nent baskets as separate pillars is not particularly helpful when assessing its 
cross-sectional political properties - i.e., what defines it as a nascent re-
gional system. 
Conceptualising the EMP through the lens of regime theory has the advan-
tage of moving away from a formalistic approach to multilateralism, insti-
tutional linkages and the impact of domestic politics on regional affairs: it 
could set in train a process for the internationalisation of issues and their 
inclusion under a flexible management system. But it is still questionable 
how far the EMP can realise its objectives under its currently weak institu-
tional structure, and without investing in partnership-building measures on 
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questions with the view to developing a credible socio-cultural dialogue 
and a Charter for Peace and Stability with proper compliance mecha-
nisms.
95 The envisaged Charter will be an exercise in pre-emptive diplo-
macy in the form of an institutionalised alliance of co-operative states. In 
addition, it can provide the levels of transparency necessary for a continu-
ous and structured political dialogue among distinct socio-cultural settings, 
along with the necessary machinery for managing endemic crises and often 
protracted conflicts. Also, the emerging Parliamentary Forum could pro-
vide the EMP an additional legitimising platform from which to promote 
peace, stability and a regular dialogue for engendering the awareness of 
common interests and the creation of symbiotic structures of governance 
and problem-solving. Both agenda-identification (the acknowledgement of 
legitimate claims by a partner) and agenda-setting functions (the way in 
which such claims are included) could be achieved through the institution-
alisation of the Forum. A normative implication here is that the prolifera-
tion of legitimate arenas will have an important domestic impact on the 
partners’ policy strategy, in that they would now have to direct their claims 
to, and via, additional legitimate avenues. In any case, it would be interest-
ing to evaluate the endorsement of this parliamentary structure and assess 
the extent to which its mechanisms can accommodate declared principles 
and particular interests. All the above beg the question of why states are 
bound by certain norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures. 
Regime theory offers a plausible answer: whether or not international co-
operation is an a priori objective of states, the latter pursue their interests 
more effectively by being members of a larger association.  
A Transformative Order 
‘Current political transformations and reforms in Europe as well as in other 
parts of the world’, writes Olsen, ‘are redefining the terms of political 
life’,
96 reactivating basic questions of governance. Fundamental changes in 
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the conditions of shared rule pose new challenges to the search for viable 
orders based on stable authority patterns within and between states and so-
cieties. These ascending challenges offer the formative context for the inte-
gration of domestic and international politics and, by extension, the condi-
tions for developing a better understanding of the process of global change. 
At the same time, the struggle for social and political equality, the ever 
widening chasm between rich and poor, as well as the displacement of bi-
polarity by deep divisions of socio-cultural and political values at various 
levels, point in the belief that defining elements of separateness proceeds 
hand in hand with the need to identify degrees of common understanding 
among a plethora of public, semi-public and private actors operating under 
conditions of complex interdependence and global interconnectedness.  
Against this swiftly changing background, whose intellectual outcome - 
amongst many - has been the ascendance of ‘identity politics’ and with it of 
new, non-territorial and even post-national forms of fellowship and repre-
sentation, the Mediterranean refers to a heterarchical regional space, whose 
history, politics and complexity continues to spark the interest of interna-
tional scholarship. Such composite mosaic of self-images, belief-systems 
and identities results, as claimed earlier in this paper, in a composite system 
of partial regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and belong-
ing. Arguably, this largely constructivist definitional approach is specific 
enough to map the peculiarities of the region and broad enough to allow for 
the accommodation of complementary variables. Indeed, the relationship 
between complexity and reality in the region can be understood as having 
developed from a uniquely Mediterranean context. The above syllogisms 
are themselves testimony to the enduring influence of cultural distinctive-
ness and civilisational diversity in the politics of regional order-building; 
with the Mediterranean remaining a divided (social) construct within a 
transformative globe. 
The active engagement of multiple actors in Euro-Mediterranean politics 
post-1995 may thus exacerbate the possibilities for reaching substantive 
agreement on many good governance issues, including transparent policy-
making, economic security-building, civil-military relations, respect for 
human rights, co-operative conflict management and, ultimately, intra-
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regional (sub-systemic) reconciliation. As Zartman and Bergman note, suc-
cessful negotiations change established perceptions of conflict from a 
‘zero-sum’ to a ‘win-win’ situation.
97 Partnership-building and a shared 
commitment to mutually rewarding outcomes can feed into this process, 
constituting an crucial adjunct to inter-segmental accommodation and, 
above all, the emergence of a sense of security at the grassroots. Central to 
this endeavour is the institutionalisation of the EMP and, in the words of 
Olsen, arguably the maître penseur in this regard, ‘the emergence of endur-
ing practices and rules, structures of meaning and resources’.
98 This is all 
the more so, given the need for a new civilisational dialogue to do away 
with the subjectivist approach that wants the West to act as a universal hu-
man rights protector based on fixed notions of democratic governance and 
a predominantly liberal understanding of political order. 
Limited as it may be, the potential for systematising a new politics of insti-
tutional accommodation in the region awaits utilisation. Working on the 
concept of a socially viable Euro-Mediterranean order implies maximum 
use of civil society mechanisms and monitoring structures with the view to 
improving, as opposed to merely increasing, the levels of transparency in 
the workings of common institutions of governance. A difficulty associated 
with this line of development is that the socio-cultural Partnership has not 
yet operationalised or even regularised the normative ambitions of the Bar-
celona Declaration. The levels of complexity stemming from the particular 
nature of protracted conflicts and threat (mis)perceptions constrain the im-
plementation of agreed principles and objectives. Linked to the above is the 
claim that effective order-building can not be realised under the present in-
stitutional configuration of the EMP as a whole. Although its flexibility is a 
positive element in managing interdependence, its weak institutional struc-
ture makes it difficult for partners to sacrifice the pursuit of short-term in-
terests on the altar of substantive regional co-operation. But what model of 
institution-building should the Partnership proceed with so as to reorganise 
the Euro-Mediterranean order? A plausible answer is that the partners 
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would have to foster an atmosphere in which norms of good governance act 
as a system-steering agency in the construction of a larger pluralist order. 
In this context, the prospective Charter of Peace and Stability may lay the 
groundwork for mutual governance based on legitimate patterns of shared 
rule. Let us for a moment recall that the 1990 Paris Charter, by establishing 
a timetable of regular political consultations as well as a modest degree of 
institutional underpinning, has contributed to the structural transformation 
of the CSCE into an international organisation ‘proper’, with operational 
capabilities of its own (OSCE). A Euro-Mediterranean Charter can thus 
provide the levels of transparency, stability and trust needed for any mean-
ingful regional partnership. But it must also be flexible enough to allow the 
southern partners to develop their own ‘styles’ of political liberalisation.  
Although the process can not but go ahead by trial and error, it is impera-
tive to keep a fundamental direction: designing efficient systems of interna-
tionalised shared rule requires a maximum, not a minimum, of what might 
be called ‘capacity for governance’. At the macro-systemic level, such a 
capacity is presently lacking, not only because of various institutional 
weakness per se, but also due to the absence of political will and credible 
commitments by the partners themselves to make effective use of the exist-
ing regional arrangements. As Couloumbis and Veremis note, ‘the central 
question, in theory as well as in practice, is whether the Mediterranean re-
gion ... will manage to fit into a functionalist paradigm which permitted 
Western Europe ... to move forward toward economic and political integra-
tion employing the geoeconomic premises of Jean Monnet and abandoning 
the military power considerations of Clausevitzian geopolitics’.
99 From this 
view, the Partnership, combining both low and high politics areas, may 
prove instrumental in fostering a new co-operative ethos among its mem-
bers. The argument goes that interest-convergence around economic tasks 
acts as a means of contributing to a relaxation of tensions in areas where 
controversy is more likely to arise than not. The composite nature of the 
EMP offers a wide range of opportunities for the functionalist expectations 
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of the partners to form the basis of a consensually pre-determined set of 
policies, which may prove crucial to overall systemic stability. In other 
words, the Partnership can be seen as a system of rules governing the inter-
action of interdependent actors around functionally specific tasks. By ele-
vating the creation of rules of transaction to a systemic property of the 
Partnership, a certain economic bias may prevail, whose liberalising effects 
could offer a platform from which substantive rewards can be gained for 
all. This points to a preference for a functionalist strategy, which is never-
theless embedded within the practise of market-oriented regimes.  
Be that as it may, central to the need for accommodating dialogue in the 
fragmented Euro-Mediterranean system for preserving regional stability is 
the role of institutions. The problem is one of organising regional politics 
out of the systemic complexity of a heterarchical regional space, where 
several civilisations have mutually influenced and enriched each other. But 
to break down such regional complexity, one has first to realise the impor-
tance of diversity as an essential principle: the regional system is itself con-
stituted in the clash of different sub-systems. A heterarchical order mini-
mises homogeneity/universality as the principal referent for sub-systemic 
co-operation. This form of enhanced particularity through a reflexive ap-
propriation of difference becomes the basic normative unit of the system 
itself. This resonates with a broader aspiration of partnership that tran-
scends any mono-dimensional configuration of power, stressing instead the 
complex character of an allegedly common destiny. This is exactly where a 
heterarchical regime is better equipped to manage the existing levels of 
Mediterranean complexity. The plausibility of this claim to the importance 
of reflexivity as opposed to co-ordinated hierarchy rests on a systemic per-
spective, whereby ‘sub-systems do not [necessarily] join together into 
higher level systems ... nor can they be conceived of as instances of a total-
ity’.
100 True, some hierarchy of norms may prove necessary, but this should 
also reflect the praxis of mutualism and respect for the ‘other’. From a 
positive interpretation of regional heterarchy, therefore, the aim is for ‘oth-
ers’ to be brought into the management structures of the EMP, and for re-
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gional diversity to transform itself from a self-referential property of dis-
tinct units into an identifiable pluralist order.  
Conclusion 
Mediterranean politics has gained a higher profile since 1995, sparking new 
interest in issues of collective governance in terms of studying the envis-
aged transformation of the region from a dispersed system of bilateral ties 
to the emergence of institutionalised patterns of joint rule based on shared 
understandings and symbiotic interactions among diverse socio-cultural 
units. A new phase of intensified interaction between the EU and its south-
ern Mediterranean partners has thus emerged, especially in the economic 
sphere (mainly trade, financial investment and industrial relations). The 
problem that persists, however, is that the region’s economic accomplish-
ments do not match its potential for political governance to facilitate the 
identification of common interests, aspirations and, crucially, a shared vi-
sion for the shape of things to come. Regional complexity, different con-
ceptions of order and the ‘good polity’, and a multitude of distinct strate-
gies toward collective conflict-management are the principal reasons 
underlying this shortfall. As the global market will predictably continue to 
expand, the Mediterranean will become even more important as a regional 
economic space, as well as a channel for the movement of vital resources. 
The emergence of globalised and regionalised markets make the systemisa-
tion of Euro-Mediterranean relations increasingly possible, yet not inevita-
ble. While bright opportunities exist post-1995, they could prove passing 
without adequate levels of institutionalisation and, given that the EU has 
been more concerned with the perceived threats of migration and Islamic 
activism, than with the opportunities offered by shared interests, it is hardly 
surprising that its Mediterranean policy has been criticised for being lim-
ited, betraying a lack of long-term credible commitments.
101 Progress in 
developing co-operative relations is not always irreversible. Failure to em-
pathise with the other’s needs could lead to an increase in hostility and mis-
trust. Also, reactions to socio-economic inequities and suspicions about the 
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motives of both Mediterranean rims could conceivably result in the resur-
gence of forces of disorder. Thus, of crucial importance will be the chosen 
institutional format to transcend the peculiarities underlying the envisaged 
regional transformation. But institutionalisation of existing rules alone is 
not sufficient to manage an ever complex regional agenda. New rules and 
norms on how to handle change and instability should emerge, given that 
behaviour, not just proclamations, will determine the outcome of the re-
gional process. Nationalistic and religious cleavages are a major feature of 
the region’s social structure. Such fragmentation is responsible for the 
slowing down of democratic consolidation and viable socio-economic re-
form. Beneath such tensions lie the differences in the historical trajectories 
for constructing and sustaining differentiated identities in the Mediterra-
nean. These trajectories reflect different models of socio-political integra-
tion underpinned by different philosophies, ascribing different meanings to 
such general and even essentially contested concepts as democracy and 
modernity. There are good grounds for thinking that preventive diplomacy, 
trust-building, transparency, cultural pluralism, symbiotic association, and 
an open and structured civilisational dialogue are useful tools for revitalis-
ing a cross-fertilisation between heterogeneous units. The search for a new 
system-wide legitimacy thus depends as much on the partners’ capacity to 
resist the forces of polarisation, as it does on the credibility of their com-
mitment to discovering a sense of process (and purpose too) based on hu-
manism, pluriformity and social justice. 
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Stephen Calleya 
Cross-cultural Currents in the Mediter-
ranean – What Prospects?  
At the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference which took place in Barcelona 
in November 1995 the twenty-seven partner countries established three 
principal areas of co-operation: a political and security partnership with the 
aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability; an economic and 
financial partnership with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity; 
and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to pro-
mote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil socie-
ties. 
*1 
The key question to address when it comes to closer cultural co-operation 
across the Mediterranean is whether this is worthwhile or not? In actual 
fact, the majority of those who examine Euro-Mediterranean relations be-
lieve that closer co-operation in this sector is the key to nurturing closer co-
operation in other sectors. Shifting north-south perceptions of one another 
in a positive dominant fashion and fostering closer south-south relations is 
crucial.  
When one focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process one no-
tices the following: cultural co-operation is the most advanced area in this 
sector; social interaction remain the most limited as does the human dimen-
sion. In the cultural sector programmes such as the Heritage programme are 
assisting in raising awareness of cultural riches in the area and helping to 
find institutional support to preserves such treasures. The Euro-Med Audio-
Visual programme is also helping to raise awareness in this area. The Euro-
Mediterranean Youth programme is helping to promote cultural interaction 
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at a grass-roots level by providing educational and cultural exchange ser-
vices.  
One must applaud and support the regional programmes under way in the 
culture, audiovisual and youth fields in the context of a spirit of cultural 
identity, and voice its satisfaction at the recent launching of the Euromed 
Heritage II programme, as well as its support for the implementation, as 
soon as possible, of the Euromed Heritage and Euromed Audiovisual II 
programmes. 
If the Human, Social and Cultural dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership process is to become more effective it is essential that in the 
next few years more of an effort is concentrated on promoting fundamental 
values of mutual respect.  
When it comes to practical suggestions on how to further social and cul-
tural co-operation in new Euro-Med programmes numerous areas should be 
considered. These can include exchanging data and enhancing closer co-
operation between Euro-Mediterranean partners in areas such as refugees, 
illegal human trafficking, judicial co-operation, and xenophobia.  
The Cultural Dimension 
The Mediterranean epitomises many of the problems associated with the 
North-South debate. These include migration, terrorism, religious intoler-
ance and the lack of human rights. Nurturing co-operative cross-cultural 
patterns of interaction which address these issues is a prerequisite to im-
proving economic disparities and ethnic divisions in the area. 
The Mediterranean is the historic cross-roads for diverse ethnic, cultural, 
and religious traditions. How can these be safeguarded and respected while 
at the same time tolerance and understanding are promoted? Can the Barce-
lona Process' proposals for educational exchanges be turned into concrete 
and practical programmes?  
A concerted effort is required to remove misperceptions and prejudice 
which continue to exist across the Mediterranean. This is where interna-
tional cultural activities, such as cultural tourism, may play a strategic role 
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as culture brings about relations based on trust. Tangible proposals that ac-
tually initiate cross-cultural ventures of co-operation and seek to further the 
principles of respect and understanding which are still lacking are long 
overdue.  
Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Training Network 
Five years since the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Proc-
ess it is clear that the time has come to upgrade a dimension of the process 
that remains at an embryonic stage - the human resource training dimen-
sion. History has proved that aid and trade on their own will not succeed in 
transforming a region as diverse as the Euro-Mediterranean area. Like their 
counterparts in Europe, citizens of the Mediterranean also need to be 
versed about the rapidly changing global political economy and trained so 
that they are able to adapt to the competitive system they must operate 
within. It is for this reason that one should consider establishing a Euro-
Mediterranean Training Network (EMTN).  
The EMTN should consist of a pool of European and Mediterranean aca-
demic and professional specialists that are able to articulate clearly devel-
opments taking place in each of the three chapters of the Barcelona process. 
Above all else, the specialists must be capable of applying the information 
the EMP is generating so as to enhance sectoral co-operative development 
in the Mediterranean.  
The flexible group of Euro-Med envoys could be assembled on an ad hoc 
basis and their outreach programme coordinated by the EMTN in order to 
ensure a systematic training programme. This would ensure that the initia-
tive remains cost-effective and is able to offer a service where there is the 
largest demand. Specific subgroups of the network can also offer outreach 
training courses around the Mediterranean whenever there is a specific de-
mand for such training - for example short training courses on location 
could take place for industrialists seeking to adapt to the changing regional 
and global market economy around them.  
Given its positive geo-political credentials and track record in this respect, 
Malta may be the most suitable location where to set up the EMTN. In ad-
dition, this initiative complements the Information and Training Seminar 
  151 
Stephan Calleya 
programme that the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies at the 
University of Malta has already been organising for mid-ranking diplomats 
of the EU and its Mediterranean Partners during the last 5 years. 
In the course of the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
process, the necessity for shaping a culture of dialogue and cooperation 
among the European member states and its Mediterranean Partners has 
continually been emphasised. The first ten Euro-Mediterranean Seminars 
that have been held in Malta between October 1996 and May 2001 have 
provided an up-to-date analysis of the progress registered in each of the 
three chapters of the Euro-Mediterranean process and a briefing on a work-
ing project or programme in a related field.  
An additional feature of the Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training 
Seminars is the Mediterranean Internet Forum, a project that the European 
Commission entrusted the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies 
to design and to operationalise. This project aims at facilitating the flow of 
information between the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries and became 
fully functional at the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in 
Malta. The significance of this exercise was further underlined in Annex I 
of the Euro-Med Malta Declaration of April 1997 where direct reference is 
made to the training sessions as a confidence-building measure. 
*2 
The rapidly growing number of programmes and projects under the aus-
pices of the Barcelona Partnership necessitates regular updates. Apart from 
its intrinsic value, the continuous and consistent dissemination of informa-
tion pertaining to the Partnership process will help to overcome inconsis-
tencies in the process and facilitate informal exchanges of views on a wide 
variety of subjects of common interest.  
The EMTN can act as a unique mechanism if it succeeds in facilitating the 
informal exchange and open dialogue between actual practitioners directly 
involved in the implementation of the EMP. The networking effect that 
such a forum can offer is a feature that can later serve as a foundation upon 
which other forms of co-operation are explored.  
The overall objective of the EMTN will be to assist in upgrading sectoral 
co-operative arrangements that currently take place in the energy, tourism 
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and infrastructural sectors. Such measures are an indispensable part of the 
procedure that will have to be established if the overall goal of creating a 
free trade area is to become a reality. 
Implications of culture in research and policymaking 
The third chapter of the EMP termed "Partnership in Social and Human 
Affairs: Promoting Exchanges between Civil Societies" promotes the idea 
that the countries concerned should work to encourage the participation of 
civil society in the EMP. This is to involve joint efforts in education and 
training, social development, policies designed to reduce migratory pres-
sures, the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism and international crime, 
judicial co-operation, the fight against racism and xenophobia, and a cam-
paign against corruption. 
Further ideas that have been proposed include joint efforts with regard to 
culture and media, health policy, the promotion of exchanges and devel-
opment of contact among young people in the framework of a decentralised 
co-operation programme. Throughout there has been an emphasis on the 
importance of dialogue between cultures, and exchanges at human, scien-
tific and technological level, deemed as an essential factor in bringing peo-
ple closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their 
perception of one another. 
But, whereas the political and security and the economic and financial 
chapters of the EMP have been met with a "fast-track" attitude by different 
parties participating in the Barcelona Process, the social and cultural chap-
ter has been the subject of long debates and discussions as the Arab and 
European views differ sharply on issues such as human rights, immigration, 
terrorism, the right of political asylum and the role of civil society.  
The Barcelona Declaration acknowledges the essential role civil society 
must play in the EMP. The Euro-Med Civil Forum, which took place in 
November 1995, was the first formal consolidation of civil society as a 
partner within the process. It gathered 1,200 experts from very diverse 
fields, representing civil society in countries from the northern, eastern and 
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southern shores of the Mediterranean. The second Euro-Med Civil Forum 
took place in Naples in December 1997. This was followed by similar 
gatherings in Stuttgart in April 1999 and in Marseilles in 2000 when a 
smaller number of non-governmental organisations met to discuss issues 
concerning civil society. Even if one points to the various cultural aspects 
that have been tackled in these meetings and the numerous projects that 
were approved in the field of cultural heritage, progress has been slow and 
difficult. Few tangible results have emanated from the ministerial meetings 
that have taken place. 
*3   
In its dealings with the countries of the eastern Mediterranean, should the 
EU turn a blind eye to regimes whose respect for human rights and democ-
ratic principles are widely criticised? If not, how can Europe's concerns be 
turned into actions that receive widespread popular support in the region? 
What can be done to further strengthen the role of civil society? 
Suggestions that should be considered: 
•  Promote dialogue between the civilisations in the Mediterranean.  
•  Aim at a more objective portrayal of cultural characteristics found in the 
Mediterranean in the European and international media. 
•  Encourage the development of civil society and non-governmental or-
ganisations. This would assist in nurturing a sense of national unity and 
stem the threat of rising ethnic, religious and social conflicts. 
•  Establish a Euro-Mediterranean Institute for Democracy and entrust it 
with the implementation of a democracy building programme similar to 
what has been undertaken in the countries of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. 
*4 
 
It is essential that a more concerted effort be made to supporting civil soci-
ety and to far closer involvement by civil society in all its forms in the ac-
tivities of the Barcelona Process, by means, inter alia, of greater support for 
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the MEDA Democracy programme and also by promoting participation by 
local authorities and institutions in the work of the partnership. 
In future, the States participating in the Barcelona Process and the institu-
tions concerned should draw up information and communication pro-
grammes in order to make all their citizens aware of the activities involved 
in this Process. 
Enhancing co-operative educational exchanges is crucial to a more co-
operative cultural Euro-Mediterranean area. There is an urgent need for the 
implementation of policies for vocational training, universities, technology 
and education, the definition of local and regional development pro-
grammes, the promotion of programmes to further equal opportunities, 
health and safety at work, and promotion of the role of women in economic 
development and support for women's organisations, associations, busi-
nesses and networks in the countries of the region. 
*5 
There is also a need for the adoption of measures to promote the develop-
ment of the information society, the use of the Internet and investment in 
information and schooling so that all opportunities that this mechanism of-
fers can be utilised.  
As the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers reiterated at their fourth min-
isterial in Marseilles in November 2000, one should so far regret that not 
all the possibilities of the culture, social and human chapter of the Barce-
lona Process had been fully exploited, especially as regards social aspects, 
civil society and the human dimension of the Partnership. 
Although bridging the cross-cultural gap in the Euro-Mediterranean area is 
not something that can be done overnight, a number of mechanisms for 
constructive civil society co-operation should be considered. 
*6 These 
include involving civil society in Euro-Mediterranean activities in order to 
give the Partnership a societal base. Civil society can also contribute to the 
institutional development of the EMP. Good examples are the Euro-Med 
Youth programme and the activities taking place in the trade union sector. 
Civil society exchanges have an important function when it comes to 
spreading mutual knowledge of the different countries participating in the 
partnership process.  
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It is clear that civil-society partnership requires the mobility of persons. 
This can only take place if measures are introduced to facilitate travel and 
visa requirements, a development that has yet to be taken. In order to 
muster the political will to overcome those that may be against introducing 
mechanisms that will facilitate the mobility of persons, the EU and non-EU 
partner states should promote the fact that civil-society co-operation is a 
confidence-building measure in itself. The co-operation and excahnges 
between a wide-ranging spectrum of societal actors may assist in increasing 
support for the financial and political commitments that are part and parcel 
of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.    
Guidelines for the future 
The twenty-seven Euro-Mediterranean countries should arrive at a consen-
sus on the need to take greater account of the social effects of economic 
transition in national programmes by placing the emphasis on training, em-
ployment, professional requalification and the reform of education systems. 
A more active programme that seeks to establish a regional programme 
covering training policies, promoting the role of women in economic de-
velopment, the reform of social systems and cooperation on health matters, 
as agreed at the Conference of Health Ministers in Montpellier in Decem-
ber 1999 should also be introduced. 
*7 
While everyone should welcome and support efforts to see conditions 
making it possible to develop the dialogue among cultures and civilisations 
in the Euro-Mediterranean area, such an exercise must be implemented 
gradually and in complete consultation with one another to avoid 
unecessary misunderstandings.  
Since the end of the Cold War the emergence of several new states has 
made international relations truly global for the first time in history. Tech-
nology, has simultaneously made it possible for every country to participate 
in events in every part of the world, including the Mediterranean.  
Unfortunately, the information age explosion has not been accompanied by 
a similar increase in knowledge. Continents and regions such as the Euro-
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Mediterranean area interact, but they do not necessarily understand each 
another. The uniformity of technology is accompanied by an implicit as-
sumption that politics, and even cultures, will become homogenized.  
It is a fundamental error for long-established nations of the West, including 
Europe, to fall for the temptation of ignoring history and judging every de-
veloping and recently independent state by the criteria of their own civilisa-
tions.  
It is often overlooked that the institutions of the West did not emerge over 
night but evolved over centuries which shaped frontiers and defined legiti-
macy, constitutional provisions and basic values.  
It cannot be emphasised enough that history and culture matter. The institu-
tions of the West developed gradually while those of most new states were 
put in place in elaborated form immediately. In the West, a civil society 
evolved side-by-side with the maturation of the modern state. This made 
possible the growth of representative institutions which confined the state’s 
power to those matters which society could not deal with by its own ar-
rangements. 
*8 
Most postcolonial states, such as those along the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean, have no comparable history. Tasks which often emerged 
over centuries in the West, have been attempted in a decade or two under 
much more difficult circumstances.  
While one can debate endlessly the differences and merits between the in-
dividualism of the West and the priority for social cohesion in several de-
veloping countries, it is clear that no one should seek to impose their cul-
tural patterns of interaction on other societies with different histories and 
necessities. Forcing one’s cultural beliefs upon others of a different back-
ground will only increase the possibility of a cultural clash and not nurture 
a co-operative cultural zone of peace which should be the overriding goal 
of all initiatives introduced in this area of international relations.  
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Franck Biancheri 
Democratization and the Internet – Two 
Cultural Trends and their Influence on 
Politics and Governance in the Mediter-
ranean Region  
Barcelone, c'est fini  
The Barcelona process is almost dead. The only objective it is still seri-
ously pursuing is the building of a the Euro-Med Free Trade Area, when in 
the meantime, the European and Mediterranean populations are totally un-
aware of such a project. The rest of the process, built as a mostly European 
strategy aiming at securing the stability of EU borders in this region and 
promoted through a huge bureaucratic machine unable to just implement its 
own programmes and policies, is now lost somewhere in the sea or in the 
sands. It is the inadequacy of the governance principles applied to the 
Trans-Med policy which led to its progressive sinking. 
On the Mediterranean side, the absence of citizen's involvement in the 
process may look relatively normal due to the weakness of such civil socie-
ties and the reluctance of governments to move towards democracy. And in 
the EU, as it is obviously shown by the current democratic crisis faced by 
the EU itself, the fact is that until now citizens and civil society have been 
mostly excluded from any policy-making or implementation process, in-
cluding therefore the Euro-Med process. 
The Euro-Med Civil Forum which has progressively become a completely 
unnoticed road show for development and cooperation NGOs does not 
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even anymore hide this complete lack of democratic support from both 
side. 
Culture matters...and democratization of the Trans-Med 
policy making and implementation is required on both 
side of the Mediterranean sea. 
Culture does matter indeed and it can be considered that the lack of democ-
ratic backing of the Trans-Med process is crucial in its general failure, be-
ing lost in bureaucratic processes and academic debates. In the future, any 
attempt to "revive" or "reshape" a new Trans-Med policy will have to take 
into account the pre-requisite of ensuring that civil society is indeed part of 
the game. Therefore we face on both sides of the Mediterranean sea the 
challenge of democratization. As a never-ending process, democratization 
is indeed required both from the Mediterranean states which seem to be 
more afraid than anything else by their population and civil societies; as it 
is required from the EU which is today, on the whole range of its policies, 
discovering that its own citizens are requiring a more democratic process 
regarding EU policy making ...including therefore the Trans-Med policy. 
Culture matters .... and the coming of Internet is modi-
fying drastically the parameters for any new Trans-Med 
policy 
Internet was nowhere ten years ago. It is already today invading Europe's 
offices, classrooms and houses while in the Mediterranean countries a 
growing number of access points are emerging in universities, companies 
and cyber cafés. Tomorrow, in 3/4 years, large sectors of the Mediterranean 
societies will have an easy access to Internet. This process is already start-
ing to disrupt the usual state to state monopoly of Mediterranean issues; 
while it helps also in bringing into the process the large immigrant popula-
tion living in the EU by offering new and cheap tools to interact with their 
home country and culture. 
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It is already changing governance patterns in the EU itself by allowing new 
democratization progresses and by creating easier trans-border debates and 
cooperation. This trend will affect in the same way the core of all Trans-
Med policies, as much as it will affect the governance processes of each 
country in the region. 
Education matters ... and the two processes combined 
put more than ever the young generations at the fore-
front of tomorrow's Trans-Med policies  
New governance practices, new democratization processes, new techno-
logical tools…this is typically the "field" for the new generations. Mean-
while, both in the EU as in the Mediterranean countries (except from "dy-
nastic accidents"), the generations below 40 have no access to the political 
debates, let not speak of the decision making processes. This may explain 
while the current policy making processes seem to be so much unaware of 
those trends which are going to affect drastically the governance and poli-
tics in this region and therefore the interactions between the EU and its 
Mediterranean neighbours. 
Access to information, both ways, is anyhow the short term priority to pre-
pare the young generations for the next two decades' Trans-Med chal-
lenges: democratizing their societies and the way they interact together, 
contributing actively to global debates and policy-making, developing 
privileged neighboring relations.  
If linked with democratization, Internet may be the missing link which can 
help the Mediterranean sea to become again a place where people (and not 
only states) interact in a common space. If efforts in that sense are not rap-
idly implemented, at least from the EU side (providing tools, platforms, 
websites, ...), then, "Seattle" in 1999 will look like a peaceful summit com-
pared to the Euro-Med Summit of 2010 ...when the Euro-Med Free Trade 
Area is supposed to be launched. 
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Ludger Kühnhardt 
The Mediterranean – New Directions of 
Research and Policy-Making  
Usually, Europe is defined and designed along the geography it constitutes 
and the history it accrued. The political organisation of Europe is related to 
both of it and at the same time not free of contradictions with regard to any 
reasonable meaning of a „European identity“. There are more institutions 
than one, given the existence of the European Union, the Council of 
Europe, the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe, and - last 
but not least - the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which institutional-
ises the United States of America as a European power. Europe is grappling 
with its borders towards the East and the South East. Can Russia belong to 
the core institutions of Europe? Is Turkey a European country? In any case, 
the discussion is following the primacy of territorial thinking. Europe, that 
is Europe’s territory and the ambition to link it both with Europe’s past and 
the future Europe hopes for. 
But Europe, that is also Europe’s lakes, the seas and waters which are an 
integral nevertheless peripheral part of Europe’s shape. The Mediterranean 
Sea and the Black Sea, may be even the Caspian Sea, certainly the Baltic 
Sea and the North Sea do impact on Europe’s self-perception and are re-
lated to many of the challenges ahead of Europe at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. They are no less important than the Atlantic Ocean 
has unquestionably been for the shaping and the destiny of Europe in the 
course of the last five hundred years, culminating in the important role the 
north American democracies have played for Europe during the twentieth 
century.  
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Intuitively, contemporary Europeans tend to perceive the waters which sur-
round and enclose European territories as borders, as limits and dividing 
lines. The opposite coast lines constitute „the other“, far away and often 
strange lands. At least they are likely to divide and to constitute black - and 
wet - holes without meaning and reason. This, however, may very well 
change in the course of the next years. A Europe which is defining its iden-
tity and is shaping its political organisations can no longer overlook the fact 
that its surrounding waters are an integral part of the shaping and making of 
the „new Europe“. The lakes of Europe are part of Europe since they con-
stitute bridges rather than barriers. For better or worse, the opposite coast 
lines are part and parcel of Europe’s future. This seems to be evident in the 
case of the Atlantic Ocean although the transatlantic relations are going 
through a period of deep redefinition since the binding glue of the common 
enmities of the Cold War is no more. The Baltic Sea is rediscovering that it 
is the magnetic force which brings its adjacent nations closer together than 
ever before since centuries. The Black Sea has only begun to discover the 
meaning and potential of the very same fact. The North Sea is still defining 
the global view of countries such as Iceland and Norway, while the Caspian 
Sea is being reinvented as a function of its sea-bed and the surrounding oil 
and gas fields. 
A unique case is - and has ever been - the Mediterranean. For almost three 
thousand years, the world’s largest inland sea has been a theatre of world 
history. The coasts of this arm of the Atlantic Ocean, to which it is con-
nected by the Straits of Gibraltar, divided naturally by the Italian peninsula 
and Sicily into a Western and an Eastern half, have been the stage for ex-
ceptional cultural and political developments. Naturally linked to the Black 
Sea by the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporus, and since 
the nineteenth century by the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean 
islands have harboured sailors from all directions for thousands of years 
and its surrounding cities have always looked towards the water as much as 
towards any of their hinterland. The Mediterranean has been a school for 
sailors and cartographs, a battlefield for adventurers and conquerors, a 
market place and both the anchor and the promoter of religious creeds and 
missionary activities, peaceful and violent alike.  
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The term „Mare mediterraneum“ reflects the claim of late Roman rule over 
all its shores and insinuates the character of a geographically defined com-
munity of values and habits. The discovery of the Atlantic African coasts 
and the New World across the unknown Ocean was the beginning of a re-
definition of the Mediterranean. It was no longer the unchallengeable cen-
ter of gravity of all earth. At the same time it opened the eyes for new links 
with other parts of the globe. More than ever before, the Crimean War 
(1853-1856) linked the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, thus opening the 
Mediterranean towards the enormous land masses of Asia. The opening of 
the Suez Canal (1869) produced an outlet towards the Indian Ocean and 
reinvigorated the trading potential of the Mediterranean which it had lost 
since the discovery of the New World in the Americas. The Mediterranean 
has a size of 2,5 million square kilometers, the maximum length is about 
2.300 miles between Gibraltar and the Syrian coast, the maximum width 
about 1000 miles between Libya and the Adriatic coasts of Slovenia and 
Italy; its deepest point is 5.267 meter. Millions of tourists are flooding its 
beaches every year and if it would only be for this reason: among Europe-
ans from Malta to Hammerfest, today it seems consensus that the Mediter-
ranean is theirs. 
This claim can however no longer be sustained. In 1950, two third of the 
population of the Mediterranean lived on its northern shores. In 2000, the 
opposite had become true. The European Union has defined the Mediterra-
nean as the common market of around 800 million people who are living 
around its basin. This has been the starting point for the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership arrangement which begun in 1995 with a sum-
mit meeting in Barcelona, where the „Barcelona Declaration“ has been 
promulgated by all (then) 15 EU member states, 11 countries of the South-
ern rim of the Mediterranean and the Palestinian Autonomy Authority. 
Libya, the former pariah, has reluctantly begun to join the Euro-
Mediterranean process since then, although it is still grappling with the 
fact, that at the beginning it was not welcomed as a terrorist state while 
now the EU is courting Libya which is vacillating between its European 
interests and its African mission. Nevertheless, the Euro-Mediterranean 
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partnership thus accommodates the EU and all governments of the South-
ern rim of the Mediterranean. This does, however, not imply yet that all are 
following a common perception and vision of the Mediterranean.
1 Al-
though the idea to form a common free trade zone by the year 2010 has 
found support of all partners of the Barcelona process, it remains question-
able whether this alone can already substantiate the modernised version of 
a joint „mare nostrum“, a lake of all the people surrounding it.  
The third question is one of balanced interests. What really does Europe 
want: Free trade or democracy? Co-operation or containment? Dialogue or 
a monopoly of norms? And who can speak for the Southern partners? 
Elite’s of authoritarian regimes or civil societies? Politics or business? Plu-
ralistic cultures or religious leaders? 
There are manifold reasons for this scepticism. The first one is geographi-
cal in nature. The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue - short hand „Barcelona 
Process“ - includes all EU member countries, but only the direct coastal 
countries of the Southern rim, thus leaving open whether such a composi-
tion is not by the very nature of its design Euro-centric while neglecting to 
link it with the strategic peripheries of the Southern side of the Mediterra-
nean, Arab peninsula, Iraq and Iran, but also Mauritania and Western Sa-
hara. The term “Euro-Mediterranean” seems inconsistent. It should rather 
be a “Mediterranean partnership” with links to the peripheral neighbours in 
the “Greater Mediterranean Area”. The second question is of political na-
ture. Does the „Barcelona Declaration“ of 1995, the Magna Charta of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue, truly reflect the combined interests, percep-
tions and potentials of all partners or is it more of a superficial declaratory 
character, neither binding nor free from contradictions, which are inherent 
in the complexity of the very region? Does it take into consideration all dif-
ferent needs and approaches of all the partners or does it push for economic 
integration – an European interest -, while neglecting the social concerns of 
the Southern Mediterranean partners – who have a point by stressing that 
the economic reforms which they are obliged to implement might cause too 
 
1   See Stephen C. Calleya, Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Mediterranean, ZEI 
Discussion Paper C75/2000, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies 2000. 
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much social hardship and thus endanger the political stability Europe is so 
much looking forward to maintain? 
Finally - or firstly - there is the historical argument whether there has ever 
been a common Mediterranean „feeling“, how it was made possible and 
why did former efforts to maintain it fail? Anybody only superficially pe-
rusing historical maps of the Mediterranean can discover the shifting nature 
of its centers of gravity, its uniting forces and dividing lines, and - most 
importantly - the changing determinants which constituted the Mediterra-
nean as a single, rather united region. A former French Foreign Minister, 
Couve de Murville, was blatant: in the 1960s he stated „La Mediterrannée, 
ca n`existe pas“ -The Mediterranean does not exist. 
Did it ever exist? Greek and Phoenician colonisation spread the model of 
trading cities around the Mediterranean. The expeditions of Ionians even 
reached the shores of the Black Sea (Pontos Euxeinos) and Phoenicians 
looked around the Straits of Gibraltar (Tingis, Lixos, Gades).The Greek 
Wars against the Persians helped to define European identity against „the 
other“, the barbarians, without incorporating the whole Mediterranean into 
the purview of this perception. Hellenism, Romanisation, and the begin-
nings of Christianity refer to the dominant role of the Eastern Mediterra-
nean and its hinterland, while the rise of the Roman Empire was colliding 
with the ambitions of Carthage in the Western Mediterranean, escalating in 
two Punic Wars which finally destroyed Carthage. 
The world of the Roman Empire during the peak of its power saw the 
Mediterranean united - and its peripheries spreading beyond Gallia (today’s 
France) into regions which today form part of the European Union or aspire 
to join it - the British Isles (Britannia Inferior, Caledonia), the Alps (Raetia, 
Noricum), Western Germany (Germania Superior), Hungary (Pannonia), 
Western Romania (Dacia Superior) and Bulgaria (Moesia and Thracia). 
The economy of the Roman Empire linked its European parts with the 
Southern shores of the Mediterranean which contributed grain, wood, figs, 
oil, glass, purple and fish to its resources. Christianity started to get rooted 
all across the Mediterranean. Even the split between East and West Rome 
in the late fourth century could not fundamentally undermine the integrity 
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of the Mediterranean, indicating however that the „mare internum“ as it 
was labelled at the time split into two different halves although both were 
still breathing Christian spirit and Roman ambition; Libya was, by the way, 
cut into two, Tripolitania belonging to the West Roman Empire and Libya 
Superior to the East Roman Empire. 
The end of the Western Roman Empire saw a temporary revitalisation of 
the Mediterranean idea under the Byzantine Empire which was spreading 
under Justinianus all the way to Numidia (today’s Tunisia and Algeria) and 
Malaga (Southern Spain) with an outlet in Septum (in today’s Morocco). It 
was the Arab migration and the spread of Islam during the seventh century 
which put an end to the all too romantic idea of the unity of the Mediterra-
nean. The Southern rim became Muslim, Arabs conquered Andalusia and 
even stood in Poitiers, not all too far away from Paris. The unity of the 
Mediterranean was lost in religious division and strife, escalating during 
the Crusades (11-13
th century), which had a lasting impact on sensibilities 
and perceptions on both sides until this day. The fall of Byzantium in 1453 
and the rise of the Ottoman Empire until it reached its biggest size in the 
17
th century was seen in Christian Europe as the ultimate threat to its very 
existence. It left a mark on Christian-Muslim relations until today. Most 
dramatically this has been demonstrated during the Yugoslavian Wars of 
Succession in the 1990s. 
The Ottoman Empire and the Vassals it collected along the Southern rim of 
the Mediterranean never generated the same homogeneity of rule over the 
Mediterranean as it has been the case during the heydays of the Roman 
Empire. In spite of the comprehensive spreading of the Islamic religion to 
the westernmost regions of the Mediterranean - and deep into sub-Saharan 
Africa - religious and political unity did never fully overlap in the world of 
Islam, and Europe was able to put an end to Ottoman expansion in Vienna 
in the 18th century. Given the important role of Turks in the Ottoman Em-
pire and the fact that both the Balkan part and the Anatolian part of the Ot-
toman Empire were located on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, 
from this time onward there was no doubt any more about differences be-
tween the Western and the Eastern part of the Mediterranean. The Mediter-
ranean idea became a myth or went into oblivion.  
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The Europe of the Vienna congress, colonialism and two world wars, the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of new nation states on both sides 
of the Mediterranean, finally the development of the European Union - 
with a parallel development of Communist states in South Eastern Europe - 
and the various efforts to create Arab unity in the light of the presence of 
the Jewish state of Israel - none of these structures or processes was able to 
reinvent the Mediterranean as a unity. Today the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership is lacking participation of the South Eastern European littoral coun-
tries of the Eastern Mediterranean. A Mediterranean idea, if there was ever 
one, never coincided with comprehensive political concepts and structures. 
In the light of such cyclical experiences and constant patterns of diversity, 
it remains indeed doubtful whether the idea of a common market and a free 
trade zone can re-ignite the myth of a Mediterranean spirit in the 21
st cen-
tury. Life after all is more than a market, more than goods and services, in-
vestments and trading rules. Has there ever been a truly Mediterranean idea 
based on partnership between the different peoples, religions and traditions 
on both sides, in all directions of the Mediterranean? Travel books account 
for it in the name of tourism and education which remains however a 
pleasure predominantly confined to the Northern inhabitants of the Medi-
terranean. The magisterial study of French historian Fernand Braudel „La 
Méditerranee et le monde méditerranéen à l`époque de Philippe II“(1949) 
is a masterpiece indeed, never copied for any other period in time, but even 
in all its substance and distinguished differentiation yet somewhat focus-
sing on the Mediterranean through European eyes.
2 Braudel is not to blame 
for this, since anybody, no matter how cosmopolitan, remains somewhat 
myopic if it comes to the analysis of owns own neighbours, let alone adver-
saries. 
In this light, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership launched in Barcelona in 
1995 is certainly an ambitious idea. It has basically been driven by the in-
terests of the European Union and can be seen as continuity with a Euro-
pean Mediterranean policy since the creation of the European Economic 
Community in 1957. The first phase, lasting from 1957 until 1972, was 
 
2   Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranee et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II, 2 Volumes, 
Paris: Armand Colin 1949 
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based on bilateral trade agreements with partial association elements or 
preferred trade products. The second phase, from 1972 until 1990, was de-
fined by the political and geopolitical parameters of the Mediterranean. The 
Middle East conflict challenged the EEC to develop a stronger political 
posture in the region while the Euro-Arab Dialogue was an offspring of the 
overall North-South policy of the time. It was the end of the Cold War 
which allowed the European Union to reassess its policies vis-à-vis the 
Mediterranean. This led to the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 
and the promulgation of the Barcelona Declaration.
3  
Analogue to the approach of the “Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe”, the Barcelona Declaration identified three fields of co-
operation among the Mediterranean partners: Political stability and secu-
rity, economic co-operation, and co-operation in cultural, humanitarian and 
social matters. The process which begun in Barcelona was intended to give 
a new dimension to the Mediterranean future, „based on comprehensive co-
operation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links 
forged by neighbourhood and history“.
4 The political declaration was fol-
lowed by a substantial working programme which the Euro-Mediterranean 
partners promised to implement in the years to come. 
Certain positive effects of the Barcelona process cannot be denied. Con-
tinuous diplomatic, political and economic dialogues have been estab-
lished. New fields of co-operation have been discovered in social and cul-
tural matters. Nevertheless, scepticism has been voiced whether the 
multilateral and trans-regional approach of the Barcelona process can truly 
serve its own purpose. In the light of the many historically rooted diversi-
ties in the region - with various Eastern and Western sub-regions - it seems 
appropriate to reconsider sub-regional orientations to make the whole set of 
ideas defined in the Barcelona Declaration work. Given that the ongoing 
Middle East conflict permanently impacts on the Barcelona vision and 
tends to hold hostage other aspects of the Mediterranean co-operation 
 
3   See Carlo Masala, Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft. Geschichte - Struktur - Prozeß, ZEI Discus-
sion Paper C 68/2000, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies 2000 
4   The European Commission (Ed.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Barcelona Declaration 
adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27./28.11.1995, at: 
http: europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/bd.htm. 
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scheme, „a special and enhanced framework of partnership with the Ma-
greb“ has been suggested, to name but one specific initiative.
5 The EU has 
begun to recognise the potential of such a Western Mediterranean core by 
opening up the Barcelona process to Mauritania, the westernmost country 
with strong Arab influence. 
Mediterranean policies remain somewhat obliged to try the squaring of the 
circle. This is due to two contradictory and mutually reinforcing facts: On 
the one hand, for geo-strategic and geo-economic reasons the Mediterra-
nean is a unity. As a strategic zone in the back of the Atlantic and in the 
weak South of Europe, the Mediterranean has to be stable in order to com-
ply with the interests both of the United States and of the European Union. 
As a geo-economic reality, the Mediterranean as one comprehensive mar-
ket is of interest both for trade and investment purposes as much as its rele-
vance as source of energy resources and other goods of interests remains 
confined to the specific local sources; not all Mediterranean countries con-
tribute the same resources or offer the same market potential. 
Politically, the Mediterranean is as diverse as it is culturally pluralistic. A 
monolithic equation „democracies in the North, authoritarian regimes in the 
South“ is too simplistic , while the dividing line between Islam and Christi-
anity is much more complex as that of a simple North-South-issue: Around 
18 million citizens in the European Union are Muslim and originate from 
the Southern rim, Turkey including, while there are Christian communities 
all over the Southern rim, in the Levante in particular, and Jews outside of 
Israel in the Muslim world, particularly in Turkey and Morocco. This cul-
tural and ethnic diversity rather supports the idea of a comprehensive Medi-
terranean policy, while at the same time the complexity of this diversity 
makes it extremely difficult to consistently be implemented. 
From a European point of view, the most important problem is not one of 
squaring the circle in terms of bringing multilevel policy approaches into a 
more or less consistent line. Europe’s experiences with the „three basket 
approach“ of the “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe” has 
 
5   Roberto Aliboni, New Directions in European-North African Relations, in: The Bologna Center 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol.4/Spring 2001, p. 63 
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demonstrated the ability of the West to play with various balls while con-
tinuously pursuing the same policy goals. The problem is not one of in-
struments but one of strategy. The European Union has never clearly made 
up its mind what the Barcelona Process truly stands for. Different actors 
have different thoughts and the dividing lines are not necessarily based on 
geographic proximity or national interests. 
For some, a Mediterranean policy serves to stabilise Europe’s security on 
its Southern flank. With the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean South, 
- along with the crisis bow stretching from Turkey across Iraq and Iran into 
Central Asia, - has been identified as the next security challenge to Europe. 
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration movements, unco-
operative regimes, radical political Islam and historical neurosis might 
form the potential of new and lasting threats to Europe and its desire for 
peace, stability and prosperity. Is Hannibal truly „ante portas“?
6 
Others define the Mediterranean as a development problem. Both legal and 
clandestine migration are certainly a consequence of social and economic 
problems in the Southern Mediterranean, a shortage of employment and 
limited perspectives for an improved standard of living. The underdevel-
oped infrastructure in the Southern Mediterranean countries impedes upon 
a speedy regional development. Environmental disasters could effect the 
northern Mediterranean countries as much as they do impose their dirty 
consequences on Europe’s poor southern neighbours. Obstacles to integrate 
into the world economy as competitive partners - only oil rich countries 
such as Algeria or Libya can offer enough of the desired resources in order 
to build up a bargaining power - and a limited participation in the fruits of 
„globalisation“ - i.e. in access to information technologies - define some of 
the disadvantages of the region in order to boom and as such to become 
more attractive for European investment and trade. But can a development 
oriented relationship between the EU and the set of Southern Mediterra-
 
6   See Andreas Jacobs/Carlo Masala, Hannibal ante portas? Analysen zur Sicherheit an der Südflanke 
Europas, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2000; see also Roberto Aliboni/Abdel Monem Said Aly/Alvaro de 
Vasconcelos, Joint Report on the EuroMesSCO Working Group on Political and Security Coopera-
tion, (Lisbon) 1997 
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nean countries ever be more than an asymmetric dependency rather than a 
symmetric partnership?
7 
Again others see the Mediterranean as ancient cradle of civilisations and a 
modern test case for humanitarian dialogue among cultures. From the point 
of view of theology and religious sciences, literature and history, as many 
points of contact and co-operation can be identified as there are differences 
and opposing, even adversary aspects of Euro-Arab or Christian-Islamic 
relations. Is the Mediterranean not determined to serve its role as promoter 
of co-operation and tolerance among the religions of the book - Christian-
ity, Judaism, and Islam - and the cultures and civilisations which developed 
on both sides of its shores ?
8 On this account there is an enormous, yet un-
tapped potential for co-operation in a spirit of fair partnership. In the past, 
European humanities including Christianity, Latin and Greek classics were 
clearly separated from Oriental Studies, including Arab, Ottoman (Turkish) 
and Persian classics. It would indeed be a fascinating endeavour to com-
bine both approaches and to transform them into joint parameters of “Medi-
terranean Humanities”. Jordan’s Prince El Hassan bin Talal, President of 
the Club of Rome, was the first personality of public standing to suggest 
such a plan
9 
Finally the geo-strategists, which are looking at the Mediterranean with a 
bird eyes view, having in mind the geopolitical shifts which started to un-
fold since the end of the Cold War. In the light of necessary energy sup-
plies to the Western world - which might well be advised to be diversified 
between Persian Gulf resources and new potentials in the Caspian Sea re-
gion - stability and co-operative patterns of behaviour are the most impor-
tant element required from the Mediterranean. Such a view, rather devel-
oped in the US than in the EU, although effecting the future of the EU as 
much as that of the US, views the Mediterranean as a zone of intensive 
 
7   See  Jürgen Wiemann, Die Mittelmeerpolitik, in: Franz Nuscheler/Otto Schmuck(Ed.), Die Süd-
Politik der EG. Europas entwicklungspolitische Verantwortung in der veränderten Weltordnung, 
Bonn: Europa Union 1992; Felix Maier (Ed.), Managing asymmetric interdependencies within the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – A German Perspective, ZEI Discussion Paper C99/2002, Bonn: 
Center for European Integration Studies 2002 
8   See Carlo Masala(Ed.), Der Mittelmeerraum - Brücke oder Grenze?, Baden-Baden: Nomos Publis-
hing House (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung,Vol.48) 2002 
9   Private correspondence with the author, July 21, 2001 
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strategic concern and interest for the West.
10 There is always a short-cut 
from the overall geopolitical perception to a specific view on the role of the 
Middle East conflict on the Mediterranean partnership. 
The related problems are evident. The South Mediterranean countries want 
to see a higher political profile of the EU in the Middle East peace process, 
Israel is rather interested in the economic potential of Europe and scared 
that Europe could politically become too lenient to the Arab arguments, the 
US is inclined to think along similar lines while not leaving any possibility 
of good economic relations with Arab countries, Libya including, aside, 
while the EU tries to be fair and objective in its political assessment, low-
profiled in its political posture and not always realising that by doing so, it 
does not necessarily serve its economic ambitions in the region while re-
straining its political posture unnecessarily. 
The European Union is inclined to start its Middle East strategy with an 
analysis of the need to organise soft security in this troubled region (confi-
dence building measures, economic and social co-operation etc.) which is 
neither wrong in itself nor unappreciated by all actors involved. Such an 
approach does however not eliminate the fact that top priority has to be the 
creation of a sustainable break-through in the field of hard security, includ-
ing a solution to the most troublesome question of the future of Jerusalem, 
the most holy city for Christians, Jews and Muslims alike. The EU has ac-
crued trust and confidence among all actors in the seemingly endless Mid-
dle East conflict. It has to capitalise on this by broadening its own com-
mitment to peace and stability by looking beyond the huge agenda of soft-
security. A lasting peace in the Middle East seems imaginable only if also 
the EU would participate in its securing elements; this must finally lead to 
EU participation in some sort of peace keeping operations in the Middle 
East. 
Depending on the point of departure, the road map of analysis and assess-
 
10   See F. Stephen Larrabee/Carla Thorson, Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges, Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation 1996; F.Stephen Larrabee/Jerrold Green/Ian O.Lesser/Michele Zanini, 
NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 
1997; Annette Jünemann, Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und globalen Wandel: Interessen 
und Zielkonflikte, in: Wulfdieter Zippel(Ed.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Publishing House 1999, pp. 29 ff. 
  174 
The Mediterranean – New Directions of Research and Policy 
ment can be extremely different. The point of arrival certainly is. The 
European Union is therefore constantly challenged to maintain its multi-
level and highly diversified approach for the Euro-Mediterranean partner-
ship, while it can neither be sure of the consistency of interests of its 
Southern partners nor of the interests within the European Union. Not the 
least relevant of them is the question of the role of the United States in the 
Mediterranean. Strategic commonalties such as those important for resolv-
ing problems of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting 
against terrorism, stability in energy supply and other natural resources 
might clash with specific interests such as the European inclination of an 
inclusive policy towards Libya, the balanced position of the European Un-
ion in the Middle East conflict and a differentiated approach to the role of 
Islam in politics and modern society. 
A comprehensive security partnership between the EU, its Mediterranean 
partners and the US is also dependent upon the resolution of contradictions 
and shortcomings in the European approach to the region. No trans-
regional approach can overcome the primordial importance of the Middle 
East conflict which is impacting on all dimensions of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership and holds it potentially hostage. No trans-
regional approach should undermine or neglect the special role France is 
playing in the Western Mediterranean as a consequence of its long standing 
proximity to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. And no trans-regional ap-
proach can overlook conflicts of interests between the EU’s Mediterranean 
strategy and the ambition of integrating the Balkan region into the Euro-
pean structures . The latter has become a top priority of EU policy making 
since the end of the Kosovo War. Although South Eastern Europe does be-
long to the Mediterranean, the challenge of integrating the Balkans is more 
of an EU homework („Europeanising the Balkan“) and thus until now not 
properly linked to an overall design for the Mediterranean. One could even 
argue that the EU has to „Europeanise Europe“ by transforming and inte-
grating South Eastern Europe first before it can truly look out for a Medi-
terranean partnership. Conflicts of aims thus remain inevitable. In terms of 
political and material resources, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
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is definitely and regrettably limiting a more pro-active policy of the EU in 
the Maghreb region, which requires stabilisation on all accounts.  
The effect of the financial support of the Middle East Peace process 
through the European Union remains dependent upon progress on the very 
issue of peace making which does - at least so far - not involve the Euro-
pean Union as a key player. Given that the United States is the only actor 
involved in the whole Mediterranean, any comprehensive partnership in the 
Mediterranean will have to be based on strategic consistency and comple-
mentarity in Euro-American approaches to the Mediterranean. The US 
have become and will remain a Mediterranean power. They will ever more 
remain present in the region at the beginning of the 21
st century since they 
presented themselves for the first time in 1804 by bombarding Libya (for 
the first time) in retaliation for attacks of Tripolitanian pirates. The Medi-
terranean, in turn, still is a bay of the Atlantic Ocean as the implications of 
the courageous explorations of the 15
th century have already indicated for 
the first time in modern history. 
Europe’s perception of the Mediterranean and its activities in the Mediter-
ranean cannot be freed from these constant factors. The Euro-
Mediterranean partnership remains based on an integral, comprehensive 
approach which is intended to support peace, stability and prosperity as 
much as good governance, democracy and cultural dialogue. Such a com-
plex approach opens ways for compromises, ad-hoc package-deals, diversi-
fied policy instruments and a certain division of labour among the EU part-
ners under the broad umbrella of a comprehensive general plan. On the 
other hand, it is endangered to become hostage of blockade policies by one 
or the other partner of the process, who tries to pursue specific interests at 
the expense of the whole process. At the end, there will be no alternative to 
the Euro-Mediterranean equivalent of a “geometrie variable”: A rather di-
versified and differentiated policy for regions and issues, depending on 
variable interests, instruments and goals of the European Union and its 
southern partners. And surely a policy which reckons with the American 
role and interest in the Mediterranean. How far such a complex and com-
plicated strategy can be handled by the evolving Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy of the European Union is another question. It requires a strong 
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hand and a clear comprehensive vision, while allowing the highest neces-
sary amount of diversity and adaptation to circumstances and developments 
without loosing sight of the overall idea of Mediterranean partnership. In 
other words: So far, the European Union has not resolved the agenda of its 
relationship with the neighbouring South, but has rather defined a tall and 
ambitious frame for it. The academic reflection on the Mediterranean has 
all reason to echo this in the years ahead. This alone would be a useful and 
welcome contribution to the creation of a vital role for the Mediterranean 
Lake in the shaping of the new Europe. 
The success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership remains to be seen. But 
one consequence is already evident. The Mediterranean is no longer and 
solely a lake of concern for the direct inhabitants of its shores. No matter 
how different the emotional and rational proximity of European Union citi-
zens in Malaga or Tartu, Thessalonica or Edinburgh might well be: Belong-
ing to the very same European Union, they are irreversibly involved into 
the same policy approaches and will be living under the same consequences 
of it. There is no longer such a thing as a particular Southern European in-
terest into the Mediterranean. The concrete effects of the Mediterranean 
will certainly continue to have a stronger relevance for the citizens of 
Spain, Italy or Greece. But by the nature of the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership, also Denmark, Ireland and Sweden have become Mediterranean 
countries. This is not free from inconsistencies and also therefore not al-
ways understood, let alone appreciated among all Southern Mediterranean 
partners. But it has become a fact they have to live with. A case in point are 
the implications of Malta’s accession to the European Union. They will 
have implications for the emigration regime of Malta, which will have to 
accept the acquis communautaire of the “Schengen Accord”. Libya, for in-
stance, can no longer maintain its special relationship and privileges with 
Malta; visas will become inevitable for Libyans visiting Malta. This gives 
Malta a hard time to explain and Libya some confusion to understand since 
at the same time it receives signals from Brussels to gradually and substan-
tially opening up to the EU. But so it is, underlining that the EU as a whole 
has embarked on the project of partnership in the Mediterranean. 
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In that sense, the Mediterranean has developed into a European lake, no 
matter what the intensity of its presence and impact for all EU citizens - 
and let alone no matter what the agenda for dialogue and partnership 
among the northern and the southern rim countries - might be. But the 
Mediterranean is also part of the bigger Atlantic Ocean, its scope and stra-
tegic implication. In that sense, there can hardly be an autonomous 
„Mediterraneism“ without recognising the broader circumstances and de-
pendencies which remain vital for the Mediterranean in the 21
st century. 
One of the broader dimensions clearly relates to Africa. This continent has 
clearly been neglected by Europe over the last decades – and mismanaged 
by many of its own regimes. New efforts to bring Africa back to the atten-
tion of Europe have to be organised around strategies of hopes. Libya, the 
most difficult of all partners in the Barcelona process, has clearly right by 
stating the need for a greater interest of Europe – and the whole world in 
Africa. A substantial partnership between the European Union and the de-
veloping African Union, founded with strong Libyan encouragement in 
2001, is not an easy task. The Mediterranean partnership could certainly 
play an instrumental role in such noble effort. It would need to broaden the 
horizon of all partners of the Barcelona process beyond the very goals and 
instruments of the Mediterranean partnership as such. By looking beyond 
itself towards a new beginning with Africa, the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership could serve its true and timely historic purpose. This would not 
relatives the Mediterranean partnership, but would rather put into a per-
spective of broader meaning. The Euro-Mediterranean process would not 
be left fertile and useless in such a context but could rather become a nec-
essary but transient vehicle to serve more than itself. No matter how long 
such a development might take: A new beginning by a successful adapta-
tion and consistent development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
would truly position Europe as a world partner, which is looking beyond its 
geographic peripheries and the historical intricacies stemming from this 
into the sphere of global visions and responsibilities. In fact, it could one 
day be the ultimate justification of the Mediterranean partnership.  
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